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Abstract
This research broadens the prime concern of nuclear power plant operations from safe
performance to both economic and safe performance through monitoring and advice.
First, rotating machines such as turbine generators and reactor coolant pumps are
identified as main contributors for the lost availability through the review of pressurized
water reactor (PWR) forced outage records. The integrated architecture utilizes
comprehensive sensor networks incorporating modern signal processing systems,
advisory systems for sensor validation, and advisory systems for the intelligent diagnosis
and maintenance (D&M).
For the development of comprehensive sensor networks for complex target systems, an
integrated method incorporating a structural system hierarchy and a functional system
hierarchy, a fault-symptom matrix, sensor selection criteria, a sensor installation
feasibility study, and advanced instrumentation techniques is formulated. Such advanced
instrumentation techniques reflect the state of the art in advancement of data acquisition,
data processing, and data integration techniques. Once the sensor types and locations are
selected definitively, they are incorporated into drawings using a computer aided design
tool (e.g. AutoCAD) program in order to make sure that it would be possible to install the
comprehensive set of recommended sensors on each specific component studied.
The second major part of this study is the development of an intelligent D&M advisory
system integrating a comprehensive sensor network. This advisory system employs a
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) as a high level reasoning tool for incorporating inherent
uncertainty for use in probabilistic inference. It is demonstrated that a rule-based
knowledge representation is simply a special case of a general BBN by showing how the
general BBN can be reduced to a rule-based representation. The presented major steps for
constructing the BBN based generic inference algorithms are applied to systematic
elicitation and synthesis of various levels of experts' knowledge. Prototype D&M
algorithms are represented explicitly through topological symbols and links between
them in a causal direction.
This D&M advisory system is set up with an easy-to-learn, user-friendly, man-machine
interface and modern graphics for efficient operator interactions. As new pieces of
evidence from sensor networks developed are entered into this system, it provides
operational advice concerning both availability and safety so that the operator is able to
determine the likely failure modes, diagnose the system state, locate root causes, and take
the most advantageous action. Thereby, the comprehensive monitoring supported advice
improves operational availability.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As increased productivity is necessary to remain competitive in all areas of
machinery process operation, attaining a high level of power plant operational availability
is one of the most importance issues facing the nuclear power industry. The nuclear
power industry must be willing to expand the goal of each plant from safe performance to
both safe and economic performance. This is due to the fact that forced outages or power
reduction constitute significant financial losses and possible degradation of power system
reliability to unacceptable levels. For example, the financial loss caused by one day of
forced outage amounts to about $ 0.7 million for a 1300 MW nuclear power plant. In
addition, the degradation of system integrity due to forced outages may increase even
further financial losses.
Consequently, it is of vital importance to reduce the probability of forced outages
and improve the maintenance schedule and procedure. There is a strong interest in the
implementation of modern condition monitoring and intelligent maintenance. The
capability to provide early detection and diagnosis of component deterioration is an
essential part of any effective maintenance program.
Therefore, the work reported here is concerned with use of on-line monitoring and
advice to improve nuclear power plant operational availability. It is focused upon new
pressurized water reactors (PWRs), such as is envisioned for the Korean Next Generation
Reactor (KNGR).
1.2 Objectives
The work reported here examines operational availability improvements through
monitoring and advice. The key objectives are categorized in this section. They are
aimed at constituting the entire form of a comprehensive sensor network integrated
advisory system at the design stage in a systematic way. It is in this context that we
examine the techniques now available and movement of the state of the art toward on-line
intelligent condition based monitoring, diagnosis, and maintenance.
1.2.1 Method Formulation for Developing Sensor Networks
The rapid advancement of powerful monitoring devices and computers permits us
to configure an advanced on-line sensor network as a foundation for efficient plant
monitoring and diagnosis. This technical trend and increasing competition motivates an
interest in plant operations for both increased safety and operational availability.
In designing a monitoring system a study should reveal which components make
dominant contributions to lost operational availability of the PWRs. Those components
with high failure rates and those failures causing long duration outages are the prime
culprits for causing the plant's unavailability. When designing equipment, it is desirable
to consider condition monitoring in conjunction with failure mode studies. Thus, for any
important component each failure mode should be identified and a number of possible
methods for detecting the onset of failure should be considered. However, most of the
equipment in a nuclear power plant have very complex functions and interrelationships
with other subordinate components. As the complexity and interrelationship of
subordinate components increases, it becomes more difficult to employ a proper set of
sensors and advanced data processing techniques in a systematic way. To that point,
there has been no well-established systematic method in common use for developing
comprehensive sensor networks considering all steps of modem data processing
techniques for complex systems. That situation motivates the work reported here to
develop a systematic approach for analyzing failure modes and determining associated
sensor sets incorporating modern data processing equipment.
1.2.2 Comprehensive Sensor Network Development at the Design Stage
These days, special instrumentation and powerful computer supported
maintenance systems are finding their ways into nuclear power plants. The cumulative
effect of using a monitoring and diagnostic system is expected to be a significantly
improved operational availability of the power plant in addition to detailed understanding
of system conditions by the plant operation staff. Thus, an integrated architecture for
systematically performing on-line condition monitoring and intelligent diagnostic
maintenance should be configured.
As prerequisite work, we should perform a state of the art review on modern
sensor processing technologies used in other industries such as aerospace, chemical
process and automated manufacturing for evaluating the feasibility that may also be
imbedded useful for the nuclear power industry. Moreover, special instrumentation and
powerful computer supported maintenance systems are finding their ways into nuclear
power plants. Currently, there are many newly developed proprietary devices on the
market that may be used for advanced condition monitoring. Most of these devices are
usually applied after a plant component has been installed. It very difficult and expensive
to add instrumentation to a plant once it has been built. Rarely is equipment supplied
which has been designed with the presence of condition monitoring devices as a basic
design consideration. A designer has incentives to install an abundant sensor network
into the initially constructed plant. Thus, this study places a great emphasis upon the
value of inclusion of modern condition monitoring into the requirement of design
equipment, and it expands a concern for the development of intelligent systems in order
to integrate process and control with condition-based maintenance (CBM). A modern
condition monitoring can ensure that all actions and decisions are made based upon
substantial and corroborated diagnostic information, thereby eventually leading to
financial gains.
1.2.3 Sensor Network Supported Advisory System Development
Even though a comprehensive monitoring system is configured through this
study, effective maintenance and troubleshooting of complex mechanical equipment is
still a formidable task. Considerable diagnostic information available from this
monitoring system is not always correlated or otherwise analyzed and presented in a form
which can be well suited for aiding the operator's judgement. Technical staff should
interpret a large amount of available information, such as data from sensors or data
processing equipment, promptly and efficiently. In practice, it is very difficult to establish
cause and effect relationships because of the non-linear nature of complex mechanical
systems. In this situation, operators must use subjective judgement, based upon their
experience and training, in prioritizing alarms and analyzing diagnostic conditions.
Expert systems (ES) are known to be computer-based systems employing human
knowledge to solve problems that are thought to require human expertise. Applications
of expert systems in many fields of study have grown very rapidly during the last decade
or so. Automating some of the decision making tasks to be performed on a regular basis,
thereby relieving the operator to do more demanding tasks can reduce the burden of the
operator. A knowledge-based advisory system incorporated into a modern condition
monitoring system is recommended for capturing the decision logic of diagnosis and
maintenance. This advisory system transforms information from comprehensive sensor
networks into the operational advice that is useful to safe and economic operation.
However, most of the knowledge-based systems employed in the area of
diagnosis have used a shallow knowledge of the system, which link an observed
phenomenon to an individual system fault itself. In the nuclear power industry existing
monitoring systems have been designed mainly from the safety standpoint. In the
diagnostic advisory system their corresponding safety related operational procedures are
usually represented by a set of production rules that express deterministic problem
solving domains or straightforward stochastic problem solving domains supplemented
with an uncertainty factor. This is usually done with shallow understanding or heuristics
of the causal evolution of system faults.
In most practical applications, however, uncertainty is inherent factor to be
considered, not an exception. There are various sources of uncertainty. The observations
may be uncertain, the information may be incomplete, and the relations in the domain
may be of a non-deterministic type. Thus, there is a need for expert systems that deal
with uncertain situations. Moreover, in a complex, sophisticated problem solving domain,
the use of deterministic rules often forces the domain expertise descriptions into an
inappropriate representation because they are characterized by a large collection of rules
based upon empirical associations. Trouble shooting in a rule-based system typically
involves simple retrievals of stored candidate lists indexed by failure symptoms. The
availability-driven diagnosis involves an inherently increasing uncertain due to greater
system complexity than is associated with safety-related monitoring.
Although this can result in fast efficient diagnoses for deterministic fault
identification, it is not suitable for representing structural and functional domain
knowledge in a complex system, which represents the interconnection and the behavior
among subordinate components in a complex system. A complex mechanical system
mechanism involves complicated cause-effect interactions between many subordinate
components. Skilled management is required in order to achieve efficient performance.
This requires considerable experience and a sound understanding of the cause-effect
relationships governing the complex processes of interest. Finally, this broadened
concern motivates the work reported here to employ high level reasoning tools for
incorporating inherent uncertainty for analysis of complex problems.
1.3 Overview
The work reported here broadens the prime concern of nuclear power plant
operations from safe performance to both economic and safe performance. We examine
improvements in terms of the instrumentation and control area. The framework of an
integrated architecture for performing modern on-line condition monitoring and
intelligent maintenance for operational availability improvement is configured in this
work. This integrated architecture is composed of comprehensive sensor networks
incorporating modern signal processing systems, advisory systems for sensor validation,
and advisory systems for intelligent diagnosis and maintenance. Because the degree of
validity of sensor readings proves to be a major factor in determining the accuracy of
information which will be provided for diagnosis and maintenance advice, this advisory
system is required to perform sensor validation and data file configuration for every
diagnostic advisory system input. In an advisory system for intelligent diagnosis and
maintenance, the information from the sensor validation advisory system is correlated,
analyzed, and presented in a form that can be well suited for aiding the operator's
decisions. We conclude that many of these efforts, use of a condition monitoring system,
intelligent sensor validation advisory system, and intelligent diagnosis and maintenance
advisory system are directed at perfecting on-line capabilities for improved availability
and efficiency of the power plant.
The work reported here includes two major parts for plant availability
improvement: 1) A modern on-line condition monitoring system is developed for early
fault detection in complex machines. 2) Assuming that there are valid sensor readings
available through sensor validation advisory systems, an advisory system for intelligent
diagnosis and maintenance is developed.
First, it is shown which components have had dominant influences upon major
lost availability in the recent operation of PWRs in United States. Complex rotating
machines such as turbine generators and reactor coolant pumps are identified as main
contributors for the lost availability through the review of plant forced outage records.
They are known to be very complex systems composed of various mechanical and
electrical components. Insufficient understanding of system characteristics, for example,
due to its complexities, usually renders development of an efficient monitoring condition
more difficult. Demands for improving availability facilitated by instrumentation and
control (I&C) make the development of a sensor network subject to a requirement for
profound understanding of system features and functionality. The sensor network
development in the complex system should be based upon sufficient understanding of
essential system attributes such as structure, function, and interrelationships. However, a
conventional analytical method called Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for
sensor network development has proven to be inadequate as system complexities,
interrelationship of subordinate components and the number of the utilized sensor sets
grow.
For the development of the comprehensive sensor networks for complex target
systems, an integrated method incorporating a structural system hierarchy and a
functional system hierarchy, a fault-symptom matrix, sensor selection criteria, a sensor
installation feasibility study, and advanced instrumentation techniques is formulated. The
design method suggested here also describes the rationale for the allocation of sensors for
a particular monitored component. The nature of this abstraction is dictated by the needs
for determination of the needed sensor types. It emphasizes an approach using structural
and functional system abstraction for developing sensor networks that are capable of
reflecting the aspects of the system's performance and structure. Such advanced
instrumentation reflects the state of the art in advancement of data acquisition, data
processing, and data integration techniques incorporated in order to extend the systematic
monitoring coverage. The application of this method to reactor coolant pumps and
turbine generators has been judged to be systematic and appropriate as the result of
discussions with system experts. Once the sensor types and locations have been selected
definitively, they are incorporated into drawings using a computer aided design (e.g.
AutoCAD) program to make sure that it would be possible to install the comprehensive
set of recommended sensors on each specific component studied.
The second major part of the work reported here is the development of intelligent
D&M advisory system. Its intent is not to replace the plant operators, but rather, to assist
the operator during plant operations in order to improve operational availability. Proper
maintenance and troubleshooting of complex mechanical equipment is performed by an
intelligent diagnosis and maintenance advisory system, which is supported by the
comprehensive network developed in this work. This is done assuming that a sensor
validation advisory system configures validated data files for use in the D&M advisory
system, which employs a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) as a high level reasoning tool
for incorporating inherent uncertainty for use in probabilistic inference. The BBN is a
relatively new discipline in the area of knowledge based system application. Bayes'
Theorem, Bayesian updating and influence diagrams for decision-makings provide
theoretically sound foundations. It has proven successful in complex decision making
problems with uncertainty by graphically representing the diagnostic problem domain
through simple topological symbols and links between them (PEAR 88).
We demonstrated that a rule-based knowledge representation is a part of and a
special case of the general BBN by showing how the general BBN is reduced to be a
rule-based representation. The work reported here shows that the BBN-based system is
superior to the rule-based system in its ability for complexity and uncertainty
management, systematic decision-making, and model modification and refinement.
Thus, the work reported here explores an application of Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs) using the HUGIN (HUGI 94) expert system shell for modeling the uncertainty
within the content of intelligent diagnosis and maintenance of complex mechanical
systems. It has excellent features in the structure for system use, which facilitate operator
interactions with an easy-to-learn user-friendly, man-machine interface and modern
graphics.
The work reported here presents the process by which the BBN based generic
inference algorithm is created. The presented major steps for constructing BBN based
generic inference algorithms are applied to systematic elicitation and synthesis of various
levels of experts' knowledge. The major steps suggested in the work reported here are a
structural system hierarchy and a functional system hierarchy, refined causal networks,
Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) with inference engine, and Bayesian influence
diagrams (BIDs) with inference engine. These four levels of model construction are
supported by required expertise, which is composed of expert model review, expert's
conditional probability table, library of corrective actions, and library of utility value.
The prototype D&M network for example target systems is formulated explicitly
through topological symbols and links between them in a causal direction. The output of
the influence diagram is a diagnostic mapping from the symptoms or sensor readings to a
determination of likely failure modes, directed by information flow. As new pieces of
evidence from sensor networks developed are entered into this system, it provides
operational advice concerning both availability and safety so that the operator is able to
determine the likely failure modes, diagnose the system state, locate root causes, and take
the most advantageous action. Thereby, the comprehensive monitoring well-grounded
advice improves operational availability.
For a successive adjustment a diagnostic algorithm should be subject to a series of
test cases and its prediction compared with the expected outcomes and the expert should
check how the available knowledge may be applied to solving real diagnostic examples.
Finally, the testing and validation strategy suggested in this research is aimed at ensuring
that newly acquired knowledge and further refinement result in a more sophisticated
model.
1.4 Organization
There are eleven remaining chapters in this dissertation. They sequentially
address the target system selection, an integrated method for sensor network
development, sensor network implementation, and D&M advisory system development.
These main objects constitute the integrated structure for a sensor network integrated
advisory system for improved operational availability.
Chapter 2 reviews a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) database (INEL 96)
in order to reveal which components make great contributions for the lost availability of
PWR power plants in the United States. For this evaluation, the relationships among
availability, reliability, and maintainability are stated. These are concepts, closely related
to each other, in terms of machine performance. The characteristics of target systems
selected are described.
Chapter 3 presents an integrated method for sensor network development
including advanced instrumentation techniques and compares it with conventional
methods. The overall procedure of the method presented in this chapter illustrates how
several steps composed of a structural system hierarchy and a functional system
hierarchy, fault-symptom matrix, sensor selection criteria, installation feasibility study
and advanced instrumentation techniques are utilized in designing a comprehensive
sensor network. In this chapter, after the turbine generator lubrication oil systems is used
to explain the application of this method in order to verify its adaptability, the same
approach is applied concerning complete target systems.
Chapter 4 outlines the current trend and scope of modern on-line monitoring and
suggests advanced condition monitoring techniques that can be applied to rotating
machinery such as the reactor coolant pump and the turbine generator. The details of each
new utilized technique in vibration analysis, wear debris analysis, partial discharge
analysis, motor current analysis, rotor flux monitor, shaft voltage detector, generator core
condition monitor, fiber optic end-turn vibration monitor, torsional vibration monitor,
hydrogen gas purity sensor, hydrogen dew point monitor, hydrogen leakage detector, and
water conductivity detector are described.
In Chapter 5, the overall architecture of a plant-wide condition monitoring system
network is configured. The sensor types for important components of the turbine
generator and the reactor coolant pump are listed. The determined sensor types and
locations on each specific component studied are incorporated into drawings using the
AutoCAD program (AUTO 96). Finally, the sensors suggested for the target plant
components addressed in the work reported here are presented in order of preference
priority as recommended in measuring a specific parameter with several candidates of
sensors.
Chapter 6 proposes the formalism of Bayesian Belief Networks for modeling the
uncertainty inherent in the diagnostic problem and systematic decision making of interest.
First, the characteristics of our problem solving situation are examined and its concept
and fundamental theory are briefly stated. The details of their main features and
comparison of them to rule-based expert systems are described. The BBN based expert
systems are critically examined in terms of their treatments of rule-based expert systems,
uncertainty management, knowledge representation, decision-making, ease of
modification, and systematic root cause tracking. The basic principle and structure of
prototype diagnostic networks are outlined and illustrated by means of a simple network.
In Chapter 7, selection of a proper expert system shell is performed for a problem
solving tool. Commercially available shells for rule-based approach and BBN-based
approach are reviewed briefly based upon the selection criteria defined in the work
reported here. This chapter also demonstrates features of the HUGIN expert system
shell, the tool for developing the advisory system.
Chapter 8 outlines a framework for configuring an integrated architecture for
constituting a modern condition monitoring, sensor validation, and diagnosis and
maintenance system. It explains a modeling strategy in terms of system causality and the
concept of utility employed in the diagnostic inference algorithm embedded within the
advisory system. Then, the presented major steps for constructing BBN-based generic
inference algorithms are applied to systematic elicitation and synthesis of various levels
of experts' knowledge. Finally, the prototype simple network, which will be applied to
the entire network for target systems, is computerized using the HUGIN expert system
shell.
Chapter 9 specifically addresses the implementation of the intelligent diagnosis
and maintenance advisory system by showing how our representative models work. Task
execution accompanied by an operator's interactions with the operator interface module
and results are obtained through the advanced graphical user interface. We explain the
diagnostic model structure and present its required knowledge base, which is obtained
through elicitation of experts' knowledge. Furthermore, the actual deterministic abnormal
operational procedures of a nuclear power plant are computerized using the HUGIN
expert system shell.
Chapter 10 suggests the testing and validation process. The strategy for the
validation of methods is presented for future work. Each step is summarized in order to
validate this advisory system in the actual environment by comparing it against the
reasoning of the experts in the real field.
Chapter 11 serves as the summary of this dissertation and the direction of future
research. Here, the major findings are stated, conclusions are drawn and
recommendations for future work are presented.
Chapter 2. Target Systems
2.1 Selection Criteria
There is a wide scope of monitoring coverage, which may range from a few
critical components to the complete power plant. Once we identify which systems are the
most responsible for the financial loss of the power plant, this study focuses upon the
development of a sensor networks and intelligent diagnosis and maintenance (D&M)
advisory system centering on those selected key systems. Target systems/components are
those having high failure rates and whose failures will cause long duration outages and
thus, greatly leading to financial losses. Forced outage time durations caused by these
systems are directly related to significant financial losses and can degrade power system
to an acceptable level.
The needs for identifying which components have been significantly responsible
for lost availability call for systematic criteria. These criteria should provide ways to
quantify machine characteristics into statistical measures that can then be used in
mathematical calculations. Since reliability, maintainability, and availability are concepts
related to each other, their relationships are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The legend shows
Maintainability Reliability
M(t) R(t)
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MTBF SOT - FOTSteady State Availability = M
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Figure 2.1 Relationships of Availability, Maintainability, and Reliability
(MTTR: mean time to repair, MTBF: mean time between failures,
SOT: scheduled operating time, FOT: forced outage time)
that reliability R(t) is the probability that an item will remain in service until time t,
maintainability M(t) is the probability that repair will be accomplished in time interval
[0,t], MTBF is a mean time between failures, and MTTR is mean time to repair. The
MTTR can be defined as a function of the frequency of forced outages and total forced
outage time caused by them. SOT is scheduled operating time and FOT is forced outage
time. The steady state equipment availability is defined as the ratio of the actual
operating time and the scheduled operating time.
From the mathematical relationship defined in the availability it is seen that an
increase in MTBF, or a decrease in MTTR, will result in an improvement in system
availability. As the MTBF relates to the reliability of the system through its failure rate,
so does the MTTR its maintainability via the maintenance action rate, i.e. how quick it is
to repair. Thus the importance of considering both factors during system specification
and design can not be overemphasized. We focus upon the goals of increasing the MTBF
and decreasing the MTTR through monitoring and advice.
In other words, Figure 2.1 shows that the availability depends importantly upon
the forced outage time (FOT) because the scheduled operating time (SOT) is a fixed
value. The fact that the financial loss by one day of forced outage amounts to $0.7
million for a 1300 MW plant explains the forced outage time as a key parameter for the
selection of target systems.
2.2 Lost Availability Contribution of Plant Equipment
There are wide ranges of available monitoring techniques, which generally range
from a few critical components to the complete power plant. This study focuses upon the
key machines as target systems. These target systems (or components) are selected on
the basis of past failure record review. Then, their advanced sensor networks for
operational availability improvement of selected target systems are explored.
In a previous section, the forced outage time is selected as a criterion that is the
most important factor to determine the operational availability. In order to identify the
power plant components most responsible for lost availability, we looked into the NRC
plant performance database containing failure records of components that cause forced
outages of operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs) in the United States (INEL 96).
This database is maintained by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. From 1990
to 1995, the economic importance of each component in the PWRs has been ranked in
terms of total forced outage time caused by each specific component.
The information about the total outage time, contribution of total forced outage,
number of failures, and MTTR are also listed for each specific component which is
ranked within top twenty five. Table 2.1 shows that the main rotating machines such as
Table 2.1 Lost Availability Contribution Ranking of US PWR Plant
Systems/Components (1990-1995) (INEL 96)
Rank System/Component Outage Fraction of Number of MTTR
Time (hr) Total Forced Failures (hr)
Outage(%)
1 Transformer 14,442.2 10.64 39 370.3
2 Main Generator 10,955.3 8.07 70 156.5
3 Turbine 10,654.1 7.85 115 92.6
4 Steam Generator 10,597.6 7.81 46 230.4
5 Reactor Coolant Pump 10,004.1 7.37 47 212.9
6 Service Water System 6,369.5 4.69 6 1,061.6
7 Steam Extraction Piping 6,362.8 4.69 4 1,590.7
8 Diesel Generator 5,828.1 4.29 12 485.7
9 Control Rod System 4,194.6 3.09 51 82.2
10 Main Feedwater Valve 4,147.4 3.06 60 69.1
11 Pressurizer 4,073.4 3.00 20 203.7
12 Safety Injection System 3,899.4 2.87 8 487.4
13 Reactor Coolant System 3,327.2 2.45 22 151.2
14 Main Steam Valve 3,319.7 2.45 33 100.6
15 Circuit Breaker 3,067.1 2.26 14 219.1
16 Steam Generator Feedpump 2,854.5 2.10 18 158.6
17 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2,776.4 2.05 4 694.1
18 Moisture Separator Reheater 2,413.6 1.78 19 127.0
19 Inverter 2,399.8 1.77 12 200.0
20 Condenser 2,185.1 1.61 19 115.0
21 Main Feedwater Pump 1,983.5 1.46 37 53.6
22 Main Steam System 1,225.8 0.90 15 81.7
23 Relay 1,183.7 0.87 12 98.6
24 Intake System 1,142.2 0.84 2 571.1
25 Circulating Water 955.4 0.70 8 119.4
the main generator, the turbine, the reactor coolant pump are ranked within the top five
components in terms of contributing to the total outage time. Unlike the power
transformer as a passive component and the diesel generator as a standby component, the
turbine generator and the reactor coolant pump are very important active systems. If the
total forced outage time caused by main generators and turbines is added, turbine
generators are identified as the most important equipment whose failures are associated
with significant financial loss. The fraction of forced outage caused by turbine generators
amounts to 16% and the fraction caused by reactor coolant pumps is shown to be 7%.
These important rotating machines, turbine generators and reactor coolant pumps, are
selected as the target systems being investigated here. The detailed lost availability loss
contribution caused by turbine generators and reactor coolant pumps are evaluated in the
following Section 2.3.1.
Consequently, it is of vital importance to reduce the forced outages and the
associated financial losses caused by turbine generators and reactor coolant pumps.
These aims can be initially explored by implementing comprehensive condition
monitoring systems with sensor networks for these target components, which consolidate
the foundation for efficient diagnosis.
2.3 Characteristics of Target Systems
The turbine generator and the reactor coolant pump are chosen as target systems
for the development of the condition monitoring system and the intelligent D&M
advisory system for their improved availability and efficiency. Both of them have critical
rotating machines for the operation of the power plant and are composed of various
mechanical and electrical components. Each of them is one of the somewhat unreliable
equipment whose failure will result in a reactor trip, shutdown or power reduction, as no
redundancy exists during operations at rated power. Thus, they have been involved in
significant forced outage time and corresponding financial losses.
After their functions during the operation of power plant are reviewed, the
following subordinate sections describe their main failure modes, failure causes, and
forced outage contribution by specific subordinate components in order to look for newly
developing monitoring and diagnostic techniques for use in supervising their
performance. The current forced outage records by the chosen systems are evaluated by
analyzing the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) (INPO 96) and the NRC
plant performance database (INEL 96).
2.3.1 Turbine Generator
2.3.1.1 System Characteristics
In pressurized water reactors, the turbine generator converts the energy of the
steam produced in the steam generators into mechanical shaft power and then into
electrical energy. The larger PWRs typically have only one turbine generator per plant.
It consists of a double-flow, high-pressure(HP) turbine and three double-flow low-
pressure(LP) turbines driving a direct-coupled generator. It also requires numerous
ancillary systems as well as the electrohydraulic control (EHC) system to support its
operation. These are composed of a great number of mechanical and electrical
components. These systems are normally supplied with the units. The major turbine
generator subsystems are classified into stator winding systems, bearing systems, exciter
systems, gland seal systems, and electrical grounding, excluding EHC systems. The
function and scope of important subordinate systems in terms of availability are described
in the following subordinate sections. Their diagrams are shown in Figure 2.2.
2.3.1.1.1 Stator Windings with Auxiliary Cooling Systems
The stator winding provides the generator output voltage and current, composed
of stationary high voltage coils arranged in slots in the stator core to form a three-phase
winding that is usually wye-connected. These coils are arranged in the phase groups
spaced at intervals of 120 degrees. Two stator coils are arranged in each stator slot. Each
coil consists of mica-insulated strands of copper plus ventilation tubes surrounded by
insulation. The ventilation tubes are open at each end of the coil, allowing a blower to
circulate gas through the tubes to cool the windings. The coils are held firmly in place by
a system of high strength wedge filler and prestressed driving strips. The ends of the
coils that extend beyond the core are mechanically braced to withstand vibration and
abnormal forces.
Heat is produced in a generator as a result of resistive losses caused by current
flow in the stator and field windings, stator core magnetic losses, and windage losses.
Because the largest source of heat is the stator winding, the heat is removed by through
convection by a flow of hydrogen cooling gas over the bars. This choice is made because
the thermal properties of hydrogen are superior to those of other gases. Nevertheless, as
the generator ratings are growing larger, the additional cooling system called Stator Coil
Cooling Water Auxiliary System (SCCW) is usually employed. Demineralized water is
pumped through hollow strands interspersed through the bar cross section. Their
schematic diagrams of the SCCW and hydrogen cooling auxiliary systems are shown in
Figures 5.4 and 5.5, respectively (GONZ 95), (BLAC 96).
2.3.1.1.2 Bearings with Lubrication Oil System
The TG bearings are designed to support and control the motion of rotating shafts,
while providing very low frictions and must be lubricated whenever the rotor is turning at
any speed. Oil is required to form the dynamic action that supports the rotating shaft on a
thin film of oil. Adequate supply of this oil at the proper pressure and temperature will
ensure that no damage is incurred either on the shaft journal or the bearing. Loss of oil to
the bearing while the rotor is turning can result in loss of wiped babbitt, scored bearings,
and damage to the rotor journals as well as to the gland seals.
The bearing lubrication oil provides a clean and temperature-controlled supply of
oil to serve purposes described above. A diagram of a typical lubrication oil system is
shown in Figure 5.3. The complete system includes pumps, coolers, oil tank, purification
devices and associated piping, valves, and controls. During the normal operation, the
lubrication oil is driven by a shaft-mounted oil pump. Electric motor-driven pumps are
used to supply the oil as backups when the main oil pump fails (GONZ 95), (BLAC 96).
2.3.1.1.3 Gland Seal System
The hydrogen cooling gas described in the previous section must be tightly sealed
within the generator frame. Because the generator shaft is driven by an external source of
power, the shaft must extend through the gas-tight frame. The two major components of
the hydrogen sealing system are the gland seal rings used to seal the frame and the seal
oil supply system used to provide the oil flow to the rings allowing the rings to perform
their functions.
Gland seals, supplied with oil under pressure, are used to prevent the leakage of
hydrogen through the clearance between the shaft and the frame. A gland seal assembly
consists of housings that are supported from the outer end-shield at each end of the
generator. The seal oil supply system is designed to furnish the oil required by the gland
seal ring in order to maintain a gas seal. It is the function of seal oil supply system to
lubricate the seals, prevent hydrogen from escaping through the seals, and to do so
without introducing excessive amounts of contaminants into the hydrogen (GONZ 95),
(BLAC 96).
2.3.1.1.4 Generator Grounding
There is a difference between a power system ground and the system neutral.
Electrically both points should be at the same potential and are normally connected to the
earth. However, a system ground is not expected to carry a constant current. The
generator experiences some phase unbalance in its normal load, therefore must be solidly
grounded to the system.
2.3.1.1.5 Exciter System
The purpose of the excitation system is to provide direct current to the rotating
electromagnetic field. It must be capable of supplying the required field current for all
permissible load conditions and must be able to be controlled either manually or
automatically by a control mechanism. The control system for the field current is
referred to as an automatic voltage regulator, but modern excitation control systems
include many features over and above the function of maintaining a constant generator
terminal voltage.
2.3.1.2 System Failure Mechanism
The main generator ranks the second and the turbine ranks the third from the lost
availability standpoint. The total sum of outage time caused by both the main generator
and the turbine exceeds that caused by the transformer. Consequently, unplanned outages
of turbine generators have caused a massive loss of financial earnings as the most
dominant contributor.
The causes of turbine generator failures leading to forced outages form the search
of NRC data from 1990 to 1995 are shown in Figure 2.2. Note that the definition of
failures in Figure 2.3 considers only failures which have lead to plant outages.
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Figure 2.2 Leading Causes of Turbine Generator Availability Loss
(from NRC Database)
It shows that the stator winding related systems are the most dominant
contributors responsible for 30.5 percent lost availability. These systems include the
stator winding itself, the hydrogen auxiliary system, and the stator coil cooling water
auxiliary system. 18.3% of forced outages have been caused by the bearing related
components, which are the bearing itself and lubrication oil systems. We note that 87.7
percentage of forced outages have been caused by turbine bearings.
Thus, the work reported here focuses upon the development of a comprehensive
sensor network integrated diagnosis and maintenance advisory system, centering upon
important components described in this section. These are bearings with the lubrication
oil system, and stator windings with auxiliary cooling systems.
2.3.2 Reactor Coolant Pump
2.3.2.1 System Characteristics
In PWRs, reactor coolant pumps (PCPs) circulate water through the primary
coolant systems in order to transport energy from the core to the steam generator. The
larger PWRs typically use four RCPs per plant. They develop the necessary pressure to
overcome the friction loss that the fluid suffers in flowing through the core plena, piping
and steam generator tubes. As components of the primary coolant system, operating
under high temperature, pressure, radiation and performing the critical function of
providing circulating water to cool the core, the RCP must be designed and manufactured
subject to stringent criteria. They are classified as Safety Class"' I and must obey the
provisions of Section III of the ASME code.
Each RCP is about 10 m high with vertical orientation and are single stage,
requiring an electric motor of about 10,000 horsepower. As a drive device, a three-phase
alternating current induction motor designed to operate at constant speed is mounted
vertically on the top of the pump. The inlet is at the bottom and the discharge is on the
side.
Since the water circulated by the pumps is somewhat radioactive and seal failures
can increase the likelihood of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) during normal
operations, the shaft should be equipped with properly designed seals in order to prevent
leakage of the radioactive coolant.
) As USNRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States) design criteria, the quality
requirements for each system and component of the nuclear power plant (NPP) have been categorized into
safety classes I, II, III, and IV in terms of the safety importance. Class I is applied to the design of systems
or system parts directly pressurized from the reactor.
2.3.2.2 System Failure Mechanism
The RCP ranks as the fifth greatest contributor whose failures have resulted in
significant lost availability. Compared to the main feedwater pumps (MFPs) based upon
data in Table 2.1, RCPs have somewhat lower failure rates in causing forced outages, but
they have much longer contributors to the value of the MTTR due to the harsh
environment described in Section 2.3.2.1. Additionally this is because access to the RCP
for repair almost always requires shutting down the plant and creating the conditions
necessary for access the pump.
From 1989 to 1995 the leading causes of availability loss contribution by specific
components of the RCP to the total RCP failures are shown in Figure 2.3. The major
RCP components leading to forced outages are classified into bearings, bus, motor, and
seals. This bearing related components includes the bearings themselves, bearing
lubrication oil system and bearing related vibration failures in shaft. Seal related
components include the seal flow injection system as well as the seals themselves. Even
though the bus is an electrical component, which is connected between the transformers
and RCPs, its failure included within the set of RCP failure contributors. The failure of
the motor includes the motor induced grounding failure as well as failure of the motor
failure itself. A diagram of a typical motor is shown in Figure 5.9
We note that the definition of failures in the Figure 2.3 considers only failures that
can lead to plant outages. Figure 2.3 shows that the bearing-related components are the
most dominant contributors, providing 33.4 percent of lost availability, and the seal
related failures are the second greatest contributors responsible for 30.0 percent lost
availability. Actually, bearing related components have lower failure rates, compared
with the failure rate of seal related components. Thus, the greater MTTR value of
bearing related components overwhelms their lower failure rate, leading to a higher
contribution to the availability loss than from the seal related component. Also, 15.3
percent of forced outages were caused by motor related failures. The rest of failures
excluded in Figure 2.3 were caused by impeller, diffuser, casing, etc. and unknown
failures.
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Thus, the work reported here focuses upon the development of a comprehensive
sensor network integrated diagnosis and maintenance advisory system, centering around
important components described in this section, being bearings and a shaft with
lubrication oil system, seals with seal flow injection system, and a motor.
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Chapter 3. Integrated Method for Comprehensive Sensor
Network Development
3.1 Introduction
The rapid advancement of powerful monitoring devices and computers permits us
to design comprehensive sensor networks as the foundation of a system for efficient plant
condition monitoring and diagnosis. In order for sensor networks to be effective in
improving system operational availability, they should detect incipient system failures.
However, there has been no well-established systematic method in common use
for developing sensor networks for complex systems such as turbine generators (TGs)
and reactor coolant pump (RCPs). They are composed of various mechanical and
electrical components. Sensor networks for monitoring such components should be
designed subject to an understanding of complex system characteristics. Insufficient
understanding of the system characteristics, for example, due to its complexity, usually
renders an efficient condition monitoring difficult to realize.
In understanding the detailed system characteristics, it is convenient to distinguish
between a system abstraction-based approach and a mathematical model-based approach.
The mathematical model based approach utilizes a mathematical process model that
reflects the physics of the process in terms of a set of algebraic and differential equations.
Although it provides a detailed quantitative description, most of the current mathematical
models are cumbersome, impractical to apply for uses of either monitoring parameter
development or diagnosis. By contrast, a system abstraction-based approach utilizes an
abstract concept of essential attributes such as structures, functions, and the
interrelationships subject to the complexity of the systems under consideration. The
nature of the abstraction made is dictated by the needs of either the diagnostic problem to
be solved or the sensor network development. The work reported here emphasizes an
approach using structural and functional system abstractions for developing
comprehensive sensor networks that can reflect the aspects of complex system's
performance and features.
Therefore, the aim of an integrated method incorporating system oriented
hierarchies and advanced instrumentation techniques is to enable us to build advanced,
real-time, condition monitoring systems applied to complex target systems. Moreover, as
a prelude to system diagnosis in addition to efficient condition monitoring, the structural
and functional system hierarchies for sensor network development can serve as a general
frame for describing the knowledge that will be embedded into the diagnostic reasoning
of an advisory system.
This method is defined in general terms here, and then implemented, using the
example of monitoring aspects of complex rotating machines such as the turbine
generator system and the reactor coolant system. The application of this method to
reactor coolant pumps and turbine generators has been judged to be systematic and
appropriate through following discussions with system experts.
3.2 Conventional Methods for Determination of Sensor Networks
Most of the sets of existing sensors in a nuclear power plant have been
incorporated into the plant due to safety concerns. Their associated monitoring
parameters indicate some important process behaviors. The straightforward determination
of monitoring parameters and sensors are usually associated with a shallow
understanding of or a heuristic treatment of system faults. Conventionally, Failure
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) has provided a conventional tool for depicting our
problem solutions within a fixed frame. Basically, it tabulates answers to the questions
'what if as dictated by our concern. It is concerned in the manner of failure, the effect of
such failures, and other required information requested by specific concerns. Once major
failure modes of interest are listed in a table concerning the development of sensor sets,
then we try to tabulate associated monitoring parameters, corresponding sensors, and
other information, such as costs, by incorporating associated knowledge. This approach
is useful either for straightforward reasoning process for safety related sensor
determination or for problem solving in well understood, simple systems
However, as system complexity, the interrelationships of subordinate components
and the number of utilized sensor sets grow, FMEA has proven to be inadequate in
dealing with complexity and high level reasoning required for sophisticated system
features. This is why it offers little insight concerning complex system features and
performance. Consequently, FMEA cannot reduce the system complexities in a
systematic way and explain the complex interrelationships inherent among numerous
subordinate components without overlooking important system features associated with
specific concerns of this work, either. In particular, it is very difficult to represent cause
and effect relationships because of its synergistic nature of complex systems. It is also
poor in systematically incorporating advanced signal processing techniques, which can
provide more detailed information on system performance based upon deep
understanding of system features.
Thus, the work reported here requires a new integrated method, which can reflect
entire tasks from system abstraction dictated by determination of sensors to advanced
data processing techniques.
3.3 System Oriented Hierarchy Based Approach Integrating Advanced
Instrumentation Techniques
The wok reported here formulates an integrated method incorporating a structural
system hierarchy (SSH) and a functional system hierarchy (FSH), a fault-symptom
matrix, sensor selection criteria, advanced instrumentation, and study of sensor
installation feasibility.
The abstract failure modes of each hierarchical level in the FSH generate the
corresponding monitoring parameters by using a fault-symptom matrix. The monitoring
parameters of interests are listed under the primitive components in the SSH for deciding
upon the monitoring locations. The corresponding sensor sets are chosen for observing
the system parameters by use of sensor selection criteria. Then, we perform sensor
installation feasibility studies with technical staff in the power plant with sensor
manufacturing companies, and target system manufacturing companies and we
coordinate their opinions to drawing work. Finally, the advanced instrumentation
techniques reflect the state of the art in terms advancement in data acquisition, data
processing, and data integration techniques incorporated into sensor networks developed
in order to extend the systematic diagnostic coverage.
Assuming that the comprehensive sensor networks are developed based upon the
presented procedures, the identification of the causes and locations of system fault
initiation can be tracked properly by considering systematically the interrelationships
between components and the combinations of various signal measurements. System
diagnosis can be integrated by means of a set of suitable sensors at the subassembly or
even the complete system level.
Figure 3.1 shows a process diagram representing these major steps sensor network
development. Each box represents a module dedicated to the completion of our
systematic development.
3.3.1 Structural System Hierarchy and Functional System Hierarchy
We employ a method for abstracting system features in order to determine the
needed proper sensor types in a systematic way. It should be noted that this abstraction
method describes causal relationships in terms of system structure and malfunctions
dictated by the needs of systematically determining the system parameters and locations
to be monitored. Abstracting a mechanical system structure and function is generally a
formidable undertaking using the hierarchical approach of 'divide and conquer'. This
process of subsequent division and refinement is repeatedly applied until the needed level
of detail and completeness is achieved. This abstraction procedure will reduce the
probability of overlooking possible failures.
The structural and functional system hierarchies are presented for decomposing
the effective complexity of a system without overlooking the major features of the
system's behavior and composition and then for determining the parameters and locations
being monitored. This method is based upon a hierarchical decomposition of the
complex systems under consideration. Each system is modeled by viewing it both as a
structural hierarchy and a functional hierarchy. This is why the determination of
monitoring locations is directly associated with system structure and the determination of
monitoring parameters is associated with system malfunction.
In the first abstraction step, the hierarchical level of the system is defined in terms
of its relationship to a lower level of systems in the structural system hierarchy (SSH).
This hierarchical technique is primarily based upon consideration the system as a
hierarchical tree of components. Figure 3.2 illustrates a generic decomposition for
systems having four levels of description: device, modules, component and monitoring
parameters or sensors. The node representing the system itself lies at the top of a
hierarchy. This system itself at the top serves as the root of the system functional
hierarchy. It is then decomposed into modules, which are in turn decomposed into
primitive individual components listed at the bottom level of the nodes. These bottom
nodes stand for specific monitoring locations.
Then, below the bottom nodes of the SSH the proper set of corresponding
monitoring parameters are listed through the analysis of the FSH, which depends upon
specific definitions of failures as violations of expected plant behavior or certain
functional constraints. System malfunction modes formulated in terms of a functional
system hierarchy (FSH) are decomposed into primitive nodes, from which monitoring
parameters are extracted at each level of failure abstraction by means of a fault-symptom
matrix as treated in Section 3.3.2. Creation of a functional hierarchy usually requires a
more complex set of reasoning and additional knowledge because it should analyze the
system performance and failure modes and then provide an accurate sensor set. Then,
each level of the malfunction nodes of the FSH has one or more objects such as a device,
module, or component. This system itself at the top of the SSH serves as the root object
of the FSH. Decomposing the functional entity of a system into successive subordinate
levels of functional complexity permits us to partition the malfunction process into
concrete determination of monitoring parameters corresponding to the objects of SSH.
These extracted parameters are finally assigned to the individual components listed at the
bottom level of the SSH. The FSH forms the foundation for system diagnosis.
As example applications of the method presented, Figure 3.3 illustrates the
elements of the SSH for the turbine generator lubrication oil system and Figures 3.4-1 to
3.4-4 illustrate how the FSH is configured. Thus, it is shown how this abstraction
methodology is applied in the process monitoring of the turbine generator lubrication oil
system as a module of the turbine generator. It is modeled by viewing it both in terms of
a functional and compositional decomposition of the system, forming the SSH and the
FSH. A top level functional abstraction, the lubrication oil system failure is shown to be
decomposed in terms of the various primitive failure modes, which extract monitoring
parameters. Also, at the top level structural abstraction, the lubrication oil system is
shown to be broken down in terms of its primitive components, each of which has its
required monitoring parameters.
Based upon the presented method, we configure the SSH and FSH of stator
winding, stator core, rotor, gland seal system, auxiliary water cooling system, and
auxiliary hydrogen system in the turbine generator as well as entire subordinate systems
of reactor coolant pumps. As reference materials for above work, fault trees, the NRC
database (INEL 96), NPRDS (INPO 97), and other power plant engineering references
have been used for aiding such abstraction. They are shown in Section 3.4.
It is concluded that this structural and functional system abstraction applied to
complex engineering systems can provide the framework of architectures and tools for
sensor network development. Eventually, it will be explored how this abstraction method
can pave the way for knowledge acquisition for an abnormal system state identification,
root cause fault location and signal processing and integration imbedded in advisory
systems.
3.3.2 Fault-Symptom Matrix
The each level of failure modes in the FSH has its own characteristics, which are
indicated by the variations of process parameters and system status parameters. The
accumulated expertise from operational experience and manufacturing process makes it
possible to select a proper set of monitoring parameters for each failure mode.
In this work, the fault-symptom matrix shown in Table 3.1 is introduced for the
ease of monitoring parameter determination for the primitive failure modes listed at the
bottom level of the FSH. This matrix is intended to address the needs for monitoring
parameters corresponding to specific failure modes extracted from each level of the FBH.
The boxes of this matrix are marked with the symbol "Y" if there exists a need for
sensing a specific failure mode by means of a specific parameter, or a number of listed
parameters in the first row. They are composed of system process parameters
(temperature, pressure, etc.) and system status parameters (vibration, partial discharge,
etc). By doing this repeatedly, the required parameters are listed for the primitive
components of the SSH where finally a set of sensors will be installed.
Table 3.1 illustrates how the fault-symptom matrix is applied for the
determination of monitoring parameters for the turbine generator bearing lubrication oil
systems. The failure modes listed in the column are taken from the failure modes of the
FBH for bearing lubricating oil system. These parameters are determined in the fault-
symptom matrix and are used to determine the corresponding sensor types, selected using
the sensor selection criteria introduced in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.3 Sensor Selection Criteria
The monitoring locations and parameters obtained from the system abstraction
and the fault-symptom matrix should be realized with the practically utilized sensor sets
of the sensor network for availability improvement. Table 3.2 shows the current status of
sensors available for specific parameter condition monitoring, and is the basis for
selecting the proper sensor sets. For example, there are various kinds of available sensors
for vibration measurement such as the proximity probe, tachometer, accelerometer, and
phase reference probe. These sensor selection criteria provide some references for
selecting the most proper sensor for the measurement of the specific parameter in the
expected location.
In this context of sensor selection criteria, predictive monitoring, on-line
monitoring, technical status identification, sophisticated program requirements and data
processing equipment need to be considered when formulating the design of a sensor
network. In the "Sensor Type" column, currently available sets of sensor types for each
parameter are listed. The capabilities of these sensors are evaluated in terms of whether
they can be employed for uses of predictive monitoring and whether they can provide
information concerning the system status and process parameter values in an on-line
fashion. The criterion, "Technical Status" indicates the current application feasibility,
which is labeled "A", "D", and "R", which stand for the maturation states of
advancement, development, and research, respectively. The criterion, "Program
Requirement" deals with the needs for software to interpret the measurements from
sensors. Some sensors, which need data processing equipment, are marked in the last
criterion for "Data Processing Equipment".
3.3.4 Sensor Installation Feasibility Study
For new plants, more attention needs to be given to sensor locations as well as to
the specific design for sensor installation should they be used in the future. Once the
corresponding sensor sets are chosen for these parameters by use of sensor selection
criteria, a sensor installation feasibility study is performed. Through meetings with
technical staffs in power plants, sensor manufacturing companies, and target system
manufacturing companies, their expertise is taken into account. After we coordinate such
opinions into the final determination of sensor locations through installation feasibility
confirmation or design specification modification, sensors are incorporated into drawings
using computer aided design software (e.g., AutoCAD) to make sure that we could install
the comprehensive set of recommended sensors on each specific component studied.
3.3.5 Advanced Instrumentation Techniques
The rapid development of currently available instrumentation technology has
made it possible to perform efficient gathering and processing of information from
various sensors, and motivates us to move to a new concept of monitoring for improved
operation of the system. Recent developments have progressed to the point where the
fusion of various sensor signals in a single unit has been achieved. The falling costs of
advanced instrumentation and accumulation of plant operational experience may make
these technologies more attractive in the future.
This advanced instrumentation step has been defined as three activities in our
design procedure, which is composed of data acquisition, data processing, and data
integration. Each step should be employed in order to elaborate the sensor network
configuration most effectively. The first activity is to acquire data determined by the
physical system status or the system performance process variables. Even though the
same parameter is extracted in the preceding steps, the various sensors can be placed on a
plant component according to its monitoring sensitivity range and engineering
constraints. For example, both the shaft fault and the bearing fault are usually listed at
the primitive nodes in FSH, leading to vibration as a monitoring parameters, but with
different types of vibration sensors being used for vibration sensing such as proximity
probes and accelerometers matched to each component, respectively. The data acquired
by the sensors can be a set of measurements for system diagnostics and root cause
identifications. With the availability of powerful computers, the advanced data processing
techniques such as Fast Fourier Techniques (FFT) and waterfall diagrams enable us to
further decompose the primitive malfunctions into more detailed failure modes.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show how the second step plays an important role in sensor
network configuration and system diagnostics. The shaft vibration listed at the bottom
level of the FBH are itemized into detailed failure modes represented by misalignment,
bent shaft, unbalance, looseness, and oil whirl'. These failure modes are classified by the
amplitude changes at their specific operational frequency and harmonics and by phase
changes. Bearing damage is also broken down into more detailed failure modes such as
inner race failure, outer race failure, ball damage failure, and shock pulse generation.
They also classified with the amplitude change of specific frequency. Their detailed
information is described in Section 4.3.1.
Finally, the third activity known as integration is very important in multiple
sensor arrays relating to complex systems. Effective component diagnosis requires using
a set of various signal fusions and the causal relationships describing the connections
between the fault locations. Various signal combinations should reveal the failure root
causes. For example, a situation requiring a precise signal interpretation can justify the
autocorrelation and crosscorrelation of sensors. Those correlation techniques are good
applications of signal integration techniques, which determine the time delay between
signals coming from different channels. An averaging process is widely applied to
separate repetitive signals from random noises and thus improves the ratio of signal to
noise. When the same two channels are utilized, this technique is called an
autocorrelation technique. Signal integration using two different sensors such as the
Oil whirl: The occurrence of oil whirl is more likely in higher speed machines such as the turbine
generator, which cause a precessing wedge of oil to be formed around the bearing, thus causing the shaft
deflect.
electrical partial discharge signal and the acoustic signal is called crosscorrelation
technique.
Shaft vibrations categorized in terms of misalignment, bent shaft, and unbalance
are all indicated by the signal at the shaft rotational frequency "lx". The difficulty of
distinguishing these failure modes can be overcome by use of additional measurements of
orbit and phase. These measurements of some critical parameters can be elaborated using
the concepts of signal redundancy, diversity and complementarity in order to increase the
efficiency of condition monitoring and system diagnostics.
As a new monitoring concept motivated by recent development in integrated
circuit technology, these measurements from multiple sensors may be combined within
the instrumentation package to form what is termed an 'intelligent sensor" (WILL 94).
This sensor combined with associated software convert combinations of input signals into
a meaningful quantity. So, the output of this intelligent sensor, processing several signals
such as specific frequency harmonics, phase, orbit frequency or temperature can provide
information regarding detailed failure mode progress among the alternatives of
misalignment, bent shaft and unbalance. This local processing concept, using intelligent
sensors, will provide fast and efficient monitoring and reduce the diagnostic burden
caused by increasing the amount of information obtained from increasing the number of
sensors.
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Figure 3.4-4 Functional System Hierarchy for the Turbine Lubrication Oil System
Table 3.1 Fault-Symptom Matrix for Bearing, Shaft and Lubrication Oil System
Fault Temp Flow Leak Purity Debris Vibration Pressure Humidity Position
A-i Y
B-1 Y Y Y Y Y
C-1, C-2 Y Y
C-3 Y Y Y Y Y
C-4 Y Y Y Y
C-5 Y Y Y
C-6 Y
C-7 Y Y Y Y
C-8 Y Y
C-9 Y Y
D-1 Y
D-2 Y
D-3 Y Y Y
A-1: Shaft vibration
C-2: Oil leak in tank
C-5: Low service water flow
C-8: Dehydrator failure
D-2: Oil Temp Increase
B-l: Bearing damage
C-3 : Oil pump failure
C-6: High service water temperature
C-9: Valve Failure
D-3: Oil Contamination
C-l: Oil leak in oil path
C-4: Cooler fouling
C-7: Oil line clogging
D- 1 :Oil Pressure Decrease
Y: Yes
Table 3.2 Sensor Selection Criteria
Monitoring Sensor Type Predictive On-line Technical Program Data Processing
Parameter Monitoring Monitoring Status Requirement Equipment
Temperature RTD Y Y D
Thermocouple Y Y D
Fiber optic sensor Y Y D
Flow Flow meter Y Y D
Humidity Dew point monitor Y Y D
Purity Purity sensor Y Y D
Leakage Leakage detector Y Y D
Pressure Pressure sensor Y Y D
Pyrolysis GCCM Y Y D
Debris Ferrography Y N D
On-line wear debris Y N R Y
sensor
Partial discharge Current transformer Y Y D Y Y
Capacitive coupling Y N D Y Y
Rogowski coil Y Y D Y Y
RF RF monitor Y Y D
Flux Measuring coil Y Y D
Level Level sensor Y Y D
Conductivity Conductivity cell Y Y D
Valve position Position sensor Y Y D
Vibration Accelerometer Y Y A Y Y
Proximity probe Y Y A Y Y
Fiber optic sensor Y Y R
Phase Keyphasor Y Y A
Motor current Rogowski coil Y Y R Y Y
(RTD : Resistance Temperature Detector, RF : Radio Frequency,
Y: Yes, N: No, D: Development , R: Research, A: Advancement)
GCCM : Generator Core Condition Monitor
Sensors: Proximity Probe, Keyphasor
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3.4 Application of a Structural System Hierarchy and a Functional System
Hierarchy into Sensor Network Development for Target System
3.4.1 Application into the Turbine Generator
Structural system hierarchies (SSHs) and Functional system hierarchies (FSHs) of
stator winding, stator core, rotor, gland seal system, auxiliary water cooling system, and
auxiliary hydrogen system in the turbine generator as well as entire subordinate systems
of reactor coolant pumps have been configured as a prelude for the development of
comprehensive sensor networks. As reference materials for this work, fault trees, NRC
database, NPRDS (INPO 97), and other power plant engineering references have been
used for helping to deriving such abstraction methods. The application of this method to
target systems has been judged to be systematic and appropriate, reflecting discussions
with system experts. We note that the listed monitoring parameters shown at the bottom
level of SSHs and FSHs are obtained from the corresponding fault-symptom matrix, an
example of which is shown in Section 3.3.2. The final developments regarding sensor
type selection and location are shown in Chapter 5.
All hierarchies relating to the TG are shown in Figures 3.7 to 3.17. Figure 3.7
represent the SSH of the generator stator winding system. The italic letters "H2 Cooling
System" and "Water Cooling System" listed at the bottom level of this hierarchy indicate
that the detailed information concerning those systems is listed in other corresponding
Figures 3.9 and 3.16, respectively.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the FSH for the generator stator winding system. The SSH
for the hydrogen auxiliary system is illustrated in Figure 3.9. Figures 3.10-1, 3.10-2 and
3.10-3 show the FSHs for the hydrogen auxiliary system. An italic letter "Gland Sear' in
Figure 3.10-1 depicts how this approach reflects the interrelationships among various
components. That information is decomposed in Figure 3.11, which provides the SSH of
the gland seal system. Figures 3.12-1 and 3.12-2 illustrate FSHs for the gland seal
system.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 shows the SSH and the FSH for the generator rotor system,
respectively. Both of the SSH and the FSH of the generator stator core frame are shown
in Figure 3.15. Figures 3.16 and 3.17 illustrate the SSH and the FSH for the SCCW.
3.4.2 Application into the Reactor Coolant Pump
All hierarchies relating to the RCP are shown in Figures 3.18 to 3.24. Figure 3.18
shows the SSH of the motor, which is broken down to stator core, stator windings, rotor,
airgap, and bearing. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 illustrate the FSHs for these subordinate
motor components listed in Figure 3.18. Figures 3.20 includes the decomposition of
failure modes by advanced instrumentation steps in the bearing. Figure 3.21 shows the
SSH of bearing components and lubrication oil subordinate system. Figure 3.22-1, 3.22-
2, 3.22-3, and 3.22-4 illustrate the FSHs of the bearing lubrication oil system. Figures
3.23 and 3.24 show the SSH and FSH of the seal component with the seal injection
system, respectively. Note that italic letters indicate interrelationships among these
hierarchies.
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Figure 3.7 SSH of the Generator Stator Winding System
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Figure 3.8 FSH of the Generator Stator Winding System
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Figure 3.9 SSH of the Generator Auxiliary Hydrogen Cooling System
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Figure 3.10-1 FSH of the Generator Auxiliary Hydrogen Cooling System
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Figure 3.10-2 FSH of the Generator Auxiliary Hydrogen Cooling System
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Figure 3.10-3 FSH of the Generator Auxiliary Hydrogen Cooling System
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Figure 3.11 SSH of the Turbine Gland Seal System
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Figure 3.12-1 FSH of the Turbine Gland Seal System
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Figure 3.12-2 FSH of the Turbine Gland Seal System
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Figure 3.14 FSH of the Generator Rotor System
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Figure 3.15 SSH and FSH of the Generator Stator Core Frame
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Figure 3.16 SSH of the Generator Stator Coil Cooling Water Auxiliary System
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Figure 3.17 FSH of the Generator Stator Cooling Water Auxiliary System
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Figure 3.18 SSH of the Motor in the Reactor Coolant Pump
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Figure 3.19 FSH of Motor in the Reactor Coolant Pump
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Figure 3.20 FSH and Further Breakdown by Use of Advanced Instrumentation in RCP Bearing Analysis
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Figure 3.21 SSH of the Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Lubrication Oil System
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Figure 3.24 FSH of Seal with Seal Injection Flow System
Flow
Chapter 4. Modern Sensor Based Condition Monitoring
Techniques for Target Systems
4.1 Scope of Condition Monitoring
Monitoring is the process of observing the real world and noticing when
something unexpected, unusual, or potentially disastrous occurs. It is becoming
increasingly important to use comprehensive monitoring schemes for the continuous
assessment of the condition of critical systems that are essential for operational
availability or safety in a complex power plant. By using the concept of condition
monitoring (CM), it is possible to monitor the performance of the system of interest using
trend analyses such that a change in system condition can indicate incipient faults that
can be detected and their root causes located quickly. It can also provide adequate
warning of imminent failures, and can aid in scheduling future preventive maintenance
and repair work. This can lead to the improved operational availability by means of
reducing downtime as well as preventing forced outages. Formally, these attractive points
are classified as follow (DAVI 90):
1. An early knowledge of impending failure, through the use of trend analysis
techniques or qualitative inspection: Preventive maintenance put in hand as a
consequence of this information reduces the system/component failure rate and so
increase equipment reliability.
2. Actual condition knowledge and accurate failure prediction: This allows
sufficient flexibility for the plant to be shutdown for repairs at a point in time
convenient to the manufacturing schedule thereby improving system availability
and minimizing random failure.
3. Diagnostic potential: This is present in a condition based maintenance (CBM)
and can pinpoint impending component failure together with the cause of that
failure. The use of diagnostic routines also permits system modification, to remove
identified failure modes and thereby improve inherent design reliability. In
addition, through the rapid identification of an impending failure, system
maintainability is improved together with workload planning and spare part
stockholding.
4. Flexibility: If used in conjunction with an adaptive control system, the
monitoring aspect of CBM can extend the useful life of plant and equipment, by
limiting the effect of a dynamic mechanism within the system. This reduces the
likelihood of early failure and thus improves system reliability.
There are very many proprietary devices on the market that may be used for CM.
At the present time, many new CM sensors and data processing equipment are backfitted
for use with plant components in order to improve monitoring coverage. This process has
been expensive because it sometimes requires some system modifications. The
monitoring system specification and its development approach are intertwined, indeed
considerable information of use in drawing up the specification regarding target
components, imbedded sensors and equipment for data processing and integration can be
obtained by investigating the development approach and evaluating currently available
commercial products. Therefore, increased attention to monitoring at the design stage
would be valuable so that CM equipment needs can be considered as essential design
requirements.
When designing CM equipment, it is desirable to match the characteristics of
currently available sensors to the failure modes to be monitored. The rapid advancement
of powerful sensors and data processing equipment should be anticipated in the study of
instrumentation design review. This means that each step of advanced instrumentation
system development, namely data acquisition, data processing, and data integration
should be incorporated in order to extend monitoring coverage in a systematic way.
Eventually, through the use of modern powerful monitoring devices and
computers as a foundation of efficient plant diagnosis, CM can ensure that all decisions
are made on substantial and corroborated diagnostic information, thereby yielding many
technical, financial advantages.
The study in this chapter begins with the review of the current state of the art for
monitoring techniques for use with target rotating machines, such as the reactor coolant
pump and the turbine generator. The monitoring parameters on the target systems that are
suitable for CM using available techniques are investigated. There are basically two
distinct categories of monitoring parameters used in this work:
1) Process Parameters : e.g., temperature, pressure, flow
2) System Status Parameters : e.g., vibration, motor current, partial discharge, wear
debris, flux, leakage, pyrolysis
Process monitoring, as its name implies, is concerned with monitoring of the
machine process monitoring of the appropriate functions of all subordinate systems.
Status monitoring is concerned with the physical health status of the machine. Generally,
the monitoring of status parameters provides a longer time to enable corrective actions to
be taken. However, it sometimes needs to use sophisticated local data processing
equipment for interpreting complicated patterns of each signal and enhancing the ratio of
signal to noise.
The following Sections, 4.2 and 4.3, outline the current scope of modern
condition monitoring techniques for selected monitoring parameters, described above,
that can be applied to target systems.
4.2 Modern Process Parameter Condition Monitoring Techniques
Process monitoring, as its name implies, is concerned with monitoring of machine
process parameters such as temperature, flow and pressure. Temperature is a widely
monitored parameter related to the process in electrical drives such as turbine generators
or reactor coolant pumps. For example, it is quite common to find temperature sensing
used to monitor the cooling fluids of Turbine Generators (TGs) and Reactor Coolant
Pumps (RCPs), and specific area of the stator core. Bearing temperature is measured in
order to provide complementary information for the assessment of its conditions. Here
we have three widely used temperature sensors: thermocouple, resistance temperature
detector (RTD), and thermistors.
The RTD is basically an electrical wire whose resistance varies in accordance
with its temperature, a well-known concept in electricity. The RTD is simply a thin-film
or wire-wound device that has a reasonably large, positive temperature coefficient of
resistance value. The RTD exhibits the high linearity and is recommended as the most
reliable and accurate temperature sensor for general temperature measurement.
Thermocouples are basically two wires of different material joined together at one
end. The difference in materials will generate a small voltage proportional to the
temperature at the joint. By measuring the voltage accurately, the temperature at the joint
can be determined. Thermocouples are true point measurements, and they can come in
dudl elements. However, they are typically not accurate as RTDs
The final type of sensors is the thermistor. It operates in a like manner to the RTD
but, because it is made from a ceramic semiconductor, it shows a large change in
resistance as a function of temperature. It is inexpensive. However, its use is generally
limited up to below 300 OC. Alternatively the thermistor may be used as a switching
device to operate an alarm when the temperature exceeds a preset limit.
The choice of sensor location requires careful consideration during the
specification stage of the machine design. Especially, use of an embedded temperature
detector is recommended for the stator winding because the space in the stator end
winding is very long and narrow. In some parts of the generator, the most likely hotspot
is difficult to predict because of the great length of the potentially overheating elements.
For example, temperature detectors embedded in the stator winding need to be located
close to its hottest part, which my be in the slot portion or end winding portion depending
upon the thermal design of the machine. Whereas this imbedded temperature detector
using slot RTDs can be effective in determining a number of bar overheating conditions,
they suffer from the inherent lack of discrimination between problems in the top or
bottom bars. Sometimes, if the hot spot is localized and it does not coincide with the
location of the RTD, the hot spot may never be detected. Also, this imbedded temperature
detector indicates a temperature that is substantially lower than the hottest copper
temperature at the same axial location (TAVN 87).
In an effort to address this problem, the development of a continuous temperature
monitor using fiber optics makes it possible to detect a hot spot regardless of where it is.
The fiber optic temperature sensor was developed to address this situation.
The lack of precise temperature data is a major shortcoming in assessing the
condition of rotor winding insulation. Operation at high temperature causes many types
of insulation to lose electrical and mechanical integrity, eventually resulting in
catastrophic failures. As well, thermal cycling can induce aging by causing relative
movement between insulation system components. The phenomena known as
"ratcheting" whereby the rotor slot wedges loosen is a direct result of thermal cycling.
One system is introduced in this work to obtain accurate rotor temperature data. Sedding
introduced that the Electronic Rotor Temperature Sensor (ERTS) measures the
temperature of the rotor at a specific location (SEDD 89). The active components of the
device are mounted in a modified rotor balancing plug that is installed in the balance hole
in the winding face of the rotor. Temperatures are measured and transmitted across the
airgap to receiving antennae located in the stator bore and end regions. A specially built
receiver decodes the radio frequency (RF) transmissions. Packaging of the ERTS
electronics is critical since the device is mounted at a point which experiences elevated
temperatures and the presence of high magnetic fields. For these reasons the mechanical
design of the plug and selection of a suitable potting compound are crucial in ensuring
the integrity of the design.
The sensors for measurements of pressure and flow have been widely used for a
long time. Usually, pressure transmitters are used for the measurement of pressure.
Flowmeters are normally used for measurement of flow.
4.3 Modern Status Parameter Condition Monitoring Techniques
Status monitoring is concerned with the physical health status of the machine.
System status parameters include vibration, motor current, partial discharge, and wear
debris, etc. Their spectral analysis usually uses sophisticated data processing equipment
for interpreting the complicated pattern of each signal and enhancing the ratio of signal to
noise.
4.3.1 Vibration Analysis
Vibration analysis in rotating machinery such as the turbine generator and reactor
coolant pumps is an extremely effective means for diagnosing incipient malfunctions that
might have catastrophic results if not discovered in time. Vibration is an important
sensitive parameter indicating the operating state of a rotating assembly. Every rotating
machine has its own characteristic vibration signature, which can be obtained from
frequency spectra of the monitored vibration signals.
Typically the primary vibration source is estimated by using vibration amplitude
and frequency data. The changes of individual frequency components in the spectrum
can give the earlier indications of faults in the pump elements. This spectrum analysis
requires advanced data processing equipment with associated ancillary devices, which are
illustrated in Figure 4.1. Moreover, in order to increase the accuracy of diagnosis, the
combination of one sensor output with other measurement parameters should be
performed.
4.3.1.1 Sensor Type
Vibration monitoring systems for RCPs employs three kinds of transducers. The
measurement made by proximity probes is for relative displacement of the shaft. It
provides a voltage output as a function of the probe-to-shaft gap. These transducers are
the most sensitive to very low amplitude and low frequency vibrations of the rotating
shafts in a RCP and a turbine generator. The second sensor type has been used to
measure the shaft rotational velocity. These tachometer signals are necessary in order to
provide the rotating speed of the turbine generator and to allow shaft torque
measurements to be performed. The third sensor type, called an accelerometer,
effectively measures the acceleration of rotating components such as bearings, the
impeller and rotor because it has high frequency sensitivity.
Table 4.1 Comparison of Vibration Sensors
Proximity Probe 0- 1500 Hz Displacement Noncontact
Conductive parts
Mounting difficulty
Frequency limit
Tachometer 8-1500 Hz Velocity Self-generating Moving part
Seismic Massive
EM sensitivity
High frequency
Accelerometer 1-20,000 Hz Acceleration Small size Temperature limit
Seismic
(EM: Electromagnetic)
Figure 4.1 Data Processing Equipment for Advanced Vibration Spectrum Analysis
(BOVI 89)
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4.3.1.2 Major Failure Modes and Diagnosis
1) Imbalance
Imbalance is a condition where the center of mass is not coincident with the
center of rotation. This usually stems from a nonuniform mass distribution about the
center of rotation. So, imbalance shows up as a vibration signal with a frequency exactly
equal to the shaft rotational speed, and with amplitude proportional to the amount of
imbalance.
2) Misalignment
Coupling misalignment is a condition where the shafts of the motor and the pump
are not on the same centerline. When coupled and rotated together, the two shafts are
cyclically strained at the running speed. A deflection is created. The bearings affected
by the force leading to this deflection create the reactionary forces that prevent the shafts
from moving as much as it would in achieving its full amplitude excursion. This strain of
the shaft generates higher frequency harmonics of vibration signal. So, misalignment
shows up in the frequency domain as a series of harmonics of the running speed.
Misalignment also has temperature dependency related to thermal fatigue. In the RCPs,
the presence of a significant temperature difference in the vicinity of the shaft between
the coolant water and seal cooling/injection water is another common factor. Therefore,
the change of harmonics during temperature changes is a strong indication of temperature
induced misalignment.
3) Looseness
Mechanical looseness shows up in the frequency domain as a 1/2 harmonic, as 1-
1/2, 2-1/2, etc. These harmonics show up because of clipping of the waveform when the
loose parts hit against their limits of movement. Generally, the presence of 1/2 harmonics
indicates a more severe condition of looseness (WOWK 90).
4) Oil Whirl
The oil whirl is a condition, which causes a precessing wedge of oil to be formed
around the bearing, thus causing the shaft vibration. The occurrence of oil whirl is more
likely in higher speed machines. It manifests itself as a vibration signal of less than one-
half of the rotational speed. This speed comes from the average oil velocity with some
slippage (WOWK 90).
5) Bearing Damage
All roller bearings give off signals at four distinct specific frequencies, related to
the bearing outer race defect (ORD), bearing inner race defect (IRD), bearing ball sphere
defect (BSD) and train defect (TD) at specific vibration frequencies. Their relative
amplitude is an indication of their condition. These fundamental frequencies of a rolling
bearing can be obtained by simple calculations (ALLE 88) as
foRD = (N / 2)fr[1 - bd cos() / dp],
fiRD = (N / 2)fr[1 + bd COS(f) /dp], (4.1)
fBSD= dpfr /db{1 - [bd cos(P))/ dp] 2},
fro = (fr / 2)[1 - bd cos( )/ dp].
Here, fr is the shaft rotational frequency, N is the number of balls, bd and dp are the ball
diameter and ball pitch diameter respectively, and 3 is the contact angle of the ball with
the races.
It should be noted that the very first indications of bearing wear are metal-to-
metal shocks. They show up as shock pulses in the time domain due to the short duration
transient nature with a frequency between 1000 Hz and 10,000 Hz (BRAU 86).
Therefore, the earliest detection of bearing degradation is these high frequency shock
pulses in the time domain as measured by accelerometers.
6) Electrical Device Induced Vibration
Related by electrical device induced vibration, every electrical machine powered
by 60Hz line frequency gives off a mechanical vibration at 120 Hz because of the
magnetic field expanding and collapsing in the iron laminations of motors (VAS 93).
4.3.1.3 Vibration Diagnostic Chart
Diagnostic charts can be drawn to relate the RCP faults to vibration frequencies.
These cause and effect relationships were derived by some detailed mathematical
analysis (BRAU 86) or by observing the effects of real rotating machine faults.
Table 4.2 Vibration Diagnostic Chart
Fault Frequency Amplitude/ Other Parameters
Imbalance 1X No Phase change
Misalignment 1X, 2X, 3X, nX Orbit, Phase change
Bearing BSF, IRF, ORF, TDF High frequency shock in time
domain
Looseness 1/2, 11/2, 21/2, nl/2 Amplitude decrease with load
Bent shaft iX Orbit, Phase
Oil Whirl 0.43-0.48X Oil temperature change
Cracking Unexplained drop in higher Phase change is more significant
harmonics No definite single indicator
Motor Vibration 2 times synchronous Motor current
frequency
Legend,
nx: Multiplier of shaft rotational frequency
BSF: Ball sphere defect frequency
IRF: Inner race defect frequency
ORF: Outer race defect frequency
TDF: Train defect frequency
4.3.2 Wear Debris Analysis
Analysis of wear debris carried in the oil stream can provide an insight into the
operating condition of the oil-wetted components of a machine. While wear debris
analysis can be successful as the sole condition monitoring technique, it is better applied
as part of suite of analysis techniques. It combines very well with vibration analysis and
provides complementary information about faults where insufficient data exist to identify
a fault using vibration analysis, and vice versa (YARR 91).
4.3.2.1 Off-line Wear Debris Analysis
Practically all wear debris analysis techniques rely upon sampling the oil. The
types of representative off-line wear debris techniques are the following.
1) Spectrometric Oil Analysis (SOA)
A sample of oil taken from the machine lubrication system is analyzed for
concentrations of metals. The concentrations of each metal in the oil are compared to
preset limits, or used to calculate the machine's wear rate. SOA is usually performed by
emission spectroscopy, X-ray fluorescence, and atomic absorption spectroscopy (YARR
91).
2) Wear Particle Analyzer
More recently ferrographic methods have come to be used. Analytical ferrography
is an off-line technique that uses an intense magnetic field to extract ferrous wear
particles. The wear particles are deposited in order of size, with the larger particles being
deposited first at the entry, with progressively smaller debris coming down as the oil
flows across the ferrogram. High power optical or scanning electron microscopy is used
to study the size distribution of collected wear particles.
Direct reading ferrography is similar to analytical ferrography as described above,
using the same magnet to collect the wear particles. Light sensors are used to determine
the density of the wear debris deposited in the glass tube in two positions, thereby giving
a numerical value for the concentration and an indication of the size distribution of the
ferrous particles.
4.3.2.2 On-line Wear Debris Analysis
On-line wear debris detection sensors built into a machine's lubrication system
are aimed to indicate continuously the occurrence of any wear particles. However, there
are few commercially available wear debris monitors. Those that are in use have typically
been design for the aircraft industry and as such are designed for too low an oil flow for
industrial application. In this work, we introduce the state of the art available on-line
wear debris analysis techniques. We describe their current capabilities and limitations,
and provide a groundwork concerning feasibility of what activities in this area employed
upon rotating machines in the power plants. In the near future, on-line wear debris
monitor may show promise for use in rotating machines in the power plants. The types
of on-line wear debris monitor available are the following.
1) Through-Flow Inductive Debris Monitor
Lubricating oil flows through a transducer coil, causing small changes in the
inductance of the coil as any metallic particles pass. The direction of the frequency shift
allows discrimination between ferrous and non-ferrous particles and the signal amplitude
gives a measure of debris size and concentration. This type of sensor has the advantage
of not disrupting the oil flow, but also has the disadvantage that this through flow coil
suffers from electrical interference (WHIT 92).
2) Electrical Gap Bridging Detector
The Electrical Gap Bridging Detector uses a magnet to capture ferrous debris and
bridge the electrical contacts. A sufficient build-up of fine debris or a single large
particle can bridge the gap, thus completing the circuit and triggering a warning
indication. This type of sensor is fitted to many aircraft engines and transmissions. In
some installations the electrical gap type sensors can be a problem often being triggered
by normal wear products and giving rise to false 'nuisance' warnings (YARR 91).
3) Instrumented Magnetic Chip Detector
The Instrumented Magnetic Chip Detector uses a magnet to capture ferrous wear
particles. The magnet is equipped with inductive coils or magnetoresistive sensors that
indicate the mass of ferrous material accumulated or the instantaneous disruption of the
magnetic field as a particle arrives. These systems have an advantage over the simple gap
system in that they continuously measure the accumulation of wear particles, and are not
limited to a single detection (YARR 91).
4) Optical Oil Debris Monitor
The Optical Oil Debris Monitor is based upon illumination of the oil lubrication
column with a diode laser, followed by imaging in transmission of suspended particles
and identification of the particles by analysis or classifier. The optical monitor is capable
of recognizing metallic and ferrous particles, such as those from metal bearings and
gears, as well as non-ferrous particles, such as ingested sand and debris from composite
bearings. Objects suspended in the oil flow are imaged by light transmission onto the
array of detectors, appearing as dark shadows against a bright background (REIN 94).
5) Filter Blockage Technique
Within the Filter Blockage Technique a sample of fluid is passed through a filter
screen and the pressure drop across the screen is monitored. As the filter becomes
blocked, the pressure builds up giving an indication of the number of particles in the
fluid. This technique has the disadvantage that it cannot distinguish between metallic and
non-metallic debris (HUNT 91).
4.3.3 Motor Current Analysis
4.3.3.1 Motor Failure Mechanism
As a drive device, a large three-phase alternating current induction motor
designed to operate at constant speed is mounted vertically on the top of the pump. When
evaluating the reactor coolant pump performance, it is necessary that the condition of the
motor should be considered, in addition to the coupling between pump and motor. To
prevent the sudden failure of a motor, it is essential that failure modes should be
identified and then corresponding on-line monitoring equipment to detect incipient failure
signature should be set up.
The magnetic field produced in stator induces a flow of electrical current in the
rotor windings. Typical failure modes in large-phase induction motors are rotor bar
fracture, airgap eccentricity, bearing wear and insulation degradation as shown in Figure
4.2. During the mechanical transients, rotor bars are likely to be exposed to thermal and
mechanical stresses coupling vibration. The incidence of cracking in the region of bars
and end ring can cause serious damage to the stator winding and insulation failure. Speed
and torque oscillations also occur as well as arcing and heating in the vicinity of a fault.
Airgap eccentricity and unbalanced magnetic pull as a result of a bent shaft, bearing wear
and misalignment can lead to a rubbing between rotor and stator and consequent damage
to the stator windings. Moreover, bearing failures are caused by mechanical
misalignment, abnormal rotor unbalance and shaft whirl. Finally heat generated in the
stator windings, coupled with vibration, transients and airborne contaminants can
disintegrate the organic insulation material.
Motor Failures
MajorFailure Rotor Bar Airgap Bearing Insulation
Fraction Eccentricity Damage DegradationMechanisms 
------ t at
Root Loads Vibration Design Contamination
Causes
Figure 4.2 Motor Failure Diagram
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4.3.3.2 Motor Current Monitoring Techniques
The identification of mechanical problems such as rotor bar fracture, airgap
eccentricity and bearing wear via on-line analysis of the current is common. It can
indicate an early stage of failure. Like vibration monitoring, it primarily relies upon the
amplitude of specific frequency components in the current spectrum. The supply current
is normally monitored very easily, without interfering with the machine, simply by fitting
a clip-on current transformer around the supply cable to the motor, see Figure 4.3 (TAVN
87). Using an Analog-to-Digital (A/D) converter digitizes the monitored line current
signal and using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) can perform the spectrum analysis.
Motor Load
Advisory System &
Main Control Room
AD Converter Spectrum Software to Detect
Analyzer Spectral Peaks
Figure 4.3 Current Transformer Installation for Motor Current Monitoring
(TAVN 87)
Previous research (JONE 72), (WILL 82) shows that the speed and torque
oscillations occurring due to asymmetry of broken rotor bars induce a twice the slip
frequency sideband signal (±2sfl). The definitions used in this work are as follows:
s = (ns -n)/ ns, (4.2)
where, s : slip (dimensionless)
ns : synchronous speed (rpm)
n : actual speed (rpm)
f, : supply frequency (60Hz).
The Fast Fourier Transform technique (FFT) has made it possible to identify this
unique pattern in the current spectrum in the frequency domain. A progressive increase
in the amplitude of the slip frequency sideband signals is one of the most dominant
indicatives of broken rotor bars.
Static eccentricity which can be caused by the incorrect position of the stator or
rotor, will generate signals which also contain signals at twice the slip related frequency
in addition to the slot harmonic components governed by the Equation 4.3 (YANG 81).
In the presence of dynamic eccentricity ,caused by a bent rotor, there will also be a signal
at twice the slip frequency sideband in addition to slot harmonic components, as
f = fl [ (kZ2 ± nd)(1-s)/P+ v ], (4.3)
where,
k : any integer
Z2 : number of rotor slots
nd : 0 for static eccentricity, 1 for dynamic eccentricity
P; number of pole pairs
v: 0, 2, 4, 8, ...
Early indications can be detected by measuring the increase in the levels of these
specific frequency components. The diagnostic algorithms should contain the amplitude
for normal state of the spectral component in order to quantify these malfunction modes.
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4.3.4 Partial Discharge Analysis
Partial discharges are sparks involving the flow of electrons and ions when the
electrical insulation of small volume of gas beaks down. This can occur in voids within
the electrical insulation system itself or in regions adjacent to the insulation of high
voltage stators. The term partial is used since there is a solid insulation, such as epoxy-
mica, in series with the void, which prevents a complete breakdown.
Insulation of rotating machines is subjected to electrical, thermal, and mechanical
stresses during the operation. The acquisition, storage, and processing of partial discharge
signals in the rotating machines such as the turbine generator and the reactor coolant
pump are important condition monitoring tools because the partial discharges not only
degrade the electric insulation but also provide the symptoms of the incipient defects.
As deterioration of the stator windings continues to be one of the predominant
causes of partial discharge, this degradation can be characterized by the changes in
discharge activity as a major symptom of insulation failure. It is normally the result of
progressive degradation that may typically be due to physical movement, contamination,
or thermal effects. Several concrete conditions that can generate partial discharge activity
are stator bar vibration, end winding contamination, damage to the end winding voltage
suppresser system, broken conductor, insulation degradation, and collector brush
sparking. In practice, it is often difficult to establish cause and effect relationships
because of the synergistic nature of insulation deterioration mechanisms. In this case, we
highly recommend use of a suite of sensors, which can provide correlated signals for the
detection of complex degradation mechanisms (GEPS 94).
Capacitive couplings and Rogowski coil are available as transducers for on-line
partial discharge monitoring. They have a good sensitivity and wide bandwidth, and can
be easily installed. The capacitive coupling housed between the high voltage terminal
and the monitoring instrument is generally not suitable for on-line monitoring of
discharge activity. The Rogowski coil can be suggested. It is located around the high
voltage terminals of the stator winding as a non-invasive current transducer for
measurement of high frequency current pulses in the stator windings, as generated by
partial discharge activity in the insulation structure. It looks similar to a conventional
103
current transformer but there is no ferrous material in its construction because it is
designed to respond to low level high frequency discharge signals of the order of
picocoulombs (EDWA 92).
A partial discharge event at a point in the winding structure gives rise to a pulse of
electric current that travels away from the point of origin as a wave. The most important
features from a diagnostic viewpoint are repetitive peak discharge magnitude over a
period of time. This is because the discharge magnitude, based upon signal pattern
analysis, is related to the energy released at the point of discharge and the degree of
significant insulation degradation. For on-line measurements, a spectrum analyzer for
signal processing is recommended. It is tuned to specific frequencies and the levels of
these frequencies are analyzed in a time sequence. The continuous increase of the specific
magnitude indicates that insulation is being degraded. This instrument with Rogowski
coil and data processing equipment is known in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Schematic Diagram of On-line Partial Discharge Monitoring System
(TAVN 87)
Therefore, the information about discharge signal pattern may provide important
indications of the degradation process that has given rise to the discharge activity. It can
provide complementary information correlated with other signals such as those from the
stator winding temperature, and vibration, etc. Then, the partial discharge analysis can
assist maintenance engineers to form a clear picture of the problem and to assess the
urgency of any remedial action that may be required.
4.3.5 Rotor Flux Monitor
Shorted turns in the rotor winding change the airgap flux of the synchronous
machine. Due to the interturn faults, an asymmetrical temperature distribution of the
rotor can arise. This can cause abnormal operating conditions, which cause rotor
vibration problems and decrease efficiency. With a larger number of shorted turns, the
rotor may not even be able to achieve full load at any power factor. Furthermore, local
overheating can also occur due to the shorted rotor winding. Shorted rotor turns can also
lead to increased shaft voltages. This work introduces two sensors developed to obtain
accurate information about abnormal flux distributions. These are known as the airgap
search coil and the flux probe. Shorted rotor turns in a generator can be detected by using
a small airgap search coil installed in the stator in the air-gap of the generator as shown in
Figure 4.5. The search coil is situated near the rotor surface.
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Figure 4.5 Generator Airgap Search Coil Installation (HIRV 91)
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The search coil can be either cylindrical or rectangular in shape. As the rotor
rotates, a voltage is induced in the search coil, which is proportional to the rate of change
of the rotor flux associated with each rotor coil. The amplitude of the induced voltage is
directly proportional to the ampere-turns in the rotor slot that passes under the search
coil, and thus a reduced voltage is induced in the presence of a shorted coil. It should be
noted that it is possible to detect the radial or circumferential component of the rotor flux
by installing radially- or circumferentially- aligned search coils in the air-gap. Parallel
half-phases of stator winding can also be used to measure variations in the airgap flux.
By measurement of voltage and its spectrum in the airgap search coils and of the
circulating currents in stator winding, it is possible to obtain information about the rotor
winding faults of the electrical machine during its operation (HIRV 91), (VAS 93).
The presence of shorted turns is also determined by examining test data acquired
through a sensor called a flux probe. Figure 4.6 shows flux probe installation. The flux
probe is installed in the generator airgap where it senses the field winding slot leakage
flux. The probe tip is a full 5 cm from the rotor surface, thus avoiding any interference
with the retaining rings during assembly and disassembly. The probe is wired to the
instrument terminal gland, which is mounted on the outer diameter of the generator
frame. The wire routing is similar to that of the stator bar resistance temperature detector
Small Air Gaps
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Air Gap 0.5 Probe
t 2Inches
Retaining Ring 
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Figure 4.6 Generator Flux Probe Installation (GONZ 95)
(RTD) wiring. The probe produces a voltage proportional to the rate of change of flux as
the rotor turns. This pattern of flux variation near the field is a signature unique to each
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field winding. A digital oscilloscope can also be utilized to capture and analyze data
(GONZ 95), (GEPS 97).
4.3.6 Shaft Voltage Detector
With an increase of the size of generators, the magnitudes of shaft voltages and
associated damaging circulating currents in the short-circuit path to the induced shaft
voltage have significantly increased. Thus it is important to understand the mechanism of
the generation of the shaft voltages and to take protective measures against them.
A net alternating flux is produced which links with the circuit consisting of the
shaft, bearing and frame due to many reasons such as magnetic asymmetries, static
excitation systems, electrostatic charges, etc. Thus, a potential difference is induced
between the extremities of the shaft. This induced shaft voltages between the shaft and
the bearing will stress the oil film of the bearings and in case of breakdown, electric
discharge will occur and pitting will damage the surfaces of the bearings and the seals.
Shaft voltages due to axial shaft fluxes can be partially avoided by
demagnetization of the magnetized parts. It is also useful to insert thick layers of
material with low permeability in all flux paths. Shaft voltages due to static exciters can
be reduced by keeping the common mode voltage and the rise of the voltage steps in the
common mode voltage as small as possible. Also, the circulating current on the surface
of bearing can be limited by the capacitive reactance of the bearing insulation (VAS 93).
4.3.7 Generator Core Condition Monitor (GCCM)
Excessive heat buildup in the insulated conductors in the generator field or
armature can result in thermal decomposition of the winding's groundwall insulation. The
thermal decomposition of winding or lamination insulation causes the formation of
byproducts in the form of small particles, which are captured by the hydrogen stream on
the outer surface of the conductor or lamination and blown through the generator.
The detection of overheating inside a large turbine generator before it reaches
catastrophic levels in known to be difficult. This work introduces the generator core
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condition monitor (GCCM) to detect such overheating on-line. The primary objective of
the GCCM is to identify such excessive buildups of heat in either the windings or core
.insulation by monitoring the thermal decomposition byproducts of the hotspot insulation
before they result in catastrophic failures of the insulation, and thus of the generator
itself.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the schematic diagram of one particular design of a GCCM.
A small of sample of the gas is diverted continuously to the GCCM, which is typically
located outside of the generator. When decomposition particles are present in the
hydrogen stream, the electrons will stick to the particulate. The increased mass of the
charged particulate means that it is not influenced by as much by the driving potential
difference as are the free electrons, and is thus removed from the electron current. The
GCCM measures this current flow and produces an analog signal directly proportional to
the electron current level. A threshold point can be set to alarm when the current flow
decreases to a preset level (GONZ 95), (SEDD 89).
4.3.8 Fiber Optic End-Turn Vibration Monitor
As the vibration amplitudes increase, the stator coil end-turns are progressively
more fatigued from a mechanical standpoint. Common vibration sensors such as
accelerometers are very susceptible to strong electromagnetic field near the generator
stator windings. On the other hand, the fiber optic vibration sensor has the one
significant advantage that the sensor and all cabling to and from it are nonconducting.
Thus, use of fiber optic vibration monitor can enable on-line early detection and
identification of developing end winding loosening through the measurement of coil end
vibration levels and the trending of vibration levels of over time. This eliminates the need
to insulate them from the high voltages inherent within the generator.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the operating principle of the fiber optic vibration sensor. A
grid of evenly spaced slots is mounted at the end of a flexible reed. The increases fatigue
may move the natural frequencies of the end region closer to a value near the 120 Hz,
thereby worsening the situation through the resonance amplification mode. The reed is
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Figure 4.7 Schematic Diagram of Generator Core Condition Monitor (GCCM)
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Figure 4.8 Operating Principle of Fiber Optic Vibration Sensor
(GONZ 95)
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tuned to be resonant at a natural frequency slightly above 120Hz (or 100Hz). A
continuous beam of light is directed the grid at right angles to the vibratory motion. As
each slot in the grid moves through the beam of light, a pulse of light enters the optical
cable on the other side of the grid. The number of light pulses in a given period of time is
proportional to the amplitude of vibration. The microprocessor-based monitor employs
signal processing algorithms that detect the resonance vibration frequencies for all
sensors directly from the output signal during TG operation. It increases the accuracy of
the monitor by continuously updating the sensor's calibration. Furthermore, it eliminates
erroneous vibration level readings by identifying possible sensor malfunctions.
The fiber optic vibration monitor provides measurements at various locations
(usually six) on each end of the generator. Figure 4.9 shows the construction and
installation locations of the sensor. The system is composed of vibration sensors,
internally routed optical fibers, fiber optic hermetic pressure seals, fiber optic cable
bundles, preamplifiers, and a readout box which permits the stator end winding vibration
amplitude signals to be displayed within the control room and interfaced with a computer
(GONZ 95), (HENS 93).
4.3.9 Torsional Vibration Monitoring
A wide variety of electrical disturbances on the transmission system, such as
electrical faults and high-speed reclosing of circuit breakers, can cause TG shaft fatigue
damage. A better understanding of the interactions between the electrical transmission
system and the TG would provide an opportunity for early detection of shaft problems
that can occur and to develop new operating procedures.
A torsional vibration system mentioned in this work consists of three modules: a
torsion vibration monitoring data acquisition system (TVMDAS); an electrical fault
monitoring data acquisition system (EFMDAS); and a data communication system
(DCS). The TVMDAS monitors the electrical airgap torque applied on the generator
rotor and the oscillatory changes in the shaft speed at two locations. The EFMDAS
monitors the three generator terminal currents and voltages. The TVMDAS and the
EFMDAS store data when an event occurs and transmit them via the DCS to the central
computer (GORZ 86), (GONZ 95).
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4.3.10 Hydrogen Gas Purity Sensor
The generator rotor moves within a hydrogen-filled cavity. Pure hydrogen gas
has very low density, thus minimizing the windage losses of the machine. As the
hydrogen becomes less pure as it mixes with water vapor, oil vapor, or even air, its
density rises significantly, as do the windage losses. Hydrogen purity should be held at
the level recommended by the manufacturer, or higher, in order to minimize windage
losses.
The hydrogen purity meter (HPM) monitors the purity of the hydrogen gas inside
the generator frame during operating conditions. There are various means to measure the
purity. One is through conductivity measurements, and another popular one is through
density measurement technique.
This work introduces the density measurement technique. The HPM uses
measurements of the hydrogen density to calculate its purity. The method utilizes the
differential pressure produced by a small, constant speed fan called the purity blower.
This differential pressure is proportional to the gas density, which is proportional to the
gas purity. The highly accurate microprocessor based design provides sophisticated
information and can be incorporated into entire plant condition based maintenance
(GONZ 95).
4.3.11 Hydrogen Dew Point Monitor
Determining the amount of moisture in the hydrogen gas in an important
monitoring function. It is important to minimize the moisture content of the hydrogen
gas. The ability of any gas to absorb water vapor is a direct function of its temperature.
Therefore, at higher temperature, hydrogen can absorb a greater amount of moisture than
at lower temperature. The hydrogen gas in the generator will very rarely be saturated
because of the high temperatures involved during normal operation, even at less than full
load levels. The danger from excessive moisture in a generator arises from the fact that
even though the general environment may be relatively hot, the temperatures are
unevenly distributed. Specifically, the temperature of the gas at the outlet of the
hydrogen coolers will naturally be significantly lower than at its inlet. These localized
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lower temperatures cause a decreased moisture-absorbing capacity in the gas around the
area of decreased temperatures and thus possible condensation in some sensitive elements
of the generator internals.
The work reported here introduces two methods to determine the humidity of
gases. The chilled mirror method uses a rather simple concept, which says that the
reflectivity of the mirror is a function of the amount of condensation that has settled on its
surface. The temperature of the mirror can be changed to determine the dew point. The
problem with this method is that its reliability can be composed if the gas stream is
contaminated with dirt, dust, or oil vapor.
Another method is the use of thin film aluminum oxide to detect the moisture
content. This sensor consists of an aluminum strip, anodized by a special process to
produce a porous oxide layer. This, in effect, forms an aluminum oxide capacitor, with
the aluminum surface forming one electrode and the gold coating forming the other
electrode. The porous aluminum oxide layer acts as a dielectric. The electrical
impedance of the porous material is proportionally related to the amount of water vapor
that forms on it. Thus, the absolute humidity is calculated by relating it to the impedance
between the electrodes (GONZ 95).
4.3.12 Hydrogen Leakage Detector
The hydrogen pressure in a water cooled generator is commonly designed to be
higher than the water pressure. Any cracks in the hollow water-carrying conductors or
other small leaks will tend to result in a hydrogen leakage into the water system, rather
than a water leak inside the generator frame. The types of failure that have been
experienced include failure of the armature groundwall insulation because of permeation
by water when the insulation is not water resistant. Monitoring the hydrogen leakage into
the water system can serve to detect such cracks in the hollow conductors and other small
leaks.
A water tank is used to collect the water as it exits the stator and to act as a source
of cooling water for the pumps. In some designs, the tank is covered by blanket of clean
hydrogen to control the oxygen content of the water at a proper level to minimize
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oxidation of the hollow strands in the coils. The water pressure is always maintained
lower than the hydrogen pressure so that any perforations or cracks in the water-carrying
hollow conductors will cause hydrogen gas to leak into the water system, and not vice
versa. Therefore, any introduction of gas into the water system will register as an
increase in pressure of the hydrogen blanket, if one is used. This is a key parameter to
monitor when trying to detect the presence of such perforations or cracks. It should be
noted that the manufacturer should be consulted to determine what amounts to normal
leakage. This detector applies only to those designs that maintain a hydrogen blanket
over the water tank (GONZ 95).
4.3.13 Water Conductivity Detector
Conductivity cells are used throughout the stator coil cooling water (SCCW)
system to monitor the conductivity of the stator cooling water and ensure that its
electrical conductivity is within limits. Because conductivity is such a critical parameter,
cells should be placed at several locations in the system.
One such cell is typically placed at the outlet of the demineralizers to monitor
their effectiveness in reducing the conductivity of the water routed through the
demineralizer plant. A second conductivity cell is placed in the water tank to measure the
overall conductivity of the water that will be pumped into the stator coils. It is
recommended that a third cell is installed near the inlet to the generator to measure the
water conductivity closer to the point where its value is most significant.
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Chapter 5. Development of Comprehensive Sensor Networks
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 presents an integrated methodology for developing comprehensive
sensor network involving modem data processing techniques and Chapter 4 introduces
modern condition monitoring techniques. They provide the foundation for deciding what
types of sensors to use and where to put them. This chapter explains recommendations of
the sensors for use in on-line monitoring for operational availability improvement.
In addition, this chapter presents the overall architecture of plant wide condition
monitoring system networks, reflecting modem features of data processing techniques,
and then explains how the comprehensive sensor networks developed for the turbine
generator (TG) and the reactor coolant pump (RCP) can be elaborated into
comprehensive plant wide networks.
The studies of sensor installation feasibility have been performed several times
with the technical staffs in the power plants such as Seabrook Nuclear Power Station,
South Texas Nuclear Power Station, and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and with the
sensor manufacturers. The focus of this feasibility study is upon confirmation of design
specifications for new types of sensors and their placement. Then, their opinions and
suggestions on newly developed sensors have been coordinated into the final design work
using computer aided design software (e.g. AutoCAD (AUTO 96)). The reason why we
have gone through this design work is to make sure that we could install these sensors on
specific components.
Through these studies, it is emphasized that for new plants more attention needs
to be given to sensor locations as well as specific design for sensor installation should
they be used in the future. The falling costs of advanced instrumentation and
accumulation of plant operation may make these technologies more attractive in the
future. Therefore, final decisions should be made by each utility considering its own
specific situations for the needs of new monitoring systems and economic status.
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In the end of this chapter, the order of sensor preference priority is presented in
order to help the technical staff to choose the proper set of sensors in case that there are
several candidates of sensors in measuring a specific parameter.
5.2 Architecture of Plant Wide Condition Monitoring System Networks
The work reported here suggests use of dedicated networks that link individual
system (or component) monitoring systems into a plant wide data base system housed in
the main diagnostic center. It can control overall monitoring and diagnosis work. This
interconnection of the individual systems for the purpose of shared resources and
common database is achieved though the implementation of local area networks (LAN).
The main center LAN connects all of the major components together on a high speed data
network. This center should diagnose the integrated system state throughout the plant,
manage this information, display data in a use-friendly environment, and transfer
configured information to the plant control room.
In this architecture, rather than requiring that all information from all sensors be
brought to the centralized main diagnosis center, the use of remote data processing
equipment is recommended for transferring more sophisticated, integrated data to the
main center. These remote processors can communicate to the main center over high
speed communication link utilizing the Ethernet standard for protocol and reduce the
amount of cabling to the main center.
These networks should be designed to be easily integrated to other component
instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment and the plant control room. This means
that the diagnostic center can provide a communication interface, database management,
knowledge based processing, and man-machine interface. This task can be supported via
computer workstations that access and process data from the plant data highway.
5.3 Sensor Arrangements for Advanced Condition Monitoring in the Turbine
Generator
The sensor network development methodology presented in Chapter 3 is
employed to determine monitoring parameters and locations in stator winding, stator
core, rotor, bearing lubrication oil system, stator coil cooling water auxiliary system,
117
hydrogen auxiliary system, and gland seal system, etc. This design work has been
performed in order to make sure of sensor locations and sensor types as shown on
drawings and schematic diagrams that are feasible in the opinions of experts. Table 5.1
indicates the nomenclature for each sensor name.
Table 5.1 Nomenclature for Sensor Names
Nomenclature Sensor Name
ACC Accelerometer
ASC Airgap search coil
CM Conductivity meter
CT Current transformer
DP Differential pressure sensor
DXD Differential expansion detector
FOTS Fiber optic temperature sensor
FOVS Fiber optic vibration sensor
FP Flux probe
GCCM Generator core condition monitor
HLD Hydrogen leakage detector
HS Humidity sensor
KP Keyphasor
LKD Leakage detector
LVS Level sensor
MC Motor current sensor
PDS Partial discharge sensor
PP Proximity probe
PS Pressure sensor
PT Position sensor
PuS Purity sensor
RGC Rogowski coil
RTD Resistance temperature sensor
RXD Rotor expansion detector
SRTD Slot embedded RTD
SVD Shaft voltage detector
SXD Shell expansion detector
TBWD Thrust bearing wear detector
TC Thermocouple
TS Temperature sensor (RTD, TC)
TSD Turbine stress detector
VS Voltage sensor
VT Voltage transformer
WDA Wear Debris Analysis
(RTD: Resistance Temperature Detector, TC: Thermocouple)
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5.3.1 Sensor Arrangement for the Turbine Generator Exterior
Figure 5.1 illustrates what type of sensors to put and where to put them on the
turbine generator exterior. Table 5.2 shows detailed sensor types corresponding to sensor
location numbers. The detailed descriptions of individual sensors are mostly introduced
in Chapter 4.
Table 5.2 Sensor Locations and Types in the Turbine Generator Exterior
Sensor Location Number Sensor Type
1 HP differential detector
2 Turbine speed detector
3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18 Bearing vibration sensor: ACC
Bearing temperature sensor (RTD)
8, 22 Turbine metal temperature sensor(RTD)
6, 10, 13, 16 Shaft vibration sensor: PP, KP
Shaft torsional stress sensor (TSD)
4 Shell expansion detector
19 LP rotor expansion detector (RXD)
20, 23 Turbine stress detector (TSD)
21 Thrust bearing wear detector (TBWD)
(ACC: Accelerometer, PP: Proximity Probe, KP: Keyphasor)
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Figure 5.1 Schematic Diagram of the Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring on the Turbine Generator Exterior
(KEPC 96)
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5.3.2 Sensor Network for the Main Generator
Figure 5.2 illustrates sensor locations and types on the schematic diagram of
generator interior. Table 5.3 shows the sensor types and corresponding installation
locations. The bearing metal temperature and vibration measurements provide more
correlated indications of the condition of the bearing.
Table 5.3 Sensor Locations and Types inside the Generator
Number Component Sensor Type
1,6,14,20 Stator end winding FOVS (or ACC)
Stator end winding slots FOTS (or SRTD)
2, 5 Gland seal RTD
Gland seal oil path RTD, PS, FS
3,16 Hydrogen path RTD, PS, PuS, HS, GCCM
4,17 Stator core RTD
7,13,21,23 Stator coil cooling water path RTD, CM
8 Cooler water inlet path RTD, PS
9 Cooler water outlet path RTD, PS
10 Hydrogen blower PS
11 Rotor SVD, PP, KP
12,22 Bearing ACC, RTD
Bearing oil path RTD, FS, PS
15 Stator winding terminal CT, VT, RGC
18 Stator inside plate LKD, ACC
19 Rotor airgap FP (or ASC)
Accelerometers for vibration measurement and RTDs for temperature
measurement are typically used for this task. The on-line partial discharge sensor such as
Rogowski coil is recommended at the high voltage terminal and neutral terminal of the
generator. For general temperature measurements except for those of the stator winding,
RTDs are the first preference and then thermocouples are recommended. Fiber optic
temperature sensors are favored for the stator winding temperature measurement. For the
vibration measurement in the stator end winding, the fiber optic sensor is preferred and
accelerometers are recommended as the second choice. In the rotor airgap, either flux
probes or airgap search coils are recommended for detection of the flux variation caused
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Figure 5.2 Schematic Diagram of the Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring in the Main Generator
(JERV 93)
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by short-circuited turns. This is why the uneven heating of the rotor may result in uneven
thermal expansion of the conductor.
The detailed reasons why some specific sensors are preferred for the measurement
of specific parameter monitoring at some locations are described in Chapter 4. The final
decision on choice of specific sensors requires careful consideration based upon the
specification stage of the machine and a cost-benefit analysis.
5.3.3 Sensor Network for the Turbine Generator Lubrication Oil System
Figure 5.3 shows sensor locations and sensor types in the turbine generator
bearing lubrication oil system. We suggest that comprehensive sensors such as
temperature sensors, flow sensors, pressure sensors, vibration sensors, motor current
sensors, and partial discharge sensors to be used for the monitoring of lubrication oil
pumps. Their exact locations and detailed explanation of sensor selection preference are
shown in Chapter 4.
Foreign materials in the oil can result in a bearing wipe or in journal scoring.
Furthermore, water entrained in the oil can be a cause of rusting in the ferrous metal parts
with which it comes into contact. Thus, off-line wear debris analysis is recommended for
assessing the debris contents and debris type in lubrication oil. The level of the oil tank is
monitored closely for high and low levels. Level switches are typically used for this
measurement. The temperature at the inlet of the coolers must be monitored. One major
reason is that cooling water in the cooler secondary is not tuned on until the temperature
of the oil reaches a certain level. We typically recommend using RTDs for this function.
Moreover, monitoring of the lubrication oil cooler differential pressure can indicate
whether there is flow in the coolers. Monitoring of inlet and outlet oil temperatures
should be performed in order to detect the degradation in the cooling capability.
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Steam Flow
(Note: The legend is given in Table 5.1)
Figure 5.3 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring in the Turbine Generator Lubrication Oil System
(BISS 95)
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5.3.4 Sensor Network for the Stator Coil Cooling Water System
Figure 5.4 shows sensor locations and types in the stator coil cooling water
system. In the turbine generator, the stator winding and coil cooling system usually are
the most responsible for lost availability. This design work suggests what type of sensors
to use and what locations to consider for comprehensive condition monitoring.
Figure 5.4 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring in the
Stator Coil Cooling Water System (Note: The legend is shown is Table 5.1)
This study emphasizes on the needs of modern hydrogen leakage detector, which
is installed inside the water tank. Its detailed mechanism and functions are described in
Section 4.3.12. The water tank level can also indicate some problems with the system
flow loss such as leaks. Conductivity cells are used through the SCCW system in order
to monitor the conductivity of the stator cooling water and to ensure that its electrical
conductivity is within acceptable limits. The outlet of the mineralizer, the tank interior,
and water path after the strainer are recommended as sensor installation locations. The
filter differential pressure is a good indicator that should be measured in order to
determine the internal state of the filtering element. If it is excessively clogged with
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filtered material, the element will resist the flow of water, resulting in an abnormally
large pressure drop across it. The differential pressure of the stator cooling water across
the cooler can be used to detect the flow across the cooler in order to assess the cooler
state as well as water cooling capability. Also, the temperatures of the cooling water
should be measured at the inlet and outlet of the stator to check if the temperature is
getting higher. For comprehensive monitoring of the cooling water pump, temperature,
pressure, flow, vibration, partial discharge, and motor current should be measured with
the corresponding sensors that are recommended in this study. Further analysis on the
cost and benefit are recommended in deciding how comprehensively it is monitored.
5.3.5 Sensor Networks for Hydrogen Cooling Auxiliary System
In Figure 5.5, we recommend what types of sensors to put in the hydrogen
auxiliary system. One of the most important parameters in the hydrogen system is its
pressure because its directly affects the performance of the generator stator. We
recommend using various monitoring points in the hydrogen supply system. The
differential pressure measurement determines the integrity of the hydrogen blower and
ventilation system. The problems caused by abnormal hydrogen pressure are directly
related to the flow of hydrogen through the generator.
The temperature of the hydrogen is the second important parameter measured
because the heat transfer capability of the system depends upon the temperature
difference between hydrogen and stator windings. Inlet and outlet hydrogen temperature
across the coolers should be measured in order to determine the effectiveness of the
coolers. The humidity detector measures the moisture content of the hydrogen. High
humidity levels can also be result in serious corrosion cracking of various critical
components, such as retaining rings. Liquid detectors are liquid level switches located at
the turbine end, the exciter end, the lead box, and underneath the hydrogen coolers. They
collect water or oil that is leaking and condensing from the various sources in the
generator. Especially, leaks in the hydrogen coolers may lead to critical problems such as
moisture ingress into the hydrogen. The humidity measurement of hydrogen at inlet and
outlet of the cooler, liquid detector, and the color of the desiccant crystals should be
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Electric Heater
Desiccant
Hydrogen Supply (Note: The legend is given in Table 5.1)
Figure 5.5 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring in Hydrogen Auxiliary Cooling System
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integrated. Hydrogen gas is likely to become flammable when its purity is degraded.
One significant source of impurities is a variety of problems in the gland seal system.
Thus, a hydrogen purity meter could provide information about the impurity level of the
hydrogen supply in abnormal situations.
5.3.6 Sensor Network for the Gland Seal System
Gland seals, supplied with oil under pressure, are used to prevent the leakage of
hydrogen through the clearance between the generator shaft and the frame. There are two
kinds of designs. One is a double-flow system and the other is a single-flow system.
This study introduces the condition monitoring sensor network concerning the double-
flow system. The gland seal ring for the double-flow system has two grooves, one for
each oil supply. The different oil supplies, called the air-side (AS) and hydrogen-side
(HS) systems, should be kept separate in this overall system.
Figure 5.6 shows the sensor types recommended for use in the hydrogen-side seal
Air-Side Oil Feed
Seal Ring TS TS, FS TS, FSTSBearing r
ACC Generator ACC
LS LS
. .-.- 4--.----
Defoaming Tank Drain Defoaming
I ... . I Tank I Filter
Figure 5.6 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring
in the Hydrogen-Side Gland Seal System (Note: The legend is shown in Table 5.1)
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oil system. When a defoaming tank overflows, excess oil can enter the generator frame.
A level switch is usually used in each tank to provide a warning when a defoaming tank
is in danger of overflowing. Also, the drain regulator tank level should be monitored.
The comprehensive monitoring for a pump is recommended, including the monitoring of
temperature, pressure, flow, vibration, motor current, and partial discharge, etc. An
analysis of economic cost and benefits is recommended for determining the degree of
monitoring coverage to use within the seal oil pumps. As the filter progressively
accumulates more debris from the oil, it further impedes the flow of oil, causing the
pressure drop across the filter to increase commensurately.
In Figure 5.7, sensors for the air-side seal oil system. The air-side system is
generally better instrumented than the hydrogen-side, because of its greater complexity
and greater economic importance. The air-side seal oil system has one local pressure
indicator on each side to measure the oil pressure at the ring. The pressure difference
between the hydrogen-side and the air-side systems at the rings is the parameter that
determines how much mixing is occurring between the oils from the two systems.
Because this mixing has to be minimized it is important to monitor this parameter. The
Hydrogen-Side Feeds
TS, PS - - TS, PS
Generator
DP
LS- Drain F ilterGenerator
LS Loop Seal Regulator
Drain Tank 7DP
Backup
Main Pressure Sources
Regulator
I1TS-- - TS
TS, FS TS, FS --PS
Backup Pressure
DP DP- Regulator
Figure 5.7 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Condition Monitoring in the
Air-Side Gland Seal System (Note: The legend is shown in Table 5.1)
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differential pressure between the seal oil and the hydrogen gas is important because it
determines the ability of the seal oil system to maintain a seal in the generator.
5.3.7 Sensor Network for the Generator Core and Frame
Historically, generator core failures have known been fewer than those considered
previously, however, the outage time is rather lengthy. The early indications of the fault
are flow of large circulating currents, high temperature, and the pyrolysing of insulation
materials. The most common way to monitor the core is through the Generator Core
Condition Monitor (GCCM), described in Section 4.3.7. The temperature of the core end
is typically measured by the RTDs because the core end has been known to the most
likely location for overheating to occur.
Frame cracks are generally the result of long-term operation with high frame
mechanical vibrations, possibly because of generator shaft misalignment or unbalance.
Such cracks in the frame can cause hydrogen leaks to take place. Gas vented to the
outside may create a potentially explosive situation. A tracer-gas detector can be installed
for leaks are difficult to detect. Then it is used outside of the generator to detect the
presence of a leak at a specific location. One of the typical causes of core damage is
detected through vibration measurement using accelerometers.
5.4 Sensor Arrangements for Advanced Condition Monitoring in the
Reactor Coolant Pump
The reactor coolant pump (RCP) circulates water through the primary coolant
systems in order to transport energy from the reactor core to the steam generator. Figure
5.8 illustrates the monitoring points for subordinate components of the RCP. Table 5.2
relates sensing locations shown in Figure 5.8 to the proper sensor types. The detailed
explanation of individual sensor selections is given in Chapter 4. Like the turbine
generator monitoring, vibration is an important sensitive parameter indicating the
operating state of rotating assembly since every rotating machine has its own
characteristic vibration signature, which can be obtained from the frequency spectra of
the monitored vibration signals. Proximity probes are the most sensitive to very low
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amplitude and low frequency vibrations of the rotating shafts in the RCP. A phase
reference probe detects phase changes.
An accelerometer measures the acceleration of rotating components such as
bearings, the impeller and the rotor because it has high frequency sensitivity. The
comprehensive process monitoring including the continuous measurements of
temperature, pressure, and flow is recommended for the cooling water inlet and outlet,
seal injection flow and component cooling water. Also, bearing oil pump monitoring is
recommend in order to utilize a comprehensive sensor set, which can provide information
on temperature, pressure, flow, vibration, motor current, and partial discharge
monitoring, etc. Analyzing the cost and benefit arising from addition of new monitoring
equipment should perform the final decision on coverage of comprehensive monitoring
system. Furthermore, water entrained in the oil can be a cause of rusting in the ferrous
metal parts with which it comes into contact. Thus, off-line wear debris analysis is
recommended for assessing the debris contents and debris type of lubrication oil.
Table 5.4 Sensor Locations and Types in the Reactor Coolant Pump
Sensor Location in Figure 5.8 Sensor Type
1, 2, 11, 16 ACC
3, 4, 9, 19 ACC, TS
6, 18 TS
13, 15, 20 TS, FS, PS
22, 23 PP, KP
24 TS, FS, PS, ACC, MC
(Note: The legend is given in Table 5.1)
Monitoring locations and sensors in the RCP motor are shown in Figure 5.9.
While many types of fault detection are available for motors, on-line monitoring is
generally provided by some combination of thermal, vibration, and electrical monitoring
techniques. The majority of motor failures can be related to the stator, the rotor,
insulation and the bearings. The identification of mechanical problems such as rotor bar
fracture, airgap eccentricity and bearing wear via on-line analysis of the current as the
most frequently monitored on-line parameter for an induction motor can provide an
indication of an early stage of failure.
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Figure 5.8 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for Reactor Coolant Pump
Condition Monitoring (MEYE 93)
Stator Voltage (VT)
Stator Current (CT) Stator Winding Temperature (TS)
Bearing Temperature (TS)
Bearing Vibration(ACC)
Oil Temperature(TS)
Oil Fkw(FS)
01l Contamination (WDA)
Figure 5.9 Schematic Diagram of Sensor Network for RCP Motor Condition
Monitoring (TAVN 87) (Note: The legend is given in Table 5.1)
The supply current is normally monitored very easily, without interfering with the
machine, simply by fitting a clip-on current transformer around the supply cable to the
motor. The Rogowski coil, which is located around the high voltage terminals of the
stator winding as a non-invasive current transducer, can be suggested for use for
measurement of high frequency current pulses in the stator windings generated by partial
discharge activity in the insulation structure.
5.5 Priority Recommendations of Sensors for Use in On-line Monitoring
This section summarizes recommendations of sensors for use in on-line
monitoring and advice for operational availability improvement. The sensors suggested
for the target plant components addressed in Chapter 4 and previous sections of Chapter 5
are presented in order of preference priority as recommended in measuring a specific
parameter with several candidates of sensors. In cases where there are multiple choices of
sensors for the specific monitoring point and parameter, the sensors are recommended in
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order of priority as shown in Table 5.5. The reasons for these rankings are discussed
below.
Table 5.5 Recommended Order of Priority in Measuring the Specific Parameter
with Multiple Choices of Suggested Sensors
Monitoring Point and Parameter Order of Priority of Recommended
Sensors
Generator stator winding vibration 1. Fiber optic vibration sensor
2. Accelerometer
High voltage terminal of stator winding 1. Rogowski coil
(Partial discharge in generator and motor) 2. Current transformer
3. Capacitive coupling
Generator rotor winding temperature 1. Electronic rotor temperature sensor
2. Resistance temperature detector
3. Thermocouple
Generator stator winding temperature 1. Fiber optic temperature sensor
2. Imbedded temperature detector
3. Resistance temperature detector
4. Thermocouple
Temperature measurement except stator 1. Resistance temperature detector
winding and rotor winding 2. Thermocouple
Off-line lubrication oil system wear debris Ferrography or Spectrometric oil
analysis (in generator and motor)
Rotor flux measurement in generator airgap Flux probe or Airgap search coil
Turbine generator shaft vibration 1. Proximity probe and keyphasor
2. Torsional vibration monitor
Bearings in turbine generator and reactor Accelerometer
coolant pump
Generator frame
Casing in generator and pump
Turbine rotor speed Tachometer
1) Vibration Sensor Recommendation
The relative displacement of the shaft is usually measured by proximity probes. A
tachometer has been used to measure the shaft rotational velocity. The third one, called
an accelerometer, measures the acceleration of rotating components such as bearings,
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impeller, generator frame and casing and rotor because it has high frequency sensitivity.
A phase reference probe (keyphasor) measures the change of phase in a shaft.
As the vibration amplitudes increase, the stator coil end-turns are progressively
more fatigued from a mechanical standpoint. Common vibration sensors such as
accelerometers are very susceptible to strong electromagnetic fields near the generator
stator windings. On the other hand, the fiber optic vibration sensor has one significant
advantage, that is, the sensor and all cabling to and from it are nonconducting. Thus, use
of a fiber optic vibration monitor enables on-line early detection and identification of
developing end winding loosening through the measurement of coil end vibration levels
and the trending of vibration levels over time.
A wide variety of electrical disturbances on the transmission system, such as
electrical faults and high-speed reclosing of circuit breakers, can cause turbine generator
shaft fatigue damage. Torsional vibration monitor have made it possible to understand
better how the interactions between the electrical transmission system and the turbine
generator would provide an opportunity for early detection of shaft problems.
2) Partial Discharge Sensor Recommendation
There are capacitive couplings, and Rogowski coil, which can serve as
transducers for on-line monitoring. The capacitive coupling is housed between the high
voltage terminal. Its principal feature of the partial discharge analysis is its ability to
reject the electrical interference that typically dominates the high frequency signal
emitted by the partial discharge. However, its monitoring instrument is generally not
suitable for on-line monitoring of discharge activity. The Rogowski coil can be suggested
for on-line use.
3) Temperature Sensor Recommendation
RTDs are generally considered more accurate than thermocouples and exhibit
signal linearity. Especially, an embedded temperature detector using a slot RTD is
recommended for stator winding use because the space in the stator end winding is very
long and narrow. In some parts of the generator, the most likely hotspot is difficult to
predict because of the great length of the potentially overheating elements. In order to
overcome these limitations under a strong electromagnetic field, the fiber optic
temperature sensor has been developed for detecting the location of a hotspot anywhere
in its length. For the rotor temperature measurement the electronic rotor temperature
sensor (ERTS) is introduced to measure the temperature of the rotor at a specific location.
4) Wear Debris Analysis Recommendation
Two representative methods, the spectrometric oil analysis and wear particle
analysis are recommended for use equally in the work reported here.
5) Rotor Flux Sensor Recommendation
Two representative measurements, by the flux probe and the airgap search coil are
recommended for use equally in the work reported here.
5.6 Strategy for Sensor Set Determination Utilized in a Nuclear Power Plant
The work reported here recommends much more elaborate sensor arrays at the
design stage of the new nuclear power plant than is the typical. Thus, the technical staffs
in each power plant should systematically make a final decision concerning which
sensors to keep among the suggested sensor set. The value of each sensor can be
evaluated in terms of a cost and benefit trade-off to decide whether to use a specific new
sensor or not.
The key factors to be considered concerning the total cost of a new sensor are
sensor price, sensor installation feasibility to a specific location, and sensor maintenance.
Also, a quality evaluation concerning the sensor reliability, lifetime, accuracy, and
sensitivity to indicating specific failure mode states of interest should be performed. This
evaluation should be followed by preliminary discussions with specialists in the relevant
area. In particular, a system that recommends an inappropriate recovery action caused by
a wrong sensor measurement, subject to low sensor quality, may lead to financial loss
arising from unexpected forced outages and the degradation of power plant system
integrity. Once the expected financial loss associated with a sensor of particular quality
and total cost are calculated, the expected benefit from use of a new specific sensor
should be analyzed. Use of advanced sensing capability can enable both significant
financial gains from better plant operations and potential prevention of system integrity
degradation by detecting an incipient failure. The sensing capability for an incipient
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failure mode can be evaluated though the examination of signal correlation with a
corresponding failure mode, sensor technology maturation state, availability of advanced
auxiliary data processing equipment, and previous applications to analogous cases.
Finally, a systematic decision-making process should decide upon the utilization of a new
specific sensor, if it proves to yield financial advantages. Equation 5.1 formulates the
relationship concerning costs and benefits concerning use of a new sensor.
NET (B, C, L) = B(PF, PD) - C(PR) - C(IN) - C(MA) - L(RE, AC), (5. l1a)
B(PF, PD) = EFD x ML, (5.1b)
L(RE, AC) = P x UFD x ML, (5.1c)
where,
SUM: net benefit function, B: net present benefit function, C: net present cost function,
L: financial loss function due to incorrect measurements,
EFD: expected forced outage days prevented by new sensor measurements,
ML: expected money loss per one day of forced outage,
UFD: unexpected outage days caused by sensor measurements,
P: probability of having an incorrect measurement that leads to a forced outage
PF: prevention of forced outages, PD: prevention of system degradation, PR: sensor price,
IN: sensor installation, MA: sensor maintenance, RE: sensor reliability, AS: sensor accuracy.
As an illustration using the values, shown below, we evaluate a 1300MW power
plant in operation for ten years. We examine the case of a motor current analysis in the
reactor coolant pump motor. For this case
EFD = 10 days, ML = $700,000, P= 0.01, UFD = 3 days,
C(PD) = $ 50,000, C(IN) = $ 20,000, C(MA) = &80,000
Use of Equation 5.1 leads to the following results:
Total benefit: $ 7,000, 000, Total cost: $1,500,000, Total loss: $21,000,
NET = &5479000
This means that the utilization of a motor current analysis is recommended.
Equation 5.1 is a simple cost and benefit model for selecting sensor sets. In actual
decision-making a more detailed, sophisticated model would be needed to include factors
(e.g. sensor replacement) not treated here.
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Chapter 6. Bayesian Belief Network Based Expert System
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the needs of a Bayesian Belief
Network (BBN) based advisory system, which is supported by a comprehensive sensor
network developed in Chapter 5. First, the motivations, of why a BBN is selected as a
reasoning tool within an advisory system, are discussed in comparison to the
conventional rule-based approach. Then, the BBN concept and fundamental theory are
briefly explained. After essential elements, composed of the BBN-based inference
algorithms, are defined, an example prototype diagnostic network, formulated in terms of
information flow is presented.
6.2 Expert System Applications
Expert systems (ES) are known to be computer-based systems employing human
knowledge to solve problems that are thought to require human expertise. One of
representative definitions gives the following (STEV 84):
Expert systems are machines that think and reason as an expert would in a
particular domain. For example, a medical diagnosis expert system would request
as input the patient's symptoms, test result, and other relevant facts; using these as
pointers, it would search its data base for information that might lead to the
identification of the illness. A true expert system not only performs traditional
computer functions of handling large amounts of data, but it also manipulates that
data so the output is a meaningful answer to a less than fully specified question.
There are several reasons for using expert systems. Chiefly among them are the
following (CAST 97):
1. With the help of an expert system, personnel with little expertise can solve
problems that require expert knowledge. This is also an important factor in cases
where human experts are in short supply. In addition, the number of people with
access to the knowledge increases.
2. The knowledge of several human experts can be combined together, which gives
rise to a more reliable expert systems, a system that is based on the collective
wisdom of several experts, rather than on the experience of a single expert.
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3. Expert systems can answer questions and solve problems much faster than the
human expert. Thus, expert systems are invaluable in cases where time is a
critical factor.
4. In some case complexities of the problem prevents the human expert from reaching
a solution. In other cases the solutions obtained by human experts are unreliable.
Due to the capabilities of computers of processing a huge number of complex
operations in a quick and accurate way, expert systems can provide both fast and
reliable answers in situations where the human experts cannot.
5. Expert systems can be used to perform monotonous operations and others that are
boring or uncomfortable to humans. Indeed, expert systems (e.g. an unmanned
airplane or a spacecraft) may be the only viable option in a situation where the
task to be performed may jeopardize a human life.
6. Substantial savings can be achieved from using expert systems.
Applications of expert systems in many fields of study have grown very rapidly
during the last decade or so. Figure 6.1 classifies the use of expert systems according to
areas of application and shows the application distribution of each area. This survey
examined some 2500 expert systems and classifies them according to several criteria such
as fields of applications, task performed, etc (DURK 94).
- . " @C ; , .O s$
(P
Application Fields
Figure 6.1 Applications of Expert Systems in Many Fields
139
400
350
300 -
250
200
150
100
50
0
60j
I
6.3 Bayesian Belief Network Based Approach
6.3.1 Motivation
Most of existing monitoring systems in the nuclear power plant have been
designed mainly from the safety standpoint. Their corresponding safety related
operational procedures are usually represented by a set of production rules that express
straightforward deterministic problem solving domains or stochastic problem solving
domains supplemented with certainty factors.
This broadened concern for the operational availability improvement of complex
target systems motivates the work reported here to employ a probabilistic approach,
based upon the Bayesian Belief Network, for the diagnosis and maintenance. The
availability-driven diagnosis involves a great degree of uncertainty, more than with
safety-related sensor values because
(1) The observations made may be uncertain. The sensors themselves are not
completely reliable. The information of sensor readings should be interpreted with a
degree of uncertainty.
(2) The abstract knowledge obtained is not deterministic. The system states are
simplified into several failure states in our diagnostic problem. The associated
uncertainty grows when the lower level failure modes are combined to define the
higher level failure modes of a complex system.
(3) The relationships among failure modes and measurements of various sensor signals
are not deterministic.
(4) Uncertainty can be due to incomplete understanding of target system behavior when
a given task is to be modeled in terms of the current state expertise. The accumulated
knowledge and experience in the future may overcome such uncertainty.
Even though knowledge-based systems have been widely employed in the area of
diagnosis, most of them use a shallow knowledge about target systems, which link an
observed phenomenon to an individual system fault itself. This is usually done with
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shallow understanding or heuristics of the causal evolution of system faults. Even though
this can result in fast efficient diagnoses for deterministic faults, it is not suitable for
structural and functional domain knowledge in a complex system, which represents the
interconnections and the behavior among subordinate components in the complex system.
Skilled system management requires sophisticated procedures reflecting the detailed
features and performance of the complex target system. Thus, there is a need for the
system operator to be able to detect the states of subordinate components and to treat
their processes systematically before critical states are reached.
In the early applications of expert systems, a rule-based approach was typically
used. However, this treatment is abandoned in the work reported here in favor of
Bayesian Belief Networks' (BBNs). This is because of the inability of rule-based
approaches to properly model the inherent uncertainties and the complexities of the
relationships involved. Section 6.4 discusses the pros and cons of two approaches, and
demonstrates that BBNs are superior to rule-based approach in the particular domain of
complex, incompletely understood system.
6.3.2 Overview
A BBN relies upon Bayes' Theorem, Bayesian updating and influence diagrams
for decision making. BBNs represent model domains that are characterized by inherent
uncertainty as a relatively new discipline of expert system applications. They estimate the
probability of an event as a subjective degree of belief in its occurrence and also provide
a measure of uncertainty that takes into account all available relevant knowledge and
information. This uncertainty can be due to imperfect understanding of the domain,
incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the time when a given task is to be
performed, randomness in the mechanisms governing the behavior of the domain or a
combination of these.
1 Other names for Bayesian Belief Networks include probabilistic networks, causal networks, and Bayesian
influence diagrams.
Formally, a BBN is a directed acyclic graph 2 that models the relationships of a set
of variables. Within a BBN the nodes represent random variables, and the links represent
probabilistic state variable having dependencies upon the variables. These dependencies
are quantified through a set of conditional probability tables (JENS 96). The availability
of powerful computers and a better instrumented plant makes it possible to incorporate an
abstract, symbolic knowledge representation and permits the numerical calculation
needed to support BBN based reasoning.
A Bayesian Influence Diagram (BID) is a belief network augmented with
decisions and utilities. Influence diagrams have been used successfully in uncertain
complex decision making problems by graphically representing the diagnostic problem
domain through simple topological symbols and links between them. In an advisory
system, the output of this diagram is a diagnostic mapping from sensor readings to a
determination of the probability distribution of the alternative states of the failure modes.
Once the failure modes are identified, a diagnostic inference algorithm suggests the most
advantageous action to improve the system availability.
6.3.3 Fundamental Theory
In this section we introduce basic axioms and the theory to explain the theoretical
concepts of BBNs.
Basic Axioms: The probability P(A) of an event A is a number in the unit interval [0,1].
Probabilities obey the following axioms.
1. P(A) = 1 if and only if A is certain.
2. If A and B are mutually exclusive, then
P(AvB) = P(A) + P(B). (6.1)
Conditional Probability: The basic concept in the Bayesian treatment of events is
conditional probability. A conditional probability statement is of the following kind:
2 A directed acycle graph contains no directed cycle. That is, in a directed acycle graph, we cannot travel
from a node and return to that same node along a nontrivial directed path.
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Given the event E, the probability of the event A is p.
P(A,E)P(A / E) = P p
P(E) (6.2)
I
The notation for the statement above is as follow. It means that if E is true, and
everything else known is irrelevant for A, then P(A) = p.
Joint Probability: A BBN for a set of variables { xl, x2 , ..... x, n} represents a joint
probability distribution over those variables. The joint probability distribution is
achieved through the chain rule of probability:
P(xI, X2 , ..... ) = P(Xi/xl1 ..... , Xi-). (6.3)
Conditional Independence: Another important concept for BBNs is conditional
independence. Two sets of variables, A and B, are said to be conditionally independent
given a third set of variables C if when the values of the variables C are known,
knowledge about the values of the variables B provides no further information about the
values of the variables A as
P(A/B,C) = P(A/C). (6.4)
Consider the simple network shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2 A Simple Bayesian Network (I) Illustrating Conditional Independence
Using the chain rule of probability we could calculate the joint probability distribution as
follows:
P(A,B,C,D) = P(A) P(B/A) P(C/A,B) P(D/A,B,C). (6.5)
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However, because of the conditional independence created by the graph structure the
calculation of the joint probability distribution simplifies to:
P(A,B,C,D) = P(A) P(B/A) P(C/B) P(D/C). (6.6)
Bayes' Theorem: The cornerstone of Bayesian probability theory is the inversion
formula due to Bayes' theorem.
P(E/Hi)P(Hi)P(Hi/E) = P(E/)P((6.7)
P(E/Hi)P(H1)
In the Bayesian interpretation, the probability of a certain hypothesis Hi, being
true, P(Hi) represents our degree of belief in that hypothesis. After we receive new
evidence E which reinforce or weakens that hypothesis, this degree of belief becomes
P(Hi/E) and can be formally updated according to Bayes' theorem.
Bayesian Updating: Bayesian theorem is particularly useful in contexts where
probabilities are more easily obtained in one inferential direction than another, thus
providing the flexibility to reason in either the causal or the information flow direction.
The inversion formula provides a convenient way of updating belief in a proposition in
light of new evidence.
In the causal network the probability distribution of the states of any dependent
nodes (a node where the true state is unknown) at a particular domain within the network
are defined in terms of the conditional probabilities linking the independent nodal states
(those where the nodal state is known with certainty, or is characterized by a probability
equal to unity) to the states. Then, in a new domain the probability distributions of the
dependent nodes are updated using Bayes' theorem in Equation 6.7 to estimate a
posterior probability distribution, f, in terms of the previously obtained probability
distribution, f, and new evidence, E, newly obtained in the previous domain, as
f = C P(E) f, (6.8)
where P(E) is the probability of observing the newly obtained evidence and C is constant.
Use of this relationship is called Bayesian updating.
The BBN model is a directed acyclic graph where the nodes in the graph
correspond to uncertain variables relevant to the problem. An uncertain variable can
represent an arbitrary set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions, where each
proposition is called an instance of the variable. Each variable in a belief network is
associated with a set of probability distributions. The links in the directed acyclic graph
represent direct probabilistic dependencies among the uncertain variables. In Figure 6.3,
a link from node A to node B reflects an assertion by the builder of that network that the
probability distribution of B may depend on the instance of the variable A, we say that A
conditions B. Thus, a node has probability distribution for every instance of its
conditioning nodes. The lack of links in the network reflects the conditional
independence between nodes.
Given a fully specified Bayesian network, the joint probability distribution of the
variables can be constructed.
Nodes A, B, C
Substates A(al, a2, ... , aj), B(bl, b2, ... , bj), C(cl, c2,..., Cj)
Conditional Probability P(bj/ak), P(cj/ak) ( = 1,2....,i k = 1,2, ... ,i)
Figure 6.3 A Simple Bayesian Belief Network (H) and its Logic
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If evidence from node B and C is provided, the probability distribution of the
states of node A is computed from prior probability distributions of node A, and
conditional probabilities. If evidence from node A is provided, the probability
distributions of the states of nodes B and C are computed from conditional probabilities
without considering prior probability distributions of node A.
To sum up, we conclude that BBNs represent uncertain relationships among
observation, and inference algorithms for BBNs and allow us to compute the probability
of a hypothesis given known evidence.
6.4 Comparison Between Rule-Based and Bayesian Belief Network Based
Expert Systems
The rule-based approach to the development of expert systems is based upon the
principles of classical logic and is well suited for use in problems involving few exact
relationships, or at least relationships having very strong dependencies. In these systems
knowledge is represented as a set of rules of the form 'if antecedent then consequent',
and inference proceeds by changing of the rules once a new relevant piece of evidence
appears in the database. Classical deterministic rule-based expert systems usually do not
deal with uncertainties because objects and rules are treated deterministically.
In most practical applications, however, there are various sources of uncertainty.
Observations may be uncertain, information may be incomplete, and the relations in the
domain may be of a non-deterministic type. Thus, there is a need for expert systems that
can deal with uncertain situations in a systematic way. Trouble shooting in a rule-based
system typically involves simple retrievals of stored candidate lists indexed by failure
symptoms.
The work reported here presents BBN based expert systems. The details of their
main features and comparison to rule-based expert systems are described. Keeping with
the treatment of rule-based expert systems, uncertainty management, knowledge
representation, decision making, ease of modification, and systematic root cause tracking
of BBN based expert systems are critically examined.
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6.4.1 Knowledge Base
There are two different types of knowledge in expert systems. One is concrete
knowledge and the other is abstract knowledge. Regardless of expert system type,
concrete knowledge is the evidence or facts that are given in a particular situation
associated with cases to be analyzed. This type of knowledge is not static and can change
from one situation to another. This knowledge is stored in the working memory, not in
the knowledge base. Abstract knowledge constitutes knowledge based upon information
stored is static, that is, it doesn't change from one situation to another.
The knowledge base of a rule-based system consists of a set of objects (variables)
and a set of rules. These rules represent the relationships among a set of objects. The
knowledge base in rule-based expert systems is easy to obtain, since there are needs to
handle only simple elements such as objects, premises, and rules in simple problem
solving domain. However, its knowledge is limited and inappropriate for solving
complex problems.
The knowledge base of a BBN based expert system consists of variables and
conditional probabilities. This knowledge is able to represent a complex problem domain
which cannot be represented by a set of rules because the degree of knowledge that we
can store is more advanced. Simultaneously, a large numbers of parameters are involved,
which may make the specification of BBN model difficult.
To sum up, shallow rule-based knowledge provides only a limited capability to
model and explore problems. Its inference engine is fast and easy to implement. On the
other hand, the BBN-based knowledge base is highly suitable for modeling a complex
domain where there is a need for advanced degree of expertise capture.
6.4.2 Knowledge Representation and Complexity Management
In rule-based expert systems, the relationships between objects are represented by
a set of production rules. Since corresponding knowledge is shown in text format in the
form of IF-THEN type rather than object-oriented graphics, the entire structure of the
modeling is not visible to the developer or user. It is, thus, very hard to obtain an overall
picture of the whole system from a set of rules. Moreover, because each rule is developed
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in an independent manner during all stages of expert system development, great effort is
needed to maintain the completeness and consistency of the entire inference algorithm.
In complex systems, the rules often force the domain expertise descriptions into an
inappropriate representation. Often, the knowledge engineers artificially use uncertainty
factors in order to introduce uncertainty measures to an established rule, but many times
fail to provide sophisticated diagnosis for the complex mechanisms when subject to
inherent uncertainty. Moreover, we note that the complex problem representation in rule-
based expert systems requires use of a great number of rules, which are very cumbersome
to treat properly when changes must be made.
In comparison, BBN based systems use graphical knowledge representations.
The objects are represented as nodes and their relationships as links between the nodes.
The BBN makes the domain structure explicit and utilizes the topology of the graph in
the control of the inference. This type of object-oriented programming is the result of an
evolution of programming, where newly developed tools make some programming tasks
easier and more natural. Also, with a BBN it is much easier to maintain the completeness
and consistency of the modeling system because the entire structure of model is readily
understood. The graphical representation and conditional probabilities used make BBN
based systems especially desirable for use in complex problem solving.
Use of Bayesian theory combined with either causal network or information flow
networks reduces the amount of conditional independence assumptions and the number
of conditional probability values that need to be specified. Furthermore, Bayesian
networks are not limited to binary logic, as we can take a Bayesian network node and
divide it in as many states as needed. The practical application of this approach can
become unmanageable unless one is working with predefined and controlled sets of
hypotheses and admissible pieces of evidence.
Thus, BBNs can represent complex problem domains in a consistent and complete
way without oversimplifying the complexities and help user to perform object-oriented
programming with an easy-to-learn modern graphics.
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6.4.3 Uncertainty Management
Deterministic problems are conveniently formulated using a set of rules that relate
several well-defined problems or objects. There are numerous practical cases, however,
that involve uncertainty. For example, in the diagnosis of mechanical systems, some
sensor readings always imply the existence of a degree of abnormality, and may imply
the existence of a severe failure. Even though the uncertainty management can be
performed using some treatments as a rule-based uncertainty factor and a fuzzy set, these
theoretical mechanisms do not have sound theoretical foundations and may even be
inherently inconsistent. So, they are hard to interpret and awkward to use. Most such
theories simplify the real world and are employed safely only under very limited
conditions.
By contrast, the BBN gives the probability of an event as a measure of the
uncertainty of its occurrence. The fact that BBNs are based upon probability theory can
permit us to use pre-existing knowledge and statistics to learn the prior and conditional
probabilities of the network elements.
Heckerman and Shortliffe (HECK 92) review the history and mechanics of
uncertainty factors, and delineate their theoretical and practical limitations. They show
that the BBN representation overcomes many of the limitations of the uncertainty factor
model, and provides a promising approach to the practical construction of expert systems.
Therefore, BBNs are an excellent, theoretically based method for providing a complete
and consistent treatment of uncertainty.
6.4.4 Decision Making
Once the state of a system is identified, an expert system should draw conclusion
and provide advice for efficient management of the system. This means that the final aim
of an expert system is to choose an acceptable action on the basis of an imperfectly
known state and uncertain predictions of future changes that might follow a particular
action. For example, after diagnostic expert systems evaluate signals from a range of
sensors, they should finally suggest the most advantageous actions that might remedy
particular situations.
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In the BBN based expert systems, influence diagrams have been combined
successfully in complex decision making problems by graphically representing the
diagnostic problem domain through simple topological symbols and links between them.
So, this influence diagram is defined as Bayesian influence diagram (BID). Decision
nodes represent points at which choices have to be made between well-defined
alternatives and links directed to a decision node depict information available at the time
of making the decision. The procedure for decision making can be modeled explicitly by
taking into account costs and gains in terms of cost benefit competition, or by defining
utilities in the utility node associated with particular combinations of management
measures and the true state of the system. In the work reported here the alternative action
having with the highest expected utility is suggested for use in the inference algorithm
imbedded in the advisory system.
By contrast, rule based systems do not have efficient uncertainty management
capabilities. So, decision making in rule based systems is either realized qualitatively,
which is not satisfactory in many cases, or complemented by some procedural
subordinate routines which perform mathematical calculations, thereby introducing new
complexity into the system. Artificial decision making using a rule based system
typically involves greater effort than with a BBN.
6.4.5 Inference Engine and Mechanism
The inference engine is the heart of every expert system. The main purpose of
this component is to draw conclusions by applying the abstract knowledge to the concrete
knowledge (CAST 97). For example, in the diagnosis of mechanical systems the
symptoms as indicated by sensor readings (concrete knowledge) are analyzed in the light
of the symptoms of all abnormalities of subordinate components (abstract knowledge).
Despite some limitations of the rule-based approach, its computational procedure
has been so straightforward when used on problems involving exact relationships and or
at least having very strong dependencies. The inference engine of BBN based expert
systems is more complicated, based upon the evaluation of conditional probabilities. The
degree of difficulty of use depends upon the selected model and ranges from low, for
general independence models, to high for general dependence models. Fortunately, the
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computational penalty associated with the probabilistic approach has largely been
overcome in the BBN area in recent years through the rapid advancement of computer
technology and the development of methods based upon graphical representations of
dependencies and efficient updating algorithms which take advantage of the dependency
structure.
Inference in rule-based systems where the rules represent purely logical
relationships is unidirectional. Their search mechanism is by forward chaining only.
However, sophisticated diagnosis in complex systems with inherently uncertain
relationships between various subordinate components cannot be achieved using
unidirectional reasoning based upon classical rule-based logic. The uncertainty
relationships in most diagnostic problems require bi-directional plausible reasoning, a
dynamic combination of relationships in terms of information flow and causality, which
leads to reliable diagnosis through validation. That is, inferences in the direction of
information flow (symptom to cause) and in the direction of causality (cause to symptom)
may have to be made, depending upon the evidence available, in the chain of reasoning
leading to the final diagnosis and testing. Even though the arrows in the BBN are
determined in the specific direction dictated by special concerns, some pieces of evidence
can be provided at any nodes in addition to the nodes relating directly to symptoms.
Then, the results of the updating of all relevant nodes can be evaluated if the entire
inference model works properly.
6.4.6 Modification, Refinement and Verification of Knowledge
Since the knowledge is not complete, there can be greater potential with the BBN
for handling newly acquired expertise. Then, the model itself should be readily modified
and extended to reflect changes and growth in the real world system. Thus, most of the
models of knowledge based systems have no choice but to be extended, fine tuned, and
refined incrementally as experience occurs. It is desirable to accommodate such changes
at low cost.
In rule based systems being changed, many associated rules usually have to be
searched for in order to reflect any changes in the knowledge base. Sometimes their
implicit structures make the selection of associated rules more difficult. Moreover, the
meaning of an uncertainty factor is artificial, and difficult to explain as a measure of
change in belief. Sometimes, in order to correct the expert system's logic, extra rules
have to be created to ensure that other rules are triggered in the right order. Thus,
generally rule-based systems require rigorous testing and validation due to the problems
mentioned above. Domain experts find them difficult to follow during debugging, as the
new rule processing does not always flow logically.
In BBN based systems, the software editor module provides facilities for creating
and editing the network of interest (i.e., creation and editing of conditional probability
tables). Explicit models are much easier to modify because they represent the entire
structure of the system represented in a natural, transparent manner. This is a very
important feature for practical knowledge based system development and maintenance.
Usually such a model is easier to maintain and verify, and thus has a larger life span than
that provided by rule-based systems. We conclude that BBNs are superior to rule-based
systems in their ability to update programming in reflecting newly acquired knowledge in
complex systems, whose behavior is inherently uncertain and complex.
6.4.7 Knowledge Acquisition
Knowledge acquisition is the first step in knowledge based system development
and is essential for the success of the expert system. It is usually realized by querying
experts and capturing their reasoning process. The reasoning process of the experts is
generally vague and large uncertainties are involved, their knowledge is not always
conveniently expressed in deterministic rules even when aided by some uncertainty
management methods.
In many cases their knowledge is intrinsically probabilistic and can be easily
modeled using the conditional probability concept. The experts have high flexibility in
modifying the conditional probabilities to find a good match of their implicit model to the
real world. Another advantage of BBN based systems in knowledge acquisition is that its
graphical knowledge representation can be easily understood by both developers and the
experts, which greatly facilitates communication and avoids confusion.
However, experts usually express their knowledge in a form, convenient for
themselves if they are not familiar with the Bayesian analyzing procedure. At the
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beginning stage, work dealing with experts should demonstrate to them that knowledge
elicitation is sufficiently natural and easy for them to understand. Documentation should
permit easy translation of expertise into the Bayesian formalism. We recommend that the
Bayesian expertise capturing procedure should systematically formulate how various
levels of knowledge are acquired and synthesized into inference algorithms imbedded in
the BBN based expert system.
6.5 Example BBN Based Diagnosis and Management Model
This section briefly illustrates an example prototype diagnosis and maintenance
model using a qualitative BBN representation. The detailed, concrete mathematical
relationships used are explained in Chapter 8, which introduces the prototype networks
using the Hugin expert system shell.
The flowchart depicted in Figure 6.4 suggests several main steps to be taken in
developing system diagnoses for provision of operational advice. This inference
algorithm consists of five procedures for developing BBN based representations. This
algorithm starts from use of input sensor readings and ends with an output prediction of
the future system status by means of the recommended action through inference of the
current status probability distribution of specific system states and determination of the
most advantageous action to take.
Figure 6.5 illustrates how the inference algorithm in Figure 6.4 is encoded into the
example diagnosis and maintenance model from the viewpoint of information flow using
the BBN formalism. This example model is applied to the diagnosis and maintenance of
a bearing component.
In this network sensor nodes are labeled "S_", and failure mode nodes are labeled
"F_". The topological symbols and links between sensor nodes labeled "S_Temperature"
and "S_Vibration" and a failure mode node (prior to action) labeled "F_BRG_Damage"
represent the relationships between sensor measurements and the system states in a
information flow direction. The node named "F'_BRG_Damage " represents the status of
a failure mode after the recommended action has been taken.
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Input: Sensor reading
Inference of probability distribution of failure mode states
given a set of sensor readings
Calculation of expected utility in terms of costs and benefits
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
Determination of a recommended action based upon the
action of highest utility
Output: Prediction of probability distribution of failure mode
states after taking a recommended action
Figure 6.4 Inference Algorithm for BBN Based Diagnosis and Maintenance Advice
The mathematical relationships between sensor nodes and failure mode are
expressed with corresponding conditional probability value. The following paragraphs
define some informational elements as used in the example network.
1) Findings:
The prototype network operates upon the observable data because in general, the states of
a system or the states of an abstracted failure mode are not directly observable. Sensor
nodes indicate a useful source of information obtained directly from sensor readings or
from advanced data processing systems. In this model, three mutually exclusive states of
the sensor readings are discretized into the classes "Low", "Medium", and "High". These
ranges are defined in reflecting the expertise of relevant equipment manufacturer and
operators.
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Legend:
BRG: Bearing
S: Sensor node having Low, Medium, and High ranges
F: Failure mode node before a recommended action having Good, Incipient, and Severe states
F': Failure mode node after a recommended action having Good, Incipient, and Severe states
Action: Action node for transitions between failure mode states by means of the alternative actions
having No Action, Remedial Action, and Trip Action
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of expected costs and benefits arising from failure mode state
transitions caused by alternative actions
Figure 6.5 Example of the BBN Based Diagnosis and Management Network for the Turbine Bearing
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2) Hypothesis:
Diagnostic hypotheses are 'artificial' concepts created to give a name to a specific
situation or combination of component states in which a system can be found at a given
time. In other words, each diagnostic hypothesis is a simplified abstraction built to
characterize some abnormal behavior states of a system such as "Bearing Damage" as
shown in Figure 6.5.
Failure mode nodes, as indicated by sensor readings are discretized into a number
of states abstracting the fault progression modes. In Figure 6.5, a node named
"F_BRG_Damage" stands for the hypothesis of the failure mode that a bearing is
damaged before a corrective action is performed. In our model, three mutually exclusive
failure mode states in terms of fault progression are labeled "Good"', "Incipient", and
"Severe". The intermediate sensor range indicates the incipient failure state and the high
range indicates a high probability for the severe failure state immediately. The reason for
discretization is to simplify the state structure of a failure mode. The structure is
associated with the alternative possible actions. This network does not show how the
system reaches a certain failure mode state. Rather, it quantifies the static failure mode
state probability as indicated by sensor information flow.
This failure mode state probability is changed by the alternative actions that can
be selected in terms of the expected utility value. The probability distribution of each
state in a transited failure mode enables us to predict the future state of a specific failure
mode. A node named "F'_BRG_Damage" in Figure 6.5 represents the hypothesis of the
transited failure mode after the corrective action has been taken.
3) Actions:
The network can reflect causal effects of actions changing the failure mode states.
At this point, action nodes are introduced to represent failure mode state transformation
functions. The probability values provided through knowledge elicitation from domain
experts are used to support decision making in order to select the action that is the most
appropriate.
The rectangular box of Figure 6.5 stands for the alternative possible actions. An
action is required to change the specific state of a failure mode. The detailed
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mathematical formulation of the relationships between failure modes, action nodes, and
utility nodes applied in the advisory system is explained in Section 8.6.
4) Utility:
The various possible alternative decisions should be evaluated on the basis of the
net value of their various consequences. The decision mechanisms of Figure 6.5 represent
points at which choices have to be made between well-defined alternatives and links
directed to a utility node depict information available at the time of making the decision.
The diamond-shaped node in Figure 6.5 stands for a utility node. The criterion of
the decision is formulated in a utility node, which integrates the information from a
failure mode node state before an action, a failure mode node state after action, and the
action node depicting the action that will cause the state transition of interest. The
usefulness is evaluated on a numerical scale, called a utility scale. In the work reported
here, the costs from particular actions and the benefit from state transition are calculated
and then algebraic sum gives the net benefits of the action.
6.6 Reduction to a Rule-based Representation of a General BBN
Previously, in Section 6.3 we outline the theory of BBNs. Section 6.4
demonstrates that the rule-based approach has serious limitations through the comparison
to the BBN based approach. Section 6.5 illustrates an example application of BBNs for
diagnosis and maintenance concerning a specific mechanical component. This section
seeks to demonstrate how general BBNs can be reduced to be a rule-based representation
as a special case.
Consider a simplified version of the system shown in Figure 6.5 assuming that
only one sensor of that system is considered the resulting system in Figure 6.6. A simple
utility table is obtained in order to express the example decision rule. "IF RCP bearing
temperature is more than 195 F, THEN trip the reactor". When there are two sensor
ranges, low or high, the utility table shown in Figure 6.6 indicates that a different
alternative action (that having a utility value of unity) should be favored in each range,
respectively. This table is very simplified, compared with that shown in Figure 6.5
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(whose concrete structure and values are explained in Chapter 8). Moreover, we see that
the number of subordinate states in the sensor and failure mode nodes in Figure 6.6 is less
than that of Figure 6.5. We conclude that a rule-based knowledge representation is a part
of and special case of BBNs.
Example Rule: IF RCP bearing temperature is more than 195 F, THEN
trip the reactor.
_ _BRGTemp tiity -. -- Action
Logic Network
Where,
S_BRGTemp: Bearing temperature sensor node (Below 195F: Low, Abovel95: High)
Action: Trip reactor action node (No Trip, Trip)
Utility: Utility node
Sensor Low High
Action • No Trip Trip No Trip Trip
Utility 1 0 0 1
Utility Node Table
Figure 6.6 Rule-Based Representation Using the BBN Formalism
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Chapter 7. Selection of Expert System Shell
7.1 Selection Criteria
Humans often solve complex problems using very abstract, symbolic approaches
which are not well suited for implementation in conventional languages. Although
abstract information can be modeled in these languages, considerable programming
efforts is required to transform this information to a format usable with procedural
programming paradigms. Programming an expert system from scratch using LISP,
PROLOG, C, or any other high level computer language is an arduous and time-
consuming task. The major advantage of an expert system shell is to save the time and
effort required to develop an inference mechanism and auxiliary features for expert
system use. As a result, the efforts can be dedicated to the development and refinement
of modeling without getting involved in the details of the programming.
A factor to consider when selecting a shell is whether a commercially available
shell is adequate. The rule of thumb to follow is if a commercially available shell exists
that satisfies the representation, performance, and support requirements of the task, then
use that shell. For the selection of the proper expert system shell, a number of criteria,
listed below are considered in this study.
1) Reasoning Paradigm and Knowledge Representation
The most important criterion that the shell must satisfy is that it must support the
knowledge representation paradigm and reasoning method used in a convenient
way. The main concern and features of specific tasks should be treated efficiently
with a proper expert system shell. The key factor for our advisory system is the
powerful ability to compute using a series of comprehensive inference algorithms
that represent our complex problem solving domain. The type of object-oriented
programming is preferred for the convenience of system development and ease of
maintenance.
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2) Real-Time Processing Capability
The expert system should be able to provide useful results in real time. Thus, the
expert system shell should provide the capability to reason and make decisions in
real time.
3) System Integration with Other Systems
Expert systems for use in power plants should be compatible with other data
processing equipment. Compatible coding and maintenance of the system
knowledge base are preferably performed in a higher language like C in terms of
system integration, instead of in a special purpose language like LISP.
4) User-friendly Structure
A shell should have features in the structure for system use, which facilitate
operator interactions with an easy-to-learn user-friendly, man-machine interface.
A user-friendly knowledge editor should have the advantage of maintaining the
consistency and completeness of the knowledge base as new information is
entered.
5) Graphical Presentation
A graphical presentation is also a highly desirable feature found in many expert
system shells. It consists of a graphical display of the relationships between the
system's knowledge components. Graphical output is also favored as a more
natural way for explaining the system's resulting conclusions.
6) Performance
A shell, which meets all of the above requirements, may perform unacceptably.
As the knowledge base grows, performance can quickly degrade. When the
performance of a shell is evaluated, the test cases should approximate the size of
the intended application to ensure that proper performance will be obtained at the
expected size and complexity of the final system.
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7) Vendor Support
The shell should be consistently maintained consistently and its creating
organization should remain operational during the shell usage lifetime. Ideally,
the shell should provide some form of on-line tutorial or assistance in its
operation. Just like any other piece of conventional software, a shell's
documentation should be complete and easy to read.
8) Cost
The definition of high cost varies with each organization. We note that the cost of
a shell does not always reflect its capability. When purchasing any shell, the ratio
of its performance to cost should be carefully analyzed.
According to criteria listed above, we searched for a shell and consulted with some
specialists in this field. The shell best suited for our application should retain a friendly
graphical user interface, have powerful data manipulation capability, use the C coding
language, operate on a PC windows platform, have uncertainty management capabilities,
and offer proper vendor support.
7.2 Review of Commercially Available Shells
7.2.1 Bayesian Belief Network Based Expert System Shells
Even though the theoretical beauty of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) was
recognized in the past, there was too little computer capability easily available to support
BBN-based expert system shells using modern graphic representations. The recent rapid
development of computer technologies has made it possible to create BBN-based expert
system shells supported by modern graphics. Contrary to most other expert techniques,
BBNs are relatively new applications in the area of artificial intelligence. Thus, a good
deal of theoretical insight as well as practical experience was considered in determining a
well-suited shell for our application.
Table 7.1 shows a comparison of these shells in terms of the selection criteria of
language, real time processing capability, graphical representation, software company,
computer, and platform.
Table 7.1 Comparison of Alternative BBN Based Expert System Shell Features
(Y: Yes, NA: Not Available, NI: No Information)
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Shell Company Graphical Language Real-time Platform Uncertainty
Representation processing Management
Baron KC Associates Y C NA Windows Y
BMR Prevision Inc. Y C Y Windows Y
Demos Luminar Decision Windows
System Y NI NA Mackintosh Y
Ergo Noetic Systems Windows
Inc. Y NI NA Mackintosh Y
Graphical- Russel G. Almond Y C Y Windows Y
Belief Unix
HUGIN HUGIN A/S Y C Y Windows Y
Unix
NETICA Windows
Norsys Y C Y Mackintosh Y
Unix
The final candidates for the application to use in this work were Baron (KC associates),
BMR (Prevision Inc.), Demos (Lumina Decision Systems), Ergo (Noetic Systems Inc.),
Graphical-Belief (Russel G. Almond), HUGIN (Hugin A/S), and Netica (Norsys
Software Corporation). This table shows that BMR, HUGIN, and NETICA have all good
features in terms of the stated criteria. Thus, the final decision of what shell to use is
made through the discussion with specialists in this area, from previous application
examples, and direct use in case modeling.
7.2.2 Rule-Based Expert System Shells
Although BBN-based systems have many advantages over rule-based systems,
rule-based systems have a much longer development history and many mature rule based
expert system shells are commercially available currently, which have been employed in
various applications. The use of a good-featured shell that is easy to learn, easy to use
and has many powerful features is favored so that the time and effort required for
programming can be saved. In order to gather as much information as possible before
making final decisions, a survey of rule based expert system shells was performed.
The ideal rule based shell should be written in the C or C++ languages, and be
working on PC Windows computer platform for integration with other software and
hardware. It should have powerful and fast rule manipulation capabilities, powerful
uncertainty management facilities, graphical user interface, interfaces to other software
and databases, should support object-oriented programming and procedural
programming. The commercially available rule based shells found in this survey are
summarized in Table 7.2, from which it can be seen that none of them has all of the
desired features. The shells can be categorized into three types, each having its own
limitations. Although many shells are mature and have many powerful capabilities, none
of them is particularly well suited for the problem solving domain of our application.
First, examples of dedicated shells designed for particular applications include
Acquire and XpertRule which are designed for knowledge acquisition, GBB for software
integration, KnowledgeMaker for rule generation, Powermodel for design process, PC
Plus for classification and some others. These shells are not be good candidates for this
work.
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Table 7.2 Comparison of Alternative Rule-based Expert System Shell Features
(Y: Yes, NA: Not Available, NI: No Information, UF: Uncertainty Factor, B: Backward, F: Forward)
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Shell Language Platform Knowledge Reasoning Uncertainty Real-time Explanation Graphics
Representation
ART 4GL Windows Frame, Rule F NA Y Y Y
Unix
Gold Works III CLOPS Windows Frame, Rule F UF Y Y
GURU KGL Windows Rule F, B UF Y Y NI
Fuzzy
FLOPS OPS5 Windows Rule NI Fuzzy NA NA NA
ILOG-Rules C Unix Object, Rule F NA Y NA Y
Kappa-PC C Windows Object, Rule F, B NA NA Y Y
M4 C Windows NI F, B UF NA Y Y
PC+ LISP Windows Frame, Rule F, B UF NA Y Y
Powermodel C Windows Object, Rule F, B NA NA Y Y
Unix
Examples of general purpose shells include Kappa-PC, M.4, GoldWorks III and
others. These shells are designed for a wide variety of applications such as business
management and technical process control. They usually support object-oriented
programming, have powerful graphical user interfaces, have interfaces to other popular
software and can be easily integrated with other systems. However, since they are not
designed for diagnostic applications, they have very limited uncertainty management
facilities, limited real time processing capabilities, and no temporal reasoning
capabilities, which make them undesirable for this work.
Examples of shells designed for real time diagnosis applications include ART,
KEE and G2. These shells have adequate uncertainty management and real time
processing capabilities and have been successfully employed to build many real time
diagnostic systems. However, they are themselves complex systems and are much too
expensive for our use. Their prices are ten times that of general purpose shells such as
M4.
7.3 Features of the HUGIN Expert System Shell
Through an evaluation based upon above criteria and advice from relevant
specialists, the HUGIN expert system shell has been chosen as having best combined
features and many records of previous applications. The HUGIN system is a high level
reasoning tool enabling us to construct expert systems in domains characterized by
inherent uncertainty. The HUGIN package provides a source of information on BBNs,
including a tutorial, current research efforts, and commercial applications as well as the
tools for expert system construction.
The HUGIN system was originally developed at Aalborg University, Denmark in
1993. HUGIN stands for Handling Uncertainty In General Inference Network. It is
implemented under the environment of Windows 95 (or NT) and Sun operating systems.
The graphical interface is made in NeWS'. Contrary to earlier probabilistic attempts and
rule-based approaches, this tool makes the overall domain structure explicit and utilizes
the topology of the graph using nodes and links in the control of diagnostic inference. We
1 NeWS is a trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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can use HUGIN through HUGIN Runtime, an easy- to- use graphical environment. This
provides an intuitive graphical visualization of the knowledge that is convenient for
operator interaction. HUGIN allows us to define both discrete nodes and to some extent
continuous nodes in the models imbedded within the advisory system.
HUGIN is implemented using C language. The HUGIN API (Application
Program Interface) which comes as a library for C (or C++) can also be utilized.
Software coding and maintenance using a higher level language like C are preferable
instead of being done within a special purpose artificial language like LISP. This
capability enables us to integrate the advisory system with other systems. The application
can communicate with the constructed component models by using the HUGIN API
(HUGI 94).
A typical HUGIN development and utilization session is divided into three
subtasks: Creation of a domain model, (2) generation of a run time system, and (3) the
actual problem solving. These tasks must be performed sequentially, but the session can
be suspended at any point and resumed later. The HUGIN shell is organized in a modular
fashion as indicated in Figure 7.1. The graphical interface module does all of the
necessary bookkeeping and provides access to facilities for creation, saving, loading, and
Figure 7.1 Schematic Structure Describing Stages of Development and Use of the
HUGIN Expert System Shell
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deletion of domains. The editor module offers facilities for creating and editing creation
and deletion of nodes, links, and conditional probability tables (CPTs), etc. The compiler
module creates a junction tree in which all calculations are performed. The inference
module maintains a set of probability values in all nodes in accordance with entered
findings (ANDE 89).
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Chapter 8. Integration of the Bayesian Belief Network Based
Inference Algorithm
8.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is to formulate the prototype Bayesian belief
network (BBN) using the HUGIN expert system shell. It is applied to the entire
diagnosis and maintenance network for each of our target systems. First, the main
interpretative modes of our advisory system are defined. These are composed of the
advisory mode, the diagnostic mode, and the predictive mode. Then, the reasoning
inference method and the utility concept, formulated in the inference algorithm, are
explained. Several major steps are suggested for the systematic formulation of the BBN-
based diagnostic inference algorithm. These steps are composed of successive
development of a structural system hierarchy and a functional system hierarchy, of the
refined causal network, of the Bayesian belief network with its inference engine, and of
the Bayesian influence diagram with its inference engine. Also, the suggested scheme for
systematic knowledge elicitation and synthesis provides the framework for obtaining
conditional probability and utility values as essential knowledge bases, which can be
elicited from experts. Finally, this chapter presents the computerized causal diagnostic
inference algorithm formulated using the HUGIN expert system shell.
8.2 Advisory System Uses
Advances in sensor technologies have provided a substantial increase in the
quality and operational information during the plant operation. Typically, available
diagnostic information is not correlated or otherwise analyzed and presented in a form
that is well suited for use by an operator. Our advisory system aims to process and
memorize information, to learn and reason in both deterministic and uncertain situations,
to communicate with an operator, and to take corrective actions. By the help of advisory
systems, the burden on the operator can be reduced by automating some of the decision
making tasks that must be performed on a regular basis, thereby relieving the operator to
do more demanding tasks. Through the operator interface module of our advisory system
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information flow to the operator can be reduced to that of key operational advice that is
essential to safe and economical operation. In the evaluations performed within the
advisory system there are three main interpretative modes:
a. The Advisory Mode, where the known nodes are the sensor outputs, and the
probability distributions of the system status and the expected utility value of the
alternative actions are estimated. Eventually, these estimates suggest to the operator
the most advantageous actions to take.
b. The Predictive Mode, where a particular action is intended and the probability
values of future states of the failure modes and the sensor readings are estimated.
This mode is useful in indicating to an operator the likely failure mode states and
sensor outputs should a particular action be taken. Such estimates provide a basis
for comparison of the actual component and sensor set performance to the
estimations of the advisory system. Large persistent divergences between the two
would indicate that the advisory system is in error for some reason.
c. The Diagnostic Mode, where the highest level failure mode state is known as
well as the sensor outputs, and the probability distribution of the states of the
subordinate failure modes are reviewed. This estimate is useful in diagnosing the
root cause of the observed failure as a basis for planning the needed component
recovery actions.
The advisory system developed in the work reported here is set up for use in all
such modes, using the graphical user interface of the computer used by the advisory
system to display the estimated results. Beside the user-friendly environment of this
system, the real-time, on-line execution engine supports the prompt functions of technical
personnel and operators during abnormal conditions at the power plant.
8.3 Integrated Architecture for an Advisory System for the Intelligent
Diagnosis and Maintenance Integrating a Comprehensive Sensor Network
In the actual operation of a power plant, the accurate advisory information should
be provided on-line for efficient diagnosis and maintenance (D&M). However, the
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process engineer is inevitably confronted by problems of inaccurate measurements and
has to interpret redundant and diverse signals in reflecting the system states. Similarly
information may be coming from instruments whose accuracy and reliability under
infrequent abnormal conditions may be different from what would be expected.
The framework of an integrated architecture for performing modern on-line
condition monitoring and intelligent maintenance for operational availability
improvement is configured in the work reported here. This integrated architecture is
composed of a comprehensive sensor network involving modern signal processing
systems, advisory systems for sensor validation, and advisory systems for intelligent
diagnosis and maintenance, as shown in Figure 8.1. The work reported here does not
address sensor validation. Each box of Figure 8.1 represents a module dedicated to the
specific role in the system's development. The D&M advisory system is supposed to
operate using a microcomputer and has an interface with a sensor validation advisory
system, which also has an interface with a comprehensive sensor network.
Modeling the sensor characteristics to an appropriate level of detail has the
advantage of giving more accurate and robust mapping between system physical state
being sensed and the sensor readings. The D&M advisory system should be supported by
a real-time sensor validation advisory system, providing an efficient and flexible way to
address every aspect of the on-line data validation and reconciliation, and sensor
monitoring. The prior and conditional probabilities reflecting historical data and expert
opinions for use in the BBN should be considered for systematic operation and
performance enhancement of this validation advisory system. Finally, the system
provides an on-line data configuration file relevant to the D&M advisory system.
Specifically for the D&M advisory system, the system should generate probabilities for
the mutually exclusive subordinate sensor states being labeled.
Then, the D&M advisory system processes the information from a sensor
validation advisory system. Eventually, this integrated architecture should be included
under the entire structure of plant wide monitoring and diagnosis system suggested in
Section 5.2.
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Figure 8.1 Integrated Architecture for the Intelligence Diagnosis and Maintenance Advisory
System Integrating the Comprehensive Sensor Network
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8.4 Reasoning Inference Method
Diagnosis is the process of determining the states of a system given its symptoms.
It is difficult to how to make reasoning their relationships. Also, it is an even more
difficult task to quantify the relationship between a failure mode and symptoms and to
represent the reasonable likelihood of a failure mode when specific sensor readings are
provided.
The work reported here discusses two types of reasoning inference methods. One
is information flow reasoning and the other is causality flow reasoning. Sometimes, the
relationships can be viewed as a mapping of causal behaviors or as a mapping in the
information flow direction. The main uses and the specific interests of using the advisory
system determine an important aspect of which reasoning inference method is selected.
8.4.1 Information Flow Reasoning
A simple network formulated in terms of information flow reasoning is made up
of a finite set of nodes representing the hypothesis of the failure mode and evidence from
validated sensor readings, and a finite set of links between pairs of nodes representing
their relations. This reasoning is the process of determining the state of a system based
upon symptoms.
Figure 8.2 represents a fragment of information flow relationship from a sensor
node (S) to a failure mode (F). Here, F is linked with S in the direction S -- F. The
The direction of evidence flow is the
Bearing v  ce.E).....Temperature same as that of the reasoning procedure
Overheat Sensor for obtaining conditional probability
(F) (S) values. Thus, it's called information
flow reasoning.
E: Evidence, F: Failure Mode Node, S: Sensor Node
Model Link Evidence Flow
Figure 8.2 A Fragment of Information Flow Reasoning
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sensor indicates the failure mode state. The dashed line represents the direction in which
way evidence enters. The solid line stands for the link that signifies the conditional
dependency direction from S to F where corresponding conditional probabilities are
generated.
In this reasoning sense, the direction of evidence flow is the same as that of the
reasoning procedure for obtaining conditional probability values. Thus, it's called
information flow reasoning. Let us consider the following example of bearing diagnosis.
In the case that a sensor indicates a high temperature range, there is high belief
(probability value) of the bearing failure mode state being that of severe overheating.
Values of the conditional probabilities P(Fi/Sj) are required as a knowledge base. If
evidence S is entered, the probability distribution of F is calculated by the following
equation.
P(Fi, S) = P(Fi/ Sj)P(Sj), (8.1)
where, i=1,..,n
j=l,..,m
Fi: i-th state of a failure mode
Sj: j-th state of a sensor reading.
The uncertainty in this reasoning inherently grows consistently in the same
direction as information from sensor readings is transferred to a specific failure mode.
The cumbersome task of assigning the prior probability value of F values in this
calculation can be eliminated. The prior probability values of F do not affect the
probability distribution of a specific failure mode.
We realize that the number of conditional probability values grows rapidly with
an increasing number of sensor nodes in a network in the case that a single failure mode
node connects to multiple sensor nodes. Moreover, this correspondence prevents us from
doing bi-directional reasoning from a failure mode to multiple sensors. In validating
model, only the use of unidirectional checking in the direction of S to F is allowed
concerning the final probability distribution of a specific failure mode given a set of
sensor readings. In the "diagnostic interpretative mode" performed within the D&M
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advisory system, there is a limitation in identifying a root cause in case that concerning a
specific failure mode an expected root cause is located in a node not connecting to any
corresponding sensor node.
8.4.2 Causality Flow Reasoning
A simple network formulated in terms of causality is also made up of a finite set
of nodes representing the hypothesis of a failure mode and evidence from validated
sensor readings. The causality flow reasoning is the way to reflect the causal process of
system itself.
Figure 8.3 represents a fragment of causal relationship from a sensor node (S) to a
failure mode (F). Contrary to Figure 8.2, F is linked with S in the direction F -> S. This
is a representation of the relationship, where a cause, "Bearing Overheat" leads to a
symptom, change of "Temperature Sensor" value. In this reasoning, the conditional
probability values P(Sj/Fi) are required to be assigned to a knowledge base in order to
signify the causal conditional dependency from F to S. The direction of the dashed line
in Figure 8.3 indicating the direction of evidence is opposite to that of causal reasoning
for obtaining its corresponding conditional probability values.
The direction of evidence is opposite to
Bearig Temperatre that of causal reasoning (from cause to
... E..d............. u symptom) for obtaining its correspondingOverheat Sensor conditional probabilities. Thus, it's called
(F) (S) causality flow reasoning.
E: Evidence, F: Failure Mode Node, S: Sensor Node
Model Link Evidence Flow
Figure 8.3 A Fragment of Causality Flow Reasoning
In the Bayesian belief network (BBN) after evidence S is entered, the probability
distribution of F is calculated using the inversion mapping by Bayes' theorem. Their
combined mathematical formula is given as Equation 8.2:
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I P(S# / Fi)P(Fi)
P(Fi,S) = P(Si), (8.2)
P(Sj / Fi)P(Fi)
where, i= 1,..,n
j=l,..,m
Fi: i-th state of a failure mode
Sj: j-th state of a sensor reading.
Unlike the use of information flow reasoning, the direction of uncertainty growth
here is opposite to that of determining the conditional probability values. The prior
probability distribution of F affects the inversion mapping in calculating the value of
P(Fi,Sj).
In the case that multiple sensors provide symptoms to a single failure mode, we
require a number of conditional probability values providing a one-to-one
correspondence between a failure mode and each sensor. In validating the model, bi-
directional reasoning in either way can be performed, from a failure mode node to related
sensor nodes or vice versa. In the diagnostic interpretive mode of the advisory system,
the root cause can be tracked systematically among subordinate failure modes where the
highest level failure state probability distribution has been observed.
Also, inference in the network can be used to predict the future state probability
distribution concerning a failure mode node state and a sensor node given that one of the
alternative actions has been executed. In the "predictive interpretative mode", the link
between a posterior sensor node and a posterior failure mode node given that one of the
alternative actions executed has the same direction consistently as that of the link
between a sensor node and a failure mode node before an alternative action is taken.
As the main interpretative modes available performed within the advisory system
are utilized, causal inference reasoning is favored rather than information flow reasoning.
This occurs for reasons of ease in terms of systematic root cause tracking, bi-directional
testing of the network, and convenience of obtaining conditional probability values
between multiple sensors and a single failure mode.
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8.5 Formulation of the BBN Based Generic Diagnosis Inference Algorithm
We chose the turbine generator and the reactor coolant pump (RCP) for applying
the ideas outlined here. Leading causes of the turbine generator (TG) are bearings with
lubrication oil system, and stator windings with auxiliary cooling systems. Because the
RCP is a relatively less complex system compared to the TG, most of the subordinate
components in the RCP are treated in the work reported here.
In Section 8.3 we construct the BBN-based generic inference algorithm in a
causal direction. Figure 8.4 illustrates the major steps for formulating a BBN diagnostic
inference algorithm. The major steps suggested here are development of a structural
system hierarchy and a functional system hierarchy, of a refined causal network, of a
Bayesian belief network (BBN) with an associated inference engine, and of a Bayesian
influence diagram (BID) for use with the inference engine. These four levels of model
construction are supported by required expertise, which is composed of expert-based
graphical model development, of an expert's conditional probability table, of a library of
corrective actions, and of a library of utility values. The detailed contents of each task
area are described in the following sections.
8.5.1 Structural System Hierarchy and Functional System Hierarchy
The knowledge base forms the core of an advisory system, together with well-
defined systematic logic network formulating procedures. For sophisticated reasoning
driven by operational availability improvement, system-oriented high level
understandings are required for complex systems. The knowledge base built upon a deep
understanding of the system structure and its malfunctions can play an important role in
developing a framework for fault evolution, cause and effect, and characteristics from
which to deduce the root causes of the observed behavior.
In order to formulate a BBN-based generic diagnosis inference algorithm in a
systematic way, first of all the work reported here employs a structural system hierarchy
(SSH) and a functional system hierarchy (FSH). Structural knowledge concerns that part
of the model that stores connection information between various components of the
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Figure 8.4 Bayesian Belief Network Based Generic Diagnosis Inference
Algorithm Formulation Procedure
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model. Functional knowledge concerns that part of the model that describes how each
component works at the complete system level. In particular, from the FSH major failure
modes for system processes and expert knowledge can be identified and then critical
parameters or sensor information indicating particular failure modes can be defined. This
allows for a natural decomposition of a system functional entity into comprehensible and
concrete system functionality, each addressing a logical part of the diagnostic algorithm.
Thus, the graphical representation of the SSH and the FSH taken together can
serve as a general frame for structuring a complete graphical algorithm explicitly using
object-oriented programming tools. This is because the BBN approach makes the domain
structure explicit and utilizes the topology of the graph in the control of inferences. The
programming tools of the HUGIN expert system shell offer facilities that make
programming tasks easier and more natural. From the view point of system causality, the
knowledge from a hierarchical decomposition can be converted into a diagnostic network
with causal paths being in the form of a directed link and a conditional probability table
between network nodes.
8.5.2 Refined Causal Network
After a structural system hierarchy and a functional system hierarchy are
constructed, then the experts are needed to review the graphical algorithm in order to
determine whether it can cover all important failure modes and relationships between
failure modes and corresponding sensor sets that indicate symptoms. Because the experts
typically are poor Bayesian analyzers, at this stage of work their expertise can be elicited
in a natural linguistic form. Then, the expertise is translated visually into graphical
notations. Such presentation permits easy arrangement of the expert knowledge and
makes it easy to elaborate the network's structure because this representation is
sufficiently easy to understand for the experts. As the experts become well trained
concerning the formalism of the BBN, they may come to represent their knowledge
directly in terms of topological symbols. These preliminary minor alterations to the
network's structure will reduce the burden of the next arduous, time-consuming steps.
After expert approval the graphical network can be completed. These nodes of
the graphical network are connected by directed links that denote causality and make
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explicit the dependencies between variables, thus leading to construction of a refined
causal network.
8.5.3 Bayesian Belief Network with Inference Engine
Once a refined causal network is formulated, the actual operational procedures of
the nuclear power plant are reviewed and the utility expert consensus obtained are
coordinated. The range of sensor readings can be discretized and then the subordinate
states of a failure mode representing the failure progression can be classified.
We realize that different numbers of sensor ranges and subordinate failure mode
states are used depending upon their types. In each sensor node, there are usually three
mutually exclusive subordinate ranges composed of "Low", "Medium", and "High". In
each failure mode node, often three mutually exclusive states are termed "Good",
"Incipient", and "Severe" in terms of fault progression relating to sensor ranges. In the
work reported here we use this classification for purposes of illustration. In the resulting
network the dependencies between variables are quantified by means of conditional
probabilities, whereby the probability of each node state is conditional upon the values of
its parent node states. Thus, in this step all required conditional probability values can be
assigned. This graphical network, incorporated using conditional probability values,
becomes a Bayesian belief network.
We should note in this step that electric company utility experts are usually not
familiar with Bayesian concepts. So, the scheme developed in the work reported here
configures a general frame concerning how to elicit their expertise in plain terms and to
translate it into a Bayesian form. Table 8.1 illustrates a standard table for obtaining
conditional probability values linking a specific sensor to a failure mode. The number of
conditional probability values in a particular link depends upon the number of
subordinate states of a failure mode node and those of a sensor node. This means that a
sensor node with three subordinate states linked to a three state failure mode requires a 3
by 3 matrix as shown in Table 8.1. If the experts agree on the basic probabilistic matrix
structure such as is shown in Table 8.1 for a specific relationship, a belief degree relating
to E value is elicited through discussion with the expert.
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Even though a belief degree must be usually represented as a real number in the
closed small interval, it is not usual for an expert to express a belief judgement in
numeric form. Neither it is easy for a user to attach a correct intuitive meaning to a
numeric belief. The work reported here uses vague linguistic labels, which seems more
Table 8.1 Conditional Probability Table from Eliciting Expertise Linking
a 3 State Sensor (S) and a 3 State Failure Mode (F) in terms of P(F/S)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 1- E1  E2 0
Mode F(Incipient) E1 1- E2 - E3 E4State F(Severe) 0 E3 1- E4
comfortable to experts. For example, let us consider the following question, " If a bearing
temperature sensor indicates a high sensor reading, what's your degree of belief that
bearing overheating is in a severe state?" The expert usually tries to answer this question
by choosing among a set of linguistic terms such as {Certain, Extremely Likely, Most
Likely, Likely, ... }. Then, this linguistic answer is scaled into numeric value with a small
interval and the resulting probability distribution values are then presented to the expert
for concurrence. For the benefit of clarity, repeating these procedures elicit more concrete
values of conditional probabilities. The proposed elicitation permits a retrieval of needed
expert knowledge, reflecting the causal relationships between variables. Then, the
conditional probability values of the failure mode states, as shown in Table 8.1, are
obtained. The corresponding values of P(F/S) are obtained as the values shown in Table
8.2, in terms of causal reasoning by using Equation 8.2. Over the lifetime of the advisory
system these associated conditional probability values should be refined continuously in
order to adjust the likelihood distribution of each variable subject to the current
understanding of the utility company experts.
Once these conditional probability values are assigned to the BBN within in our
advisory system, we wish that the BBN should be responsive to a change in the
monitored system status. For example, when an abnormal signal is observed, a high
resulting belief that the system is either in the "Incipient" or "Severe" state should be
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calculated. If the system status has changed, the new system status cannot be understood
unless the relevant signal status has also changed. This means that the calculation on the
failure mode state probability distribution, given a corresponding sensor signal state
change, starts from the stage where no information is available about the changed system
failure mode status. This corresponds to the uniform state probability distribution. It
should be assigned to prior probability values of the failure mode. Doing this will result
in the most appropriate, sensitive response being attained from the BBN.
Table 8.2 Conditional Probability Table Linking a 3 State Sensor (S)
and a 3 State Failure Mode (F) in terms of P(S/F)
Failure Mode State
Sensor
State
F(Good) F(Incipient) F(Severe)
S(Low) 1- E5  E6 0
S(Medium) e5 1- E6 - E7 E8
S(High) 0 £7 1- Eg
Also, the local and global propagation of belief states of all nodes through entire
networks should be reviewed. If examination of these propagation results shows that for
some nodes the relatively unexpected belief distributions are observed in specific cases
contrary to what the experts would expect, the structure and values of the network should
be adjusted until the results are made satisfactory to the experts. These series of test cases
and their predictions compared with the expert's expected outcomes are used to refine the
models.
8.5.4 Bayesian Influence Diagram with Inference Engine
Once the BBN is constructed, for systematic decision making action nodes and
utility nodes are introduced. Nodes for decision making points where choices must be
made between well-defined alternatives and links directed to a decision node depict
information available at the time of making the decision.
One must incorporate a library of alternative corrective actions according to the
states of failure modes and then provide respective alternative action costs and benefits
arising from failure mode state transitions in order to assess the values of their
consequences given an illustration of a net utility calculation. The criterion of decision is
defined as the utility value assigned in a utility node based upon knowledge of failure
mode node states before the action, future failure mode states after the action, and the
alternative possible actions.
Finally, once action nodes and utility nodes are integrated into the developed
BBN, this BBN, when augmented with action nodes and utility nodes, becomes the
Bayesian influence diagram (BID). It is the final form to be embedded into the advisory
system. Even though the BID is a final standard form, the advisory system developed in
the work reported here is called a BBN-based one rather than a BID-based one because
its mathematical foundation is emphasized in the terminology.
For the predictive mode performed within the advisory system, the nodes that
stand for the future states of a failure mode and sensor reading predictions are introduced.
Then, one should assess the conditional probabilities between the future failure mode and
sensor states. Such estimates provide a basis for comparison of the actual component and
sensor set performance to the estimations of the advisory system. This comparison,
performed during actual operation, can lead to successive refinement of the system's
predictive mode accuracy. Finally, extensive testing and global propagation mechanisms
using simulated cases or historical cases will show the degree of matching with real
operational cases during the development and implementation of the advisory system.
8.6 Applied Utility Principle
The Bayesian Influence Diagram (BID) can explicitly illustrate the coupling
between diagnosis and management for systematic decision making. The major task of
the operator is to choose the most advantageous course of action on the basis of
imperfectly known state knowledge and uncertain predictions of future changes that will
follow from a particular action. A utility value is a yardstick for decision making.
Decision making criteria can be monetary gains and costs, measures associated with
particular combinations of particular system states, or abstract satisfaction degree. In our
decision making using the BID, the expected utility is modeled explicitly by taking into
account costs by defining final economic loss caused by alternative actions and plant
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performance curtailment. The recommended action that will lead to the least cost utility
value.
This section explains the detailed mathematical formulation of the applied utility
concept in the BID applied in our advisory system. The network using the HUGIN expert
system (ES) shell is illustrated in Figure 8.5. In this network the current system state the
probability distribution before any of the alternative actions is taken: F = {fi },i = 1,..,n,
where fi is the probability that the system is in the i-th subordinate state, and n is the total
number of subordinate states.
Legend,
State F: Failure mode node before one of the alternative actions is taken,
State F': Failure mode node after one of the alternative actions is taken,
Action A: Action node defining the state transition corresponding to the alternative actions,
Cost C: Utility node defining the costs arising from alternative actions defined in a node A,
Loss L: Utility node defining the financial loss arising from final system states
Figure 8.5 Decision Making Network Model Explaining the Principle
of the Utility Concept
Before any action is taken, the system is in one of these states and in no other. If the
system is in a particular state, k, the probability vector is indicated by the following
relationships,
fk = 1, and f - k = 0. (8.3)
The node F' denotes the transited system state probability vector after the alternative
action is taken: F'= { f' ,i = 1,..,n.
183
__ ~
A "Action A" node is introduced to induce the "state transformation". In a certain
sense, introduction of this action node is a way of giving better characterizing the causal
relationships between the states. The rectangular shaped node A denotes the library of
alternative actions that can be taken: A = {aj }, j = 1,..,m, where aj is the j-th action, m is
the total number of alternative actions. The diamond shaped node C is a utility node:
C = {c ), j = 1,..,m, where cj is the cost of taking the j-th action. The diamond shaped
node L is another utility node: L = {li },i = 1,..,n, where li is the associated financial loss
resulting from performance curtailment of system being in the i-th system state.
Given the current system state F, the system transition probabilities can be
calculated for a particular action aj is taken as P(i I aj), where
P(i I aj) = P(i I k, a) * fk, (8.4)
k=1
Where,
i= 1,..,n
fk: probability of the k-th current state
P(i I k,aj) : conditional probability that the current system in state k will change to
a state i after an action aj is taken.
Now the state probability vector F' can be calculated as follows:
1 mf' = -* P(i I aj), (8.5)
m j=1
i= 1,..,n .
The utility value associated with each action aj can be calculated as follows:
n
j = c + li *P(ilaj), (8.6)
i=1
j= 1,...,m .
Since there is usually more interest in the difference between the utilities than the
absolute values of utilities themselves, it is more revealing to rewrite Equation 8.6 as:
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uj - k =(c -C)+li *(P(ilaj)-P(ilak)). (8.7)
i=1
It can be seen from Equation 8.7 that the difference between the utilities
associated with different actions comes from analysis of the first term to the right, cost
and the second term to the right, gain.
After the value of the utility associated with each alternative action is obtained
from Equation 8.6, the most advantageous action is identified to be that with the highest
utility value, which is the least total financial loss. In case that action ak leads to the least
financial loss in action node A, the following probability distribution is assigned in
Equation 8.8.
P(a) = IO j  k  (8.8)P( j) l,j=k
Then, our advisory system provides final results, the expected financial loss and
the future system state probability distribution once the suggested action is taken.
8.7 Prototype Decision Making Model
The two utility nodes of Figure 8.5 can be collapsed into a single utility node as
shown in Figure 8.6. Figure 8.6 becomes a model using the HUGIN ES shell for making
a decision upon the best corrective action. This model provides the basis for further
development of entire target system being investigated.
Once the suggested action in entered as an input into our advisory system, the
single utility node in Figure 8.6 indicates the eventual least financial loss and the system
state F' node gives the future probability distribution of system state after the suggested
action is taken. During the analysis of this task, each symptom can be observed at a
specific moment in time. In this network, the time line is projected onto a unique point
when the diagnosis is performed. This means that reasoning starts to be performed with
the implicit assumption that any manifestation of an abnormal signal is present at that
time.
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Legend,
State F: Failure mode node before one of alternative actions is taken,
State F': Failure mode node after one of the alternative actions is taken,
Action A: Action node defining the state transition corresponding to the alternative actions,
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of expected costs arising from failure mode state,
transitions caused by alternative actions in defined n a node A
Figure 8.6 Implicative Prototype Decision Making Model Network
Imbedded within the Advisory System
8.8 Prototype Predictive Mode Model
The network introduced in Figure 8.6 is used to diagnose a system state and
provide a corrective action. In this section, inference within the network is used to
predict the future state probability distribution of a failure mode given all prior evidence
and the most advantageous action taken.
This inference is extended to predict the future sensor value probability
distribution corresponding to a failure mode transition. Figure 8.7 represents the
prototype model being in the predictive mode in our advisory system. With this analysis,
the operator can observe the change of the real sensor state after the corrective action is
taken and also can check the predicted probability distribution of the sensor reading from
the advisory system.
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Legend,
Sensor S: Sensor node before one of the alternative actions is taken
Sensor S': Sensor node after one of the alternative actions is taken
State F: Failure mode node before one of the alternative actions is taken
State F': Failure mode node after one of the alternative action is taken
Action A: Action node defining the state transition corresponding to the alternative actions,
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of expected costs arising from failure mode state,
transitions caused by alternative actions in defined n a node A
Figure 8.7 Prototype Network for the Advisory System in the Predictive Mode
Such estimates provide a basis for comparison of the actual component and sensor
set performance to the estimations of the advisory system. Large persistent divergences
between the two would indicate that the advisory system is in error for some reason. In
this case, we should react to discrepancies found between the sensor values predicted in
our model and the real result, find its cause, and adjust the conditional probabilities of S'
given F' by systematically reasoning upon the model until the variance is accounted for.
This model provides the basis for further development of entire predictive modes in the
networks.
Chapter 9. Implementation of Intelligent Diagnosis and
Maintenance Advisory System
9.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is to address the operation and use of the
intelligent diagnosis and maintenance (D&M) advisory system, developed in the work
reported here. The probabilistic D&M network based upon the Bayesian belief network
(BBN), has been developed in our work for example target systems, the turbine generator
and the reactor coolant pump. The entire network structure is explicitly constructed using
the HUGIN expert system shell.
This chapter illustrates the model structure, presents the conditional probability
values and utility values used, explains each probabilistic model, and addresses how
some representative models execute the tasks of the advisory system. Also, we focus
upon demonstration of the operator interface module structure, and the task execution of
which accompanies an operator's interactions with the operator interface module.
Furthermore, actual representative deterministic operational procedures of a
power plant have been computerized using the Bayesian belief network (BBN). This
chapter briefly suggests several essential features that this advisory system should reflect
for purposes of successful practical applications in the actual power plant environment.
Eventually, these probabilistic and deterministic models will be applied to solving the
actual advisory tasks of the power plant.
9.2 Operator Interface Module
The computer operator interface module, used for editing the network structure, is
shown in Figure 9.1. The computer interface is mouse-based. This graphical
representation environment allows the user to construct and edit a network using object-
oriented programming. The network's modular structure enables one to link the current
network with other networks. In order to place nodes and links on the screen, the user
select the type of node using the mouse. Then, activating various menu items one can
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perform operations upon the selected items or in direct manipulation can move or create
an object (HUGI 94).
Failure Mode State
Sensor 0.97 0.05 0
Range 0.03 0.9 0.0 Conditionditional
State 0 0.05 0.95 Probability
Value
Figure 9.1 Operator Interface Module for Editing the Network
In the matrix placed in the middle of this window is shown three distinct
subordinate states of a node "Sensor" and also three states of a node "Failure Mode".
These are linked in a causal direction. Dragging the mouse in the concerned direction
draws the link between these two nodes. The matrix values shown are those of the
conditional probabilities of the sensor states given the failure mode states. Through
assignment of the proper conditional probability values for a parent node linked by
several children nodes, a real network is constructed.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the operator interface module for displaying the state of each
node. After a piece of evidence about the sensor reading is entered to subordinate states,
the probability distribution of a node "Failure Mode" can be observed. The former tells
what is obtained from the sensor. The letter indicates the outputs that should be provided
from the network after the evidence from a sensor reading (i.e., the sensor state) is
obtained.
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Failure mode state
I Failure Mode (C2)
Good
Ouput Op 5.00 Incipient S Fare ode
95.00;evere
SSensor (Cl) Failure mode state probability value
Low
Input Medium Sensor state
Sensor state probability value
Figure 9.2 Operator Interface Module for Displaying the States and their Respective
Probability Values for the Network's Nodes
In actual operation, the procedures from entering on-line data about validated
sensor readings to providing the expected probability distribution of a failure mode state
is performed automatically by adjusting the internal structure of this advisory system to
integrate it with the other support systems. In addition, the advisory system, developed in
the work reported here, should provide real-time capability for retrieving and plotting
sequential graphical trends in order to assist the operator in diagnosing a situation as it
evolves.
9.3 Implementation of the BBN Based Intelligence Diagnosis and
Maintenance Network
The objective of this section is the demonstration of the procedures to execute the
diagnostic network in the advisory system and to describe the software modules that
constitute the environment for its implementation and execution. Then, the diagnosis and
maintenance network in the advisory system is explained here.
In practice, for the target systems of the turbine generator and the reactor coolant
pump, construction of the diagnostic network is challenging, as there are sometimes
insufficient data for computing conditional probability values. This situation is attributed
190
to unfamiliarity with the BBN concept of the plant operators or to the lack of experience
in using some of the newly employed sensors suggested in the work reported here. This
section constructs probabilistic diagnostic models using the HUGIN expert system shell
with a generic inference algorithm and the formalism suggested in Chapters 7 and 8.
Section 9.3.1 explains the networks for the bearing and its lubrication oil system,
and Sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3 show the networks for the stator winding and its auxiliary
cooling systems and for the reactor coolant pump. Note that these networks are
configured in a modular fashion in order to serve the plant operator with more convenient
interactions. Their conditional probability values and utility values obtained from
experts' knowledge are given in Appendix B. Section 9.3.4 shows the network
performing in the predictive mode, defined in Section 8.8, for the generator core vibration
diagnosis. Oval shaped nodes with the first letter "S" stand for sensor nodes. Other oval
shaped nodes with the first letter "F' stand for failure mode nodes, which are artificial
constructs, created in order to characterize specific component states. The number
following "F' signifies the level of a specific failure mode. The node shown as "Fl" is
the highest level node of a failure mode, which is the major concern of the network. The
nodes with "F2" are subordinate failure modes (i.e., alternative versions of node "Fl",
each of which may lead to a failure mode labeled "Fl". The node with the greatest
number following "F" stands for the lowest level of a failure defined within the entire
network. The rectangular shaped nodes named "ACTION" contain a library of alternative
actions to be taken in order to induce a better system state transformation. The diamond
shaped node named "UTILITY' denotes the utility node, which evaluates the usefulness
of various consequence expected from alternative actions.
In order to aid understanding of the meaning and contents of all nodes in these
networks, a corresponding nomenclature table for all nodes is provided after the
individual presented network.
9.3.1 Probabilistic Diagnostic Network for the Turbine Generator Bearing
Component
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1) Network Explanation
Figure 9.3 illustrates the probabilistic diagnostic network for the bearing
components in the turbine generator using the HUGIN shell. They should be supported
by the lubrication oil system, which is also composed of numerous subordinate
components. So, these networks, as shown in Figures 9.3, to 9.5 comprise in a modular
fashion the entire network for the turbine bearings and their lubrication oil system.
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 describe the networks for the turbine generator lubrication oil
system and the lubrication oil pump, respectively. For example, the information on a
node, "F3_LBOS_Failure" in Figure 9.3 is transferred from that in Figure 9.4 because
numerous subordinate nodes determine the final state of a node "F3_LBOS_Failure".
Also, the information concerning the node, "F5_Pump_Failure" in Figure 9.4 is
transferred from that in Figure 9.5. Tables 9.1 lists the nomenclature for all nodes
presented in Figure 9.3 in order to aid understanding of the overall contents of these
networks. Table 9.2 lists the nomenclature for all nodes presented in Figure 9.4 and Table
9.3 for those in Figure 9.5
Table 9.1 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.3
Node Name Node Explanation
FlBRG_Damage Bearing damage failure mode before action
Fl'_BRG_Damage Bearing damage failure mode after action
F2_BRG_High Temp Bearing high temperature failure mode
F2_BRG_High Vib Bearing high vibration failure mode
F3 LBOS Failure Lubrication oil system (LBOS) failure mode
S BRG Temp Bearing temperature sensor
S BRG Vib Bearing vibration sensor
S_TG_Load Turbine generator load sensor
The network shown in Figure 9.3 is implemented for two cases. One is a
subjectively nominal or best guess case. The other is a subjectively pessimistic case.
These two examples illustrate how experts might bias their probability estimates in order
to compensate for uncertainty and for risk aversion purposes.
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Their corresponding conditional probability and utility values, obtained from
expert interviews, are given in Tables 9.4 and 9.5, respectively. Appendix A shows the
corresponding conditional probability and utility values used in the network shown in
Figure 9.4.
Table 9.2 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.4
Node Name Node Explanation
F3_ LBOS_Failure Lubrication oil system failure mode before action
F3'_LBOS_Failure Lubrication oil system failure mode after action
F4_OIL_Contamination LBOS oil contamination failure mode
F4_OIL_High Temp LBOS high temperature failure mode
F4_OIL_Low Flow LBOS low flow failure mode
F5_HXFailure LBOS heat exchanger (HX) failure mode
F5_LPP_Failure LBOS pump failure mode
F6_HX_Fouling LBOS HX fouling failure mode
F6_SW_Failure LBOS service water failure mode
F7_SW_Low Flow LBOS service water low flow failure mode
F7_SW_High Temp LBOS service water high temperature failure mode
S_HX_D Pressure LBOS oil differential pressure sensor across HX
S_HX_D Temp LBOS oil differential temperature sensor across HX
S_Oil_Flow LBOS oil flow sensor
S_OilPurity Oil purity sensor
SOilTemp LBOS oil temperature sensor
S_SW_Flow LBOS service water flow sensor
SSW Temperature LBOS service water temperature sensor
Table 9.3 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.5
Node Name Node Explanation
F5_LPP_Failure LBOS pump failure mode
F6_BRGFailure Lubrication oil pump bearing failure mode
F6_MTR_Failure LBOS pump motor failure mode
F6_SEAL_Failure LBOS pump seal failure mode
S_LBRG_Temp LBOS pump bearing temperature sensor
S_LBRG_VIB LBOS pump bearing vibration sensor
S_MTR_MC LBOS pump motor current sensor
SMTR PDA LBOS pump partial discharge sensor
S_SEAL_Leakoff LBOS pump seal leakage sensor
Note:
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Figure 9.3 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Bearing in the Turbine Generator
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Iput for the state probability distribution of a node,
LBOS_Failure" is obtained from the network in F fBRGDamage
re 9.4.
Failure Mode Node
Sensor Node
Action Node F2_BRG-*h ib -F2BRGH T
Utility Node
F3 TG O ed ad
F3_LBOS Fahure
~ __ ~
Table 9.4 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Nominal Case
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Note: 1.The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.1.
2.Tables (1), (2), and (3) are obtained by the elicitation from experts.
3.Tables (4), (5), (6) are calculated by using the inversion mapping by Bayes' theorem
from Tables (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
4.Tables (4) to (12) are illustrated directly from the HUGIN shell graphics.
5.Tables (7) to (12) are obtained through discussions with experts.
6.Utility values are calculated based upon the mean time to repair in a 1300MW plant.
(1)Table 9.4.1 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRG_High Vib/S_BRG_Vib)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.985 0.04 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.015 0.92 0.015
State F(Severe) 0 0.04 0.985
(2) Table 9.4.2 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRGHigh Temp/SBRG_High Temp)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.985 0.035 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.015 0.93 0.015
State F(Severe) 0 0.035 0.985
(3) Table 9.4.3 Conditional probability values for P(F3_TG_Load/S_TG_Load)
I Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.97 0.06 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.03 0.88 0.03
State F(Severe) 0 0.06 0.97
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Table 9.4 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Nominal Case
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd)
(4) Table 9.4.4 Conditional probability values for P(S_BRG_Vib / F2_BRG_High Vib)
Failure Mode State
0.965 0.015 0
Sensor 0.035 0.97 0.035
StateState 0 0.015 0.965
(5) Table 9.4.5 Conditional probability values for P(S_BRG_High Temp / F2_BRG_High Temp)
Failure Mode State
0.961 0.016 0Sensor Sno0.039 0.968 0.039
State 01 0.016 0.961
(6) Table 9.4.6 Conditional probability values for P(STG_Load / F3_TG_Load)
Failure Mode State
0.942 0.032 0
0.058 0.936 0.058
State M r 0 0.032 0.942
(7) Table 9.4.7 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRGQHigh Temp / F3_LBOS_Failure)
Failure Mode State
Sensor
State
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Table 9.4 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Nominal Case for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd
(8) Table 9.4.8 Library of alternative actions in "ACTION" node
: No Action
: Remedial Action
: Trip Action
(9) Table 9.4.9 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRG_High Vib/F3_TG_Overload, F3_LBOS_Failure)
State of a Node, State of a Node,
"F3 _TG _Overload" "F3 _TG _Overload'
State of a Node, 0.99 0.2 0 0.2 0.05 0 0 0 0State of a Node,
"F2_BRG DHigh Y" 0.01 0.75 0.1 0.75 0.85 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.01
0 0.05 0.9 0.05 0.1 0.95 0.9 0.95 0.99
(10) Table 9.4. 10 Conditional probability values for P(Fl_BRG_Damage/ F2_BRG_High Vib, F2_BRG_High Temp)
State of a Node, State ofa Node,
"F2_BRGHigh Vib" "F2_BRGHigh Temp"
0.99 0.15 0 0.15 0.05 0 0 0State of a Node,
"FlBRGDamage" 0.01 0.75 0.15 0.8 0.85 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.01
0 0.1 0.85 0.05 0.1 0.97 0.85 0.97 0.9!
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Table 9.4 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Nominal Case for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd)
(11) Table 9.4.11 Conditional probability values for P(F1'_BRG_Damage/ Fl_BRG_Damage, ACTION)
State of a Node,
"Fl_BRG_Damage" Alternative action
State of a Node,
"FI'_BRG_Damage"
(12) Table 9.4.12 Utility values arising from transited system states and alternative actions (Unit: $1000)
State of a Node,
"F '_BRG_Damage"
I Utility Value
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Alternative action
Table 9.5 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Pessimistic Case
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Note: 1.The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.1.
2.Tables (1), (2), and (3) are obtained by elicitation from experts.
3.Tables (4), (5), (6) are calculated by using the inversion mapping by Bayes'
theorem from Tables (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
4.Tables (4) to (12) are illustrated directly from the HUGIN shell graphics.
5.Tables (7) to (12) are obtained through discussions with experts.
6.Utility values are calculated in terms of the mean time to repair in a 1300MW plant.
(1) Table 9.5.1 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRGHigh Vib/S_BRGVib)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.97 0.03 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.03 0.90 0.01
State F(Severe) 0 0.07 0.99
(2) Table 9.5.2 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRGHigh Temp/SBRGHigh Temp)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.97 0.03 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.03 0.91 0.01
State F(Severe) 0 0.06 0.99
(3) Table 9.5.3 Conditional probability values for P(F3_TG_Load/STG_Load)
Sensor State
S(Low) S(Medium) S(High)
Failure F(Good) 0.95 0.04 0
Mode F(Incipient) 0.05 0.88 0.02
State F(Severe) 0 0.08 0.98
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Table 9.5 Conditional Probability Values and Utility Values in the Pessimistic Case
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd)
(4) Table 9.5.4 Conditional probability values for P(S_BRG_Vib / F2_BRG_High Vib)
Failure Mode State
0.97 0.032 0
Sensor 0.03 0.957 0.066
State 0 0.011 0.934
(5) Table 9.5.5 Conditional probability values for P(S_BRG_High Temp / F2_BRG_High Temp)
Failure Mode State
0.97 0.031 0
Sensor 0.03 0.958 0.057
State
0 0.011 0.943
(6) Table 9.5.6 Conditional probability values for P(S_TG_Load / F3_TG_Load)
Failure Mode State
0.96 0.053 0
Sensor 0.04 0.926 0.075
State 0 0.021 0.925
(7) Table 9.5.7 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRGHigh Temp/F3_LBOSFailure)
Failure Mode State
Sensor
State
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Table 9.5 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Pessimistic Case for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd)
(8) Table 9.5.8 Library of alternative actions in "ACTION" node
: No Action
: Remedial Action
: Trip Action
(9) Table 9.5.9 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRG_High Vib/F3_TG_Overload, F3_LBOS_Failure)
State of a Node, State of a Node,
"F3_TGOverload" "F3_TG_Overload"
State of a Node, 0.98 0.1 0 0.15 0.1 0 0 0 0
G , 0.02 0.8 0.07 0.75 0.8 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.005
"F2 BRGHigh Vib"
S0 0.1 0.93 0.1 0.1 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.995
(10) Table 9.5.10 Conditional probability values for P(FI_BRG_Damage/ F2_BRG_High Vib, F2_BRG_High Temp)
State of a Node, State ofa Node,
"F2_BRG_High Vib" "F2_BRG_High Temp"
State of a Node,
"FI BRGDamage"
Table 9.5 Conditional Probability and Utility Values in the Pessimistic Case for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3 (Cont'd)
(11) Table 9.5.11 Conditional probability values for P(Fl'_BRG_Damage/ Fl_BRG_Damage, ACTION)
State of a Node,
"FlBRG_Damage" Alternative action
State of a Node,
"F1 '_BRG_Damage"
(12) Table 9.4.12 Utility values arising from transited system states and alternative actions (Unit: $1000)
State of a Node,
"Fl_BRG_Damage" Alternative action
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Utility Value
Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.2.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values
are given in Appendix A.
(3)The input for the state probability distribution of a
node, "F5_Pump_Failure" is obtained from the
network in Figure 9.5
Figure 9.4 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the TG Lubrication Oil System
(TG: Turbine Generator)
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(: Failure Mode Node
: Sensor Node
:. Action Node
:. Utility Node
Note:
(1)The nomenclature is given in Table 9.3.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values of this
network were not obtained.
Figure 9.5 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Lubrication Oil Pump
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: Failure Mode Node
: Sensor Node
: Action Node
L: Utility Node
2) Demonstration of Network Execution
Figures 9.6 to 9.13 illustrates the flow of execution of the network shown in
Figure 9.3 given the assumed evidence and presents the result of each step of the system
execution displayed in the operator interface module from the inference engine during
system simulated operation.
The required conditional probability values have been obtained for two cases, a
nominal, or best guess reasoning one and a pessimistic one. Their results are shown in
Figures 9.6 and 9.7 for comparison of these two cases of Task I. In task I concerning a
nominal case, this evidence used assumes that a bearing vibration sensor and a bearing
temperature sensor each indicate the "Medium" state, the rest of sensors are in the "Low"
state, and the state of lubrication oil system, transferred from another file, is assumed to
be in the "Good" state.
According to Step I of Figure 9.6, the sensor states are entered. This then
provides the inference result of the probability distribution of the node,
"Fl_BRG_Damage" shown in Step II, and brings up which alternative action is expected
to result in highest utility value. What is indicated in Step III is a recommendation to
take a "Remedial Action" that leads to the least financial loss. By selecting a remedial
action in Step IV, then in Step V the inference engine predicts the expected probability
distribution of the states of future failure mode labeled "F'_BRG_Damage" resulting
from an action recommended in Step II. Note that in actual operation in the power plant
this task will be performed automatically.
Figure 9.7 shows that the procedures and the results from the execution of a
pessimistic case of Task I. The node, "Fl_BRG_Damage", shown in Step II, has the
higher probability values in the "Severe" state and the "Incipient" state than those in the
"Severe" state and the "Incipient" state of a nominal case shown in Figure 9.6. Two cases
recommend the same action, but the expected utility value of a pessimistic case is lower
than that of a nominal case. This means that the small variation in the conditional
probability values used in a pessimistic value leads to greater financial loss. It is caused
by the worse states of the future failure mode probability distribution even though the
same corrective action is taken.
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* S_BRG_Temp (C5) , STG..Load (C15)
- LOW - 1 LOW
IMED - - MED
- HGH - HIGH
O SBRG_Vib (C4) / F3 LBOSFailure (C1_2)
- LOW 1 GOOD
1 MED 
- ICP
- HGH 
- SVR
Input from another file concerning
Step I: Providing inputs the probability of a failure mode
Failure mode state probability state (Task I Input)
Fl_BRG_Damage (CI) j
ll 0.423058 GOOD The "Incipient" state
a 0.525407 ICP has the highest value
I 0.051 5 3 5 3 SVR
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
Utility Value I s e l e c t ion of a n a l te r n a t iv e a c
t ion
M ACTION (DID)
I ACTI -8ON67.738 N(D10) Act The "Remedial Action" will lead to the
I I I -605.635 Remedy least expected financial loss, $605,635.
I~MN I -1209.17 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
ACTION (D10 Utility Value
H E0 NoAct The "Remedial
Action" is taken
L I I 0 Trip I
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
The "Good" state has
SF1'_BRG_Damage (C9) the highest value
rL 0.895924 Good
I 0.0628477 ICP
| 0.0412282 SVR Failure mode
state probability
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.6 Execution Flow in Task I (Nominal Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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* F3 LBOSFailure
SSBRGTemp (C5)
SSBRGVib (C4)
IFailure mode state probability
Fl_BRG_Damage (C1)
aB 0.216189 GOOD
a 0.645027 IC
1 0.138784 SVR
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
(CI 2)
1 GOOD
- ICP
- SVR
Input from another file concerning
inputs the probability of a failure mode1 state (Task I Input)
The "Incipient" state
has the highest value
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
M ACTION (D10)
li 1 -1244.23 No Act The "Remedial Action" will lead to the leastI-781.473 Reme expected financial loss, $781,473.
- IMIIII I -1222.06 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs of state
transitions arising from alternative actions
Utility value
e ACTION (D10)
I- I -1244.23 No Act The "Remedial
KI
LI .1122206 Tri
I J l
Action" is taken
IrLL.. H IP
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
Failure mode state probability
Fl'_BRG_Damage (C9)L 10.63187 G
il 0.112848 IC
"* 0.255278 S
ood The "Good" state has
P the highest value
VR
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.7 Execution Flow in Task I (Pessimistic Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No ACT, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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HGH
Step I: Providing
1
I |I
I SBRGTemp (C5)
S-BRGVib C4
* SBRG Vib (C4)
Failure mode state pro
SFlBRGDamage (C1)
0.0250382 GOOD
0.258038 ICP
1 0.716924 SVR
Known sensor readings (Task II Inputs)
S_TG Load (C15)
- MED
- HGH
SF3_LBOS_Failure
- LOW
- MED
1 HGH
(C1_
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
2)
- GOOD
1 ICP
- SVR
Input from another file concerning
Step I: Providing inputs the probability of a failure mode
ability state (Task II Input)
The "Severe" state has
the highest value
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
M ACTION (D10)
Il I -1671.07 No Act The "Trip Action" will lead to the least
IlIz 1 -1616.96 Remedy expected financial loss, $1,221,790.
I III I -1221.79 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
Utility value
* ACTION (DIO)
0 No ct The "Trip Action" is0 Remedy taken
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
Failure mode state probability
* F'_BRGDamage (C9) I
I- ~.95641 TGood
I 0.0435873 ICP The "Good" state has
- SVR the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode probability distribution of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.8 Execution Flow in Task II (Nominal Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No ACT, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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SSBRGTemp (C5) )q "
1 LOW
-- MED
- HGH
S_BRG_Vib (C4)
-L- LOW
- 1 HGH
Step I: Providing inputs
Failure mode state probability
SS.TGLoad (C15)
- MED
- HIGH
* F3_LBOS_Failure (C1_2)
- GOOD
M 1 ICP
- - SVR
Input from another file concerning
the probability of a failure mode
state (Task II Input)
I FlBRGDamage (CI)
0.00584903 GOOD The "Severe" state has
1 0.116583 ICP the highest value
S0.877568 SVRr"
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
ACTION 10) Utility value
- II I -1759.19 No ActI I -175.2 NomThe "Trip Action" will lead to the least
S-1863.2 Remedy expected financial loss, $1,233,660.
I I 1 -1233.66 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
SF1'_BRG_Damage (C9) Failure mode state probability
b 0.932683! Good
- 0.0673174 ICP The "Good" state has
- SVR the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.9 Execution Flow in Task II (Pessimistic Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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* SBRGTemp (C5)
SBRG_Vib (C4)
1 LOW
- MED
- HGH
- LOW
1 MED
- HGH
S TG Load (C15)
* F3LBOSFailure
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
(CI2)
1 GOOD
- ICP
- SVR
Failure mode st
Step I: Providing inputs Input from another file concerning
the probability of a failure mode
ate probability state (Task III Input)
SFl_BRG_Damage (CI)
a 0.595313 GOOD+-L 0.380464 ICP
i 0.0242226 SVR
The "Good" state and the "Incipient"
state have high values
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
* ACTION (DI0)L Ii I -6 4.785 No Act The "Remedial Action" will lead to the
least expected financial loss, $556,326.
I I I -1206.31 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
* ACTION (DI0)
I I I 0 NoAct The "Remedial Action"
"M g is taken
I I 0 Trip
Utility value S te p IV : T a k in g th e r e c om m
e n d e d a c t ion
BRGDamage (C) Failure mode state probability4 F'_BRGDamage (C9)
n 0.937731 Good
I 0.0428909 ICP The "Good" state
I 0.01 93781 SVR has the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.10 Execution Flow in Task III (Nominal Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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SBRG_Temp (C5)
-SBRGVib (C4)
I LOW
- MED
- HGH
LOW
MEDi
HGH
MS- TG Load (C15)
* F3LBOSFailure
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
(C1_2)
1 GOOD
- ICP
- SVR
Step I: Providing
Failure mode state probability I
SFlBRGDamage (CI)L 0.38412 GOOD
1 0.511295 ICP
I 0.104585 SVR
inputs Input from another file concerning
the probability of a failure mode
state (Task III Input)
The "Good" state and the
"Incipient" state have high values
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
i ACTION (D10)
I I I -977.569 No Act The "Remedial Action" will lead to the
-717.953 Remedy least expected financial loss, $717,953.
-IMI I -1 218.36 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
I ACTION (D10) U tility valu e  I
S0 NoActi The "Remedial
Action" is taken
Sr I 953 Trinted
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
* Fl_BRGDamage (CI) Failure mode state probability
m 0.3841 GOOD
1 0.511295 ICP
1 0.104585 SVR The "Good" state has
the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.11 Execution Flow in Task III (Pessimistic Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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,'lb .. . ..
I I I v r
Known sensor readings (Task IV Inputs)Sensor state probability
i S_BRGTemp (C5)
I SBRGVib (C4)
Failure mode state probabi
Failure mode state probabi
S_TG_Load (C15)
LOW
MED
HGH
SF3.LBOS_Failure
LOW
MED
HG
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
(C1_2)
1 GOOD
- ICP
- SVR
Input from another file concerning
Step I: Providing inputs the probability of a failure mode
lity state (Task IV Input)
* FlIBRGDamage (Cl),
I 0.0386967 GOOD
M 0.317696 ICP 4
m 0.643607 SVR -- "
The "Incipient" state and the "Severe"
state have high values
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
I ACTION (010)
- II i -1627.09 No Act The "Trip Action" will lead to the least
- I 
-1507.04 Remedy expected financial loss, $1,220,860.
-l m I -1220.86 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
M ACTION (D10)
llI I
Utility value
-1627.09 No Act
-1507.04 Remedy The "Trip Action" istaken
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
SFi'BRGDamage (C9) Failure mode state probability
0.958289 Good
0.0417112 ICP The "Good" state has
- SVR the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.12 Execution Flow in Task IV (Nominal Case)
for the Network Shown in Figure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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I = 
-1 1'2O '- ri) -
Sensor state probability Known sensor readings (Task IV Inputs)
S_TG_Load (C15)
1 LOW
- MED
- HGH
- F3 LBOS_Failure
- LOW
- MED
1 HG
1 LOW
- MED
- HIGH
(C1_2)
1 GOOD
- ICP
- SVR
Input from another file concerning
Step I: Providing inputs the probability of a failure mode
state (Task IV Input)I
Failure mode state probability
* FBRG_Damage (C1) +
0.0120307 GOODL 0 0.160623 ICP
0.827346 SVR
The "Incipient" state and the "Severe"
state have high values
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to
selection of an alternative action
Utility value
* ACTION (D10)L Ili I -1736.64 No Act The "Trip Action" will lead to the least
Ila I -1790.36 Remedy - expected financial loss, $1,233,030.
I l I -1233.03 Trip
Step III: Obtaining the expected utility values in terms of expected costs
of state transitions arising from alternative actions
Utility value
1 ACTION (D10)
- I I I 0 No Act The "Trip Action" is
- I I 0 Remedy taken
Step IV: Taking the recommended action
FBRGDamage (C) Failure mode state probability
* FI'BRGDamage (C9)
- - 0.93393-Good
| 0.0660657 ICP The "Good" state
- SVR has the highest value
Step V: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode of interest after the recommended action is taken
Figure 9.13 Execution Flow in Task IV (Pessimistic Case)
for the Network Shown in Fiure 9.3
(Legend) LOW, MED, and HGH: Sensor states
GOOD, ICP, and SVR: Failure mode states
No Act, Remedy, and Trip: Alternative actions
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O SBRGTemp (C5)
SSBRGVib (C4)
t - ...-
I
I
Concerning the network shown in Figure 9.3, four different kinds of tasks are
executed both for a nominal case and a pessimistic case. Their inputs, procedures, and are
illustrated in Figures 9.6 to 9.13. Also, Table 9.6 summarizes the comparison of the
results of the nominal case and the pessimistic case in terms of the probability
distributions of the states of the failure mode, the recommended alternative action, and
the expected utility.
Table 9.6 Results from Tasks I to IV Using the Network for the Turbine
Generator Bearing System Shown in Figure 9.3
Task Case Input Failure Mode State Recommended Expected
Probability Action UtilityDistribution
N VS: M, TS: M, G: 0.42 Remedial
LS: L, LB: G I: 0.53 Action $-605,635I S: 0.05
P VS: M, TS: M, G: 0.22 Remedial
LS: L, LB: G I: 0.64 Action $-781,473
S: 0.14
N VS: H, TS: L, G: 0.02
LS: L, LB: I I: 0.26 Trip Action $-1,221,790II S: 0.72
P VS: H, TS: L, G: 0.01
LS: L, LB: I I: 0.11 Trip Action $-1,233,660S: 0.88
N VS: M, TS: L, G: 0.60 Remedial
LS: L, LB: G I: 0.38 Action $-556,326III S: 0.02
P VS: M, TS: L, G:0.38 Remedial
LS: L, LB: G I: 0.51 Action $-717,953
S: 0.11
N VS: H, TS: L, G: 0.04
IV LS: L, LB: G I: 0.32 Trip Action $-1,220,860S: 0.64
P VS: H, TS: L, G: 0.01
LS: L, LB: G I: 0.16 Trip Action $-1,233,030S: 0.83
Legend, N: Nominal case, P: Pessimistic Case, VS: Bearing vibration sensor,
TS: Bearing temperature sensor, LS: Turbine generator load sensor,
LB: Lubrication oil system failure mode, L: Low range, M: Medium range,
H: High range, G: Good state, I: Incipient state, S: Severe state.
These results show that the recommended (i.e., most advantageous) action does
not change when employing the pessimistic conditional probability assignments within
the network. However, a lower expected utility value (i.e., cost) is evaluated in each
pessimistic case than in each nominal case. In the pessimistic case, a task having the
remedial action as the recommended action shows a significant expected increase of
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financial loss compared to that taking the trip action. This is why the sensor reading
leading to the remedial action is usually in the "Medium" range. In that sensor range, a
higher degree of uncertainty is typically inherent than those in corresponding "Low" or
"High" ranges.
9.3.2 Probabilistic Diagnostic Network for the Generator Stator Windings with
Auxiliary Cooling Systems
The stator winding system including the stator itself, the stator coil cooling water
system (SCCW), and the hydrogen auxiliary system has been identified as the equipment
most responsible for lost availability in the turbine generator, as shown in Figure 2.2.
The probabilistic diagnosis and maintenance network for the stator winding is
illustrated in Figure 9.14. In Appendix B, their corresponding conditional probability and
utility values are given. Since the stator winding is supported by ancillary cooling
systems, the networks shown in Figures 9.15 and 9.16 provide some required information
for the simulation of the network shown in Figure 9.16. The information concerning the
node, "F3_SCCW_Failure" in Figure 9.14 is transferred from that in Figure 9.15 because
the numerous subordinate nodes determine the probabilities of final states of a node
"F3_LBOS_Failure". Also, the information concerning the node, "F3_HAS_Failure" in
Figure 9.14 is transferred from that in Figure 9.16. The status of the node,
"F5Pump_Failure" in Figure 9.15 is obtained from another network. Tables 9.7 to 9.9
list the terminology for all nodes presented in Figures 9.14 to 9.16, respectively.
Table 9.7 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.14
Node Name Node Explanation
Fl_STW_Damage Stator winding damage failure mode before action
Fl'_STW_Damage Stator winding damage failure mode after action
F2_INS_Degradation Insulation degradation failure mode
F2_STW_High Temp Stator winding high temperature failure mode
F2_STW_High Vib Stator winding high vibration failure mode
F3_HAS_Failure Hydrogen auxiliary system failure mode
F3_SCCW Failure Stator coil cooling water system failure mode
S_STW_PDA Stator winding partial discharge sensor
S_STW_Temp Stator winding temperature sensor
S_STW_Vib Stator winding vibration sensor
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Table 9.8 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.15
Node Name Node Explanation
F3 SCCW Failure SCCW failure mode before action
F3' SCCW Failure SCCW failure mode after action
F4 WTR Contamination SCCW water high contamination failure mode
F4_WTR_High Temp SCCW water high temperature failure mode
F4 WTR Low Flow SCCW water low flow failure mode
F5 HX Failure SCCW heat exchanger failure mode
F5 SPP Failure SCCW pump failure
F5_WTR_High Humidity SCCW water high humidity failure mode
F5_WTR_High Impurity SCCW water high impurity failure mode
F5_WTR_Leakage SCCW water leakage failure mode
S_HX_D Temp SCCW water differential temperature sensor across HX
SWTR Flow SCCW water flow sensor
S_WTR_Humidity SCCW water humidity sensor
S_WTR _Leakage SCCW water leakage sensor
SWTR_Purity SCCW water purity sensor
S_WTR_Temp SCCW water temperature sensor
(SCCW: Stator Winding Coil Cooling System, HX: Heat Exchanger)
Table 9.9 Node Nomenclature of Figure 9.16
Node Name Node Explanation
F3 HAS Failure HAS failure mode before action
F3' HAS Failure HAS failure mode after action
F4_H2_Low Flow HAS hydrogen low flow sensor failure mode
F4_H2_High Humidity HAS hydrogen high humidity sensor failure mode
F4_H2_High Temp HAS hydrogen high temperature sensor failure mode
F5_BLR_Failure HAS blower failure mode
F5_GLS_Failure Gland seal system failure mode
F5_H2_Leakage HAS hydrogen leakage failure mode
F5_HX_D Temp HAS hydrogen differential sensor across HX
S_BLR_D Pressure HAS Blower differential pressure sensor
S_H2_Flow HAS hydrogen flow sensor
S_H2_Leakage HAS hydrogen leakage sensor
S_H2_Temp HAS hydrogen temperature sensor
S_HX_D Pressure HAS hydrogen differential pressure sensor across HX
S_HX_D Temperature HAS hydrogen differential temperature sensor across
(HAS: Hydrogen Auxiliary System, HX: Heat Exchanger)
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Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.7.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values
are given in Appendix B.
(3)The input for the state probability distribution of the node,
"F3 SCCW_Failure" is obtained from the network in Figure 9.15
: Failure Mode Node
.: Sensor Node
: Action Node
A : Utility Node
Figure 9.14 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Generator Stator Winding
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Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in
Table 9.8.
(2)The conditional probability and
utility values of this network were not obtained.
(3)The input for the state probability of the
node,"F5_Pump_Failure" is from another
network, which has not been developed in
this work.
Figure 9.15 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Generator Stator
Coil Cooling Water System
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Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given
in Table 9.9.
(2)The conditional probability and
utility values of this network were not obt
Figure 9.16 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Generator
Hydrogen Cooling System
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: Failure Mode Node
i: Sensor Node
. Action Node
. Utility Node
9.3.3 Probabilistic Diagnostic Network for the Reactor Coolant Pump
In the PWR, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) circulate water through the primary
coolant systems in order to transport energy from the core to the steam generator. The
major RCP components leading to forced outages are classified into bearings, bus, motor,
and seals.
Figure 9.17 illustrates the network for the diagnosis and maintenance for the
bearing components in the RCP. Because they should be lubricated and supported by the
lubrication oil system, the network for the lubrication equipment for RCP bearings is
shown in Figure 9.18. The information on the node, "F3_LBOS_Failure" shown in
Figure 9.17 is obtained from that in Figure 9.18. The node, "F5_Pump_Failure" shown
in Figure 9.18 is obtained from that another network. The states of the node named
"F3_SHT_High Vib" in Figure 9.7 and those of the node, "F2_SHT_High Vib" in Figure
9.20 are transferred from the node, "FI_SHT_High Vib" in Figure 9.21. The diagnosis
and maintenance networks for the motor, the seal, and the shaft are illustrated in Figures
9.19 to 9.21, respectively. Note that the nodes that begin with "S" and end with '"fr"
indicate sensors providing specific frequency from the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) data
processing equipment. Tables 9.10 to 9.14 list the terminology for all nodes presented in
Figures 9.17 to 9.21, respectively.
Table 9.10 Node Terminology of Figure 9.17
Node Name Node Explanation
Fl_BRG_Damage Bearing damage failure mode before action
Fl' BRG_Damage Bearing damage failure mode after action
F2_BRG_High Temp Bearing high temperature failure mode
F2_BRG_High Vib Bearing high vibration failure mode
F3 LBOS Failure Lubrication oil system (LBOS) failure mode
F3_SFTHigh Vib Shaft high vibration failure mode
SBRG Temp Bearing temperature sensor
S BRG Vib Bearing vibration sensor
S_SHT Vib Shaft vibration sensor
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Table 9.11 Node Terminology of Figure 9.18
Node Name Node Explanation
F3_LBOS_Failure Lubrication oil system failure mode before action
F3'_LBOS_Failure Lubrication oil system failure mode after action
F4_OIL_High Temp LBOS high temperature failure mode
F4_OIL_Low Flow LBOS low flow failure mode
F5_LPP _Failure LBOS pump failure mode
F5_HX_Failure LBOS HXfailure mode
S_HX _D Pressure LBOS oil differential pressure sensor across HX
S_HX_D Temp LBOS oil differential temperature sensor across HX
S_Oil_Flow LBOS oilflow sensor
S_Oil Temp LBOS oil temperature sensor
(HX: Heat Exchanger)
Table 9.12 Node Terminology of Figure 9.19
Node Name Node Explanation
Fl_MTR Failure Motor failure mode before action
F'_MTR Failure Motor failure mode after action
F2_GAP_Eccentricity Motor airgap eccentricity failure mode
F2_RTR Failure Motor rotor fracture failure mode
F2_STW_Damage Motor stator winding damage failure mode
F3_INS_Degradation Motor insulation degradation failure mode
F3_STWHigh Temp Motor stator winding high temperature failure mode
SMC Barfr Specificfrequencyfor rotor bar fracture
S_MCGap Specific frequency for airgap eccentricity
S STW PDA Motor stator winding partial discharge sensor
S _STW Temp Motor stator winding temperature sensor
Table 9.13 Node Terminology of Figure 9.20
Node Name Node Explanation
Fl _SEALDamage Seal damage failure mode before action
FI'_SEAL_ Damage Seal damage failure mode after action
F2 _SEAL_Leakoff Seal leakage failure mode
F2 SEAL INJ Failure Sealflow injection system failure mode
S_SEALLeakoff Sealflow leakage sensor
S SEAL INJ Flow Seal injection water flow sensor
S_SEALINJ Temp Seal injection water temperature sensor
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Table 9.14 Node Terminology of Figure 9.21
Node Name Node Explanation
Fl SHTHigh Vib Shaft high vibration failure mode before action
F' SHT High Vib Shaft high vibration failure mode after action
F2_Bent Shaft Bent shaft failure mode
F2_Unbalance Shaft unbalance failure mode
F2 Misalignment Shaft misalignment failure mode
S_ Bent Shaftfr Specific frequency for bent shaft
S_ Unbalance fr Specific frequency for shaft unbalance
SMisalignmentfr Specific frequency for shaft misalignment
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Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in
Table 9.10.
(2)The conditional probability and utility
values are given in Appendix C.
(3)The input for the state probability of the
node,"F3_LBOS_Failure" is obtained from
Figure 9.18.
. Failure Mode Node
: Sensor Node
: Action Node
. Utility Node
Figure 9.17 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the Reactor Coolant Pump
Bearing
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Note:
(1) The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.11.
(2) The conditional probability and utility values of this
network were not obtained.
Figure 9.18 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the RCP Bearing Lubrication System
(RCP: Reactor Coolant Pump)
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I: Failure Mode Node
: Sensor Node
: Action Node
: Utility Node
Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.12.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values of this network
were not obtained.
Figure 9.19 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the RCP Motor
(RCP: Reactor Coolant Pump)
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Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.13.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values of this
network were not obtained.
Figure 9.20 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the RCP Seal
(RCP: Reactor Coolant Pump)
226
i: Failure Mode Node
. Sensor Node
: Action Node
. Utility Node
Note:
(1)The nomenclature for this figure is given in Table 9.14.
(2)The conditional probability and utility values of this
network were not obtained.
Figure 9.21 Probabilistic Diagnosis and Maintenance Nodal Network for the RCP Shaft
(RCP: Reactor Coolant Pump)
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. Failure Mode Node
: Sensor Node
I: Action Node
: Utility Node
9.3.4 Probabilistic Predictive Network for the Generator Core Vibration
1) Network Explanation
Figure 9.22 presents the operator interface module, which shows the network for
monitoring the generator core vibration. This network is a typical prototype model,
which includes the "predictive mode", defined in Section 8.8, evaluated within our
advisory system. This mode is useful in indicating to an operator the likely failure mode
states and sensor outputs should a particular action be taken. Such estimates provide a
basis for comparison of the actual sensor output to the estimations of the advisory system.
Their conditional probability and utility values are given in Table 9.15.
.. .. ... ...  . ........ ......... .. ....... .. ............ ........... .......... ........... .......... ..........
S Core Vib S' Core Vib
Legend,
S_Core_Vib: Generator core vibration sensor state probability distribution before the action,
having Low, Medium, and High ranges
S'_Core_Vib: Generator core vibration sensor state probability distribution after the action,
having, Low, Medium, and High ranges
F_GNR_Core Vib: Generator core vibration failure mode state probability distribution before the
action, having Good, Incipient, and Severe states
F'_GNR_Core Vib: Generator core vibration failure mode state probability distribution after the
action, having Good, Incipient, and Severe states
Action: Action node for transitions between failure mode states by means of the alternative
actions, having No Action, Remedial Action, and Trip Action
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of expected costs and benefits arising from failure mode state
transitions caused by alternative actions.
Figure 9.22 Probabilistic Predictive Network for the Generator Core Vibration
Monitoring in the Operator Interface Module
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Table 9.15 Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.22
(1)Table 9.15.1 Conditional probability values for P(S_Core_Vib/F_GNR_Core_Vib) (2) Table 9.15.2 Conditional probability values for
P(S'_Core_Vib/F'_GNR_Core Vib)
Failure Mode State
Sensor
State
(3) Table 9.15.3 Library of alternative actions in "ACTION" node
Failure Mode State I
Sensor
State
(4) Table 9.15.4 Table for utility values
: No Action State of a Node,
: Remedial Action "Fl '_BRG Damage"
: Trip Action
Utility(5) Table 9.15.5 Conditional probability values f-1500 -5400GNRCore Vib A TION)
(5) Table 9.15.5 Conditional probability values for P(F1'_GNRCore Vib IF_GNRCore Vib ACTION)
Alternative action
State of a Node,
"F'_GNRCore Vib"
0.99 0 0 0.99 0.97 0.95
0.01 0.25 0 0.01 0.1 0.2 0 0.03 0.05
0 0.75 1 0 01 0
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2) Demonstration of Network Execution
Figure 9.23 sequentially shows the task execution of the network shown in Figure
10.7 when the observed "Medium" signal in "the generator core vibration sensor" in
Step I is provided. In Step II the inference engine estimates the state of a node,
"F_GNR_Core Vib" and which alternative action is most advantageous. In Step III, this
recommended action is executed. In Step IV, the states of a future failure mode node,
"F'_GNR_Core Vib" and a future sensor node "S'_Core_Vib", are estimated, given the
recommended action. We conclude that this advisory system can perform this "predictive
interpretative mode" in a systematic way assisted by user friendly interface.
S_Core Vib (C6) Sensor state probability
+ Low
1 Medit 4 Known sensor reading
L. - Hiah I I
Step I: Providing evidence
FGNR_Core Vib (CI) Failure mode state probability
0.0383089 GOOD
0.923382 ICP + The "Incipient" state has the highest value
I 0.0383089 SVR
ACTION (D10)
I I -4293.41 No Act The "Remedial Action" will lead to the
least expected financial loss, $1,816,070.
IM I -3644.43 Trip
Step II: Obtaining a failure mode state probability distribution prior to the
action and the expected utility values
l ACTION (D10) Utility valueI-rI I I 0 No Act
160 .Ri SThe "Remedial Action" is taken
SF'_GNR_Core V
0 Trip I
Step III: Taking the recommended action
Failure mode state probability I I Sens
ib (C9) p 4D S'_Core Vib (C6)
0.86897 Good 0.8"
0.100383 ICP 0.1
).0306471 SVR 0.031
ir state probability
35817 LOW
33156 MED
0274 HIGH
The "Good" state has the highest value The "Low" state has the highest value I
Step IV: Predicting the probability distribution of the states of the future failure
mode and the future sensor reading
Figure 9.23 Task Execution Flow of the Predictive Mode Shown in Figure 9.22
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9.4 Representation of Abnormal Operation Procedures Using the Bayesian
Belief Network Formalism
This section shows how to computerize current abnormal operational procedures
using the BBN formalism. The operational procedures used here have been obtained from
several utilities. Also, this section demonstrates how the HUGIN expert system shell
executes a task using network corresponding to a deterministic rule.
The reason why we go though this work is to make sure that the rule-based
approach is consistent with the Bayesian belief network based modeling approach. Doing
this emphasizes the fact that using the BBN does not exclude the ability to use rule-based
logic. However, the BBN is preferred as a high level reasoning tool because the BBN is
able to represent complex problems that cannot be represented using a set of rules.
Figures 9.24 to 9.27 shows the turbine generator (TG) abnormal operational
procedures and execution task flows using HUGIN expert system shell. Legends below
these figures list terminology for all nodes presented in order to aid understanding of the
overall contents of these networks. Figures 9.28 and 9.29 illustrate the reactor coolant
pump abnormal operational procedure and its execution task flow.
1) Procedure TG-l
The network in Figure 9.24 suggests a trip action if one of parameters described
in Procedure TG-I reaches its setpoint. The sensor nodes have a binary structure where
one subordinate state, "Low" stands for a range below the setpoint and the other, "High"
stands for above or equal to the setpoint. In a node "S_BRGVib", for example, "Low" is
a range below 0.254 mm and "High" is a range equal to or above 0.254 mm.
(Procedure TG-I)
IF one of these generator operating parameters are in the following setpoints,
1) Bearing oil pressure is less than 12psig
2) Bearing vibration is greater than 0.254 mm
3) Stator winding cooling water temperature is greater than 80.4 'C
4) Stator winding cooling water flow is less than 84gpm
THEN perform the trip TG.
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Logic Network
Legend,
S_OIL_Temp: Lubrication oil temperature sensor node, having Low and High ranges
S_BRGVib: Bearing vibration sensor node, having Low and High ranges
S_SCCW_Temp: SCCW temperature sensor node, having Low and High ranges
SSCCW_Flow: SCCW flow sensor node, having Low and High ranges
OR1 and OR2: Artificial nodes, similar to the OR gate used in a fault tree, having Low
and High range
Action: Action node having the alternative actions, No Action and Trip Action
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of the proper action in terms of the probability
distribution of the state of the node, Trip Condition
Trip Condition: A condition node concerning the trip state having, states Yes and Nui
Figure 9.24 Rule-Based Procedure TG-1 Representation Using the BBN Formalism
The action node also has two alternative actions, "Trip Action" or "No Action". A
node "Trip Condition" has also two subordinate states, "Yes", and "No". In order to
avoid cumbersome assignment in many matrices of final status node "Trip Condition",
intermediate nodes "OR 1" and "OR2" are artificially inserted into the network of Figure
9.24. They play similar roles to the OR gate in the fault tree. Finally, a utility node
decides weather the "Trip Action" must be performed. Table shown above indicates that
the proper action is '"Trip" when the value of the '"Trip" action state probability is equal
to unity for the network shown in Figure 9.24. These states and corresponding
probability values for this network are shown in Figure 9.25.
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Table 9.16 Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in
Figure 9.24
(1) Table 9.16.1 Conditional probability values for P(OR1/ S_BRGVib, S_OIL_Temp)
State of a Node, "SOILTemp" State of a Node, "SBRGVib"
State of a 1 0 0
Node, "OR1" 1 1 
(2) Table 9.16.2 Conditional probability values for P(OR2/S _SCCWTemp, S_SCCW_Flow)
State of a Node, "S SCCW Temp " State of a Node, S SCCW Flow
State of a 0 0 1 0
Node, "OR2" 1 1 01 1
(3) Table 9.16.3 Conditional probability values for P(Trip Condition/ OR1, OR2)
State ofa Node,"ORl" State ofa Node,"OR2"
State of a Node,
"Trip Condition" 01 1
(4) Table 9.16.4 Utility values given states of a node, "Trip Condition"
State of a Node, "Trip Condition" Alternative Action
Utility 
-
Value - 10_. 01 1
Figure 9.25 illustrates the task execution flow of using the network shown in
Figure 9.24, assuming that a "High" range signal in the "S_SCCW Temp" node is
observed. In this example, the assumed sensor state values are entered into the system in
Step I. The compilation of the network result shows that the overall system state is in the
trip condition. It is recommended to perform the "Trip" action.
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Sensor state
Known sensor readings Probability The value "I" in the "Yes" state indicates that the
overall system state is in the "trip condition " state
BRG Vib (C4)
Low * Trip Condition (C9)
- High - NO
OIL_Temp (C1) 1 YES
1 Low M Action (D3)
-- High 0 No Trip
SCCW_Flow (C6) Trip
1 Low
-
- High The "Trip" action System state
S_SCCW Temp (C5) is suggested probability UtilityS- Low Value
1 High
Step H: Obtaining the system state and
Step I: Providing inputs providing the corrective action
Figure 9.25 Task Execution Flow of the Network Shown in Figure 9.24
2) Procedure TG-II
Figure 9.26 illustrates the networks for Procedure TG-II. This procedure describes
the load reduction action when we observe an abnormally high stator winding
temperature value.
(Procedure TG-II)
IF any main generator stator temperature reaches its respective alarm point, THEN
decrease main generator load to reduce temperature to less than setpoint
Logic Network
Legend,
S_STW_Temp: Stator winding temperature sensor node having Low and High ranges
Load Reduction: Action node, having the alternative actions,
(No: No action, Yes: Load Reduction)
Utility: Utility node for evaluation of the proper action in terms of the state of the node,
S_STWTemp
Figure 9.26 Rule-Based Procedure TG-H Representation Using the BBN Formalism
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Table 9.17 Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.26
State of a Node, "SSTWTemp" Alternative Action
Node Value - 0 0 1
Figure 9.27 illustrates the task execution flow of the network shown in Figure
9.26.. Once an assumed "High" range signal in the "S_STW_Temp" is entered into the
system, the compilation of this network result recommends the "Load Reduction" action.
Sensor state probability
Known sensor reading
* Load Reduction (D3)
SI I 0 No action The action "Load Reduction"
I I pl Load Reduction 4 is recommended
Utility value
Figure 9.27 Task Execution Flow of the Network Shown in Figure 9.26
(3) Procedure RCP-I
Procedure RCP-I is illustrated in Figure 9.28 using the BBN formalism. This
procedure describes the consecutive actions for letdown heat exchanger outlet
temperature when an abnormal seal injection temperature is observed.
Figure 9.29 illustrates the task execution of the network shown in Figure 9.28.
When the temperature sensor for seal injection water indicates a "High" value above the
setpoint, then the action "Check the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature" in the
node "Action 1" is recommended in Step II. In the case that the letdown heat exchanger
outlet temperature indicates a "High" range signal in Step III, then the advisory system in
Step IV provides the advice "Adjust component cooling water (CCW) to maintain
letdown temperature less than 135 OF" in the node "Action 2".
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(Procedure RCP-I)
(III-1)IF RCP seal injection temperature is greater than 135 "F, THEN check the letdown
heat exchanger outlet temperature.
(111-2) IF letdown temperature is greater than 135 "F, THEN adjust component cooling
water (CCW) to maintain letdown temperature less than 135 "F.
Logic Network
Legend,
S_SEAL_Temp: Seal injection temperature sensor node, having Low and High ranges
S_LHXTemp: Letdown heat exchanger temperature sensor node, having Low and High
ranges
Action 1: Action node having the alternative actions, Yes and No
(Yes: Check the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature, No: No action)
Action 2: Action node having the alternative actions, Yes and No
(Yes: Adjust component cooling water (CCW) to maintain letdown temperature less than135 oF,
No: No action)
Utility 1: Utility node for evaluation of the proper action in terms of the state of the node,
S_SEALTemp
Utility 2: Utility node for evaluation of the proper action in terms of the state of the node,
S_LHX_Temp
Figure 9.28 Rule-Based Procedure RCP-I Representation Using the BBN Formalism
Table 9.18 Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.28
State of a node, "S_SEAL_Temp " Alternative action of a node, "Actionl"
IState of a node, "S_LHXTemp"
Value of a
node, "Utility2"
Alternative action of a node, "Action2"
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*, SSEAL_Temp (CI)
S-
Known sensor reading
from a node, "S_SEALTemp"
- Low
Known sensor reading
from a node, "S_LHX_Temp"
* SLHXTemp (C1_1)I-m - Low
Step I:
Providing the 1st input
Sensor state probability tep III: Providing the 2nd input
after the 1st corrective action is taken
* Action 1 (D3)L EEIIrz il
Utility value
0.5 No
1.5 Yes
The alternative action, "Check the
letdown heat exchanger outlet
temperature ", is recommended
* Action 2 (D3_1)
L 
- 1
The alternative action, "Adjust component
cooling water (CCW) to maintain letdown
temperature less than 135 F", is
1 No
2 Yes
Utility
value
Step II: Recommending the 1st corrective action Step IV: Recommending the 2nd corrective
after the 1st input is provided action after the 2nd input is provided
Figure 9.29 Task Execution Flow of the Network Shown in Figure 9.28
9.5 Summary
In this chapter, representative probabilistic networks for intelligence diagnosis
and maintenance, using the HUGIN expert system shell, are used for advisory decision-
making, given the assumed evidence concerning nominal and pessimistic cases. The
results from the probabilistic network shown in Section 9.3 provide sophisticated,
reasonable numerical evaluations about the uncertain system status inherent in
availability-driven diagnosis for improving economic plant operations. Furthermore,
because in Section 9.4 the actual deterministic operational procedures are computerized
using the Bayesian belief network formalism, both probabilistic and deterministic advice,
provided through interactions with the user-friendly computer operator module, can
ensure the improved operation of the power plant.
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Chapter 10. Testing and Plan for Validation
10.1 Introduction
Our advisory system is developed using a Bayesian belief network (BBN) based
approach for application of intelligent diagnosis and maintenance (D&M). The BBN is a
relatively new discipline in the application of artificial intelligence. Moreover, there is
little expertise available concerning new sensors and most of the advanced data
processing systems recommended through this work because the technical staff of plants
has no relevant operational experience using these systems. However, as new experience
is gained, this new knowledge correlating the set of sensors and power plant system
performance interpreted with the BBN formalism can refine and improve the advisory
system developed in the work reported here.
Thus, a rigorous validation process is essential for ensuring that the BBN-based
advisory system performs as intended. Testing and validating the adequacy and
completeness of this D&M network model are quite complex. This chapter proposes a
framework for testing and a plan for validating the advisory system developed for use
with a BBN. The proposed validation strategy includes the formal testing using
simulated data, field testing, and sensitivity analysis. Also, it itemizes the concrete
elements needed to be refined during system validation. Eventually, these extensive
validation combined with familiarity with the BBN concept of the operator will result in
rapid evolution of more sophisticated models.
10.2 Proposed Validation Strategy
In simple terms, validation is the final step of quality control in knowledge based
systems. Assuming that the inference algorithm and engine are verified, validation
ensures that the system correctly represents and simulates the domain knowledge. The
proposed validation framework considers the process of knowledge acquisition and the
performance of an advisory system. It is very important to maintain objectivity during
the validation process. Validation of an advisory system's knowledge acquisition method
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involves assessment of the knowledge sources used, of the criteria for selecting human
experts, and of the methods used for knowledge elicitation.
First of all, the system's performance is evaluated through formal tests of the
accuracy and the completeness of the knowledge base. Validation by testing requires
prepared test cases. In general, the validation of this system mostly depends upon these
criteria such as comparison against known results, comparison with experts' predictions,
and mock implementation in field testing. If this approach is taken, the system
developers must ensure that the operators have no difficulty in operating the advisory
system, either in the acts of assisting them through the system's operation or by means of
the user interface. In comparison against known results, the results obtained from
simulation of the advisory system should cover historical cases. Once the simulation
results are presented from the system, the comparison with experts' prediction determines
whether they agree or disagree. The resulting answers are compared for agreement with
those of an expert or a panel of experts who try to solve the same problem.
Second, the field tests are recommended as a practical way to validate the
advisory system because they allow the developer to see how the system performs in its
actual operating environment. No matter how extensively the system is validated through
various testing cases, field testing may discover unexpected errors or poor modeling
approaches. Thus, once comprehensive case testing is performed and the system has
been continuously refined, practical field testing should be approached. As the operator
is becoming more familiar with the Bayesian analytical approach through testing
accompanied by newly accumulated operation, field testing will provide more
sophisticated data needed for continual improvement of system's knowledge base.
Finally, sensitivity analysis utilizes techniques similar to those employed when
validating simulation models. In this technique the system is given sets of inputs
containing slight variations. Effects of the variations in the inputs are studied by
observing the resulting changes in the output. This is very useful in BBN based systems
since the effects of changes in the conditional probabilities make the final results more
general.
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As time passes, such systems will likely evolve as result of a natural combination
of improvements in expert knowledge, the use of automatic systems for monitoring,
better sensor validation, and improved testing devices.
10.3 Plan for Model Refinement
The knowledge encoded in the advisory system may not be complete and so the
model itself should be able to be readily modified and extended to reflect changes and
growth in the real world system. This will typically occur incrementally. We suggest that
knowledge and further refinement ensure evolution of a more sophisticated model. This
will enhance the robustness of the advisory system and expand its quality and coverage.
The concrete steps needed to refine in the advisory system are itemized as follows.
10.3.1 Model Structure
Cooperative work with technical experts has also shown that graphical
representation of the BBN's knowledge base facilitates the processes of model validation
and refinement. Such a representation permits easy arrangement of the expert knowledge
and removal of errors and unnecessary repetitions. This graphical representation can
illustrate entire diagnostic algorithm explicitly at a single glance.
In advance, there is a need to check whether the inference algorithm can cover all
important failure modes and relationships between failure modes and the corresponding
sensor set which provides the symptom. As new knowledge is obtained, the model
should readily reflect it. These preliminary minor alterations to the network's structure
will reduce the burden of the next arduous and time-consuming steps taken during system
validation.
10.3.2 Sensor Validation
In the operation of a plant, the process engineer is inevitably confronted by
problems of inaccurate measurements that can severely impair the instrumentation and
control strategy. The successful interpretation from sensor readings and mathematical
validation of redundant and diverse signals for a specific fault should be provided.
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Thus, we emphasize that an on-line advisory system should be supported by a
real-time sensor validation advisory system, which provides an efficient and flexible way
to address every aspect of the on-line data validation, reconciliation, and sensor
monitoring.
10.3.3 Sensor Range Discretization
After the structure of the sensor network has been determined, the sensor output
states are typically discretized into three subordinate states, such as "Low", "Medium",
and "High". This classification depends upon the type of sensor being used and its
application. These ranges reflect general current operational procedures in the power
plant.
However, more mutually exclusive sensor ranges may be used for some
monitoring parameters and also fewer ranges for other parameters. Detailed operational
knowledge, of what can be sensed and how it would be used, should determine this
discretization.
10.3.4 Failure Mode Subordinate State
Mutually exclusive failure mode states are often labeled "Good", "Incipient", and
"Severe" in terms of fault progression. These ranges are artificial concepts created to
relate system fault states to their respective sensor ranges. They usually also reflect the
general operational procedures being adopted in the power plant. As more sophisticated
modeling and high level expertise are used, they may suggest use of more finely
classified subordinate states, as indicated by corresponding ranges of the sensor readings
of interest.
10.3.5 Conditional Probability
We may need to reexamine all the conditional probability values used in the BBN
and to modify them in order to adjust the relative likelihood of nodal states estimated in
each prediction. As the experts in the power plant are not familiar with Bayesian
analysis, the scheme suggested in this work configures a general framework of how to
elicit their expertise. We also translate the expert's knowledge and experience into
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Bayesian terms. Ultimately, as more sophisticated interviews with industry experts are
performed, refinement of the assessment of probabilities used in the network will become
completed.
After assigning such conditional probability values into the system, its network is
compiled and used to provide the probability distribution in the states of all nodes. If
examination of these results shows that concerning some nodes unexpected belief
distributions result in a specific case, the results from the system must be reexamined. In
such a case the experts' knowledge should independently be presented with a series of
case studies where the experts are asked to predict the likely states of specific nodes in
the network. These series of test cases and its predictions compared with the expert's
expected outcomes could also be used to refine our models. Doing this may result in
alterations to the network's structure as well as to the conditional probability values used.
Finally, these results should show that the system's predictions generally lay within the
range of those of the experts.
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Chapter 11. Conclusions
11.1 Results of This Study
So far, existing practical monitoring systems have been designed mainly
emphasizing improved safety. In them, their corresponding safety related operational
procedures are usually computerized by a set of production rules in the form of rule-
based advisory system which usually deals with straightforward deterministic problem
solving domains or stochastic problem solving domains supplemented by use of an
uncertainty factor.
The work reported here broadens the prime concern of nuclear power plant
operations from safe performance to both economic and safe performance through on-
line monitoring and advice. Thus, our work is concerned with the advanced design and
development of comprehensive sensor networks and new advisory systems in order to
improve the operational availability of the turbine generator and reactor coolant pump.
These components have had dominant influences upon lost availability in the recent
operation of pressurized water reactors in United States. The suggested integrated
architecture utilizes comprehensive sensor networks involving modern signal processing
systems, advisory systems for sensor validation, and advisory systems using the Bayesian
belief network (BBN) treatment.
For the development of the comprehensive sensor network used for complex
systems, the work reported here formulates an integrated method incorporating a
structural system hierarchy and a functional system hierarchy, a fault-symptom matrix,
sensor selection criteria, a sensor installation feasibility study, and advanced
instrumentation techniques. The application of this integrated method to reactor coolant
pumps and turbine generators has been judged to be systematic and appropriate as the
result of discussions with system experts. The details of newly utilized techniques are
discussed. They include modern vibration analysis, wear debris analysis, partial discharge
analysis, motor current analysis, generator rotor flux analysis, shaft voltage detector, fiber
optic end-turn vibration monitor, fiber optic temperature sensor, torsional vibration
monitor, hydrogen gas purity sensor, hydrogen dew point monitor, hydrogen leakage
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detector, and water conductivity detector, etc. Once the sensor types and locations within
components are determined definitively after collaboration with relevant experts, they
were incorporated into drawings using a computer aided design tool (e.g., AutoCAD)
program in order to make sure that it would be possible to install the comprehensive set
of recommended sensors on each specific component studied.
The work reported here is also concerned with the development of intelligent
diagnosis and maintenance advisory systems. There are complexities and uncertainties
inherent in such intelligent diagnosis and maintenance. Thus, our advisory system
employs a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) as a high level reasoning tool for
incorporating inherent uncertainty for use in probabilistic inference. This is done
assuming that a sensor validation advisory system configures validated data files for use
in this advisory system.
Keeping with the treatment of rule-based expert systems, we conclude that BBNs
are far superior to the rule-based approach in their ability to treat modeling of
complexities, uncertainty management, systematic decision making, inference
mechanisms, knowledge representation, and model modification for newly acquired
knowledge. Also, the work reported here demonstrates that a rule-based knowledge
representation is simply a special case of a general BBN. We do this by showing how the
general BBN can be reduced to a rule-based representation.
As the first step for developing our advisory system, the HUGIN expert system
shell was selected for use as an inference engine. It has excellent features in terms of its
structure for system use, and the degree to which facilitate operator interactions due to an
easy-to-learn, user-friendly, man-machine interface and modern graphics.
Then, the research reported here formulates how various levels of knowledge are
acquired and synthesized into inference algorithms imbedded within our advisory system
development. The four major steps are formulation of a structural system hierarchy and a
functional hierarchy, refined causal networks, Bayesian belief networks, and Bayesian
influence diagrams.
The prototype diagnosis and maintenance algorithms used are represented
explicitly through topological symbols and links between them in a causal direction. The
output of this network is a diagnostic mapping from sensor readings to a determination of
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the likely failure mode state or system states. The inference schemes used in calculate
the updated probability distribution of alternative component failure states. This
probability distribution is then used for making decisions about taking corrective actions.
This capability is routinely improved as new evidence is entered into the model.
In the work reported here, the results from the probabilistic diagnosis using the
maintenance network, given the assumed evidence, shows numerical reasonable
evaluation of the uncertain system status. Such uncertainty is inherent in availability-
concerned diagnosis when a sensor indicates a value between the normal range and the
safety-related setpoint. Moreover, the deterministic abnormal operational procedure,
computerized using the HUGIN expert system shell, also provides the safety-related
deterministic advice.
Practically, the probabilistic advice, supplied by our BBN-based system,
supplemented by the deterministic reasoning will be applied to the tasks of improved
power plant operations. Finally, the testing and validation strategy suggested in our work
can be aimed at ensuring that newly acquired knowledge and further refinement will
result in creation of a more sophisticated model.
In conclusion, the advanced design and development of comprehensive sensor
networks and Bayesian belief network based advisory systems can lead to the improved
plant operation in new power plants, such as is envisioned for the Korea Next Generation
Reactor (KNGR).
11.2 Suggested Future Work
Needed future efforts include the five items listed below. These are either
extensions of this study or efforts needed to complete the study.
First, the work reported here recommends use of much more comprehensive,
elaborate sensor sets in a new envisioned power plant than is typical. This means that the
value of each sensor should be evaluated in terms of a cost and benefit trade-off in order
to decide whether to utilize a specific new sensor. Thus, a future extension of this study
is to construct a sophisticated mathematical model for evaluating the costs and benefits
using a new sensor.
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Second, several essential features should be incorporated for actual applications
of our advisory system to practical tasks in nuclear power plants. The sensor validation
advisory system should configure on-line validated data files for use in our advisory
system. Also, the real-time capability of retrieving and plotting sequential trends using
modern graphics are suggested in order to assist the operator in diagnosing a situation as
it evolves.
Third, conditional probability values and utility values used in the knowledge
base required for the Bayesian belief network based advisory system were elicited
through discussions with relevant experts. However, concerning new sensors,
recommended in this study, there is insufficient expertise available for computing
conditional probability values. Thus, another future effort that could be that of extension
from this study is to synthesize newly acquired knowledge concerning new sensors and
their corresponding component failure mode states. Furthermore, familiarity with
Bayesian Belief network concepts of the operator can enhance the robustness of the
advisory system.
Fourth, currently our advisory system operates only statically giving advice based
upon the current state of the monitored system. It does this without considering the
pervious system status. This means that its reasoning starts when all the manifestations
of abnormal signals are present at such unique time. However, as the sensor output
changes dynamically over a time interval, the resulting corresponding failure mode
distribution will also change. Thus, the dynamic relationships of the failure mode states
and the sensor signal states could be formulated to reflect behavior during a specific time
interval. The study on this temporal reasoning process, which depends upon the notion of
the time dependence of the system states, could be a valuable future effort.
Lastly, rigorous, extensive testing and validation are essential concerning the
adequacy and completeness of our advisory system. In particular, the field tests are
recommended as a practical way to ensure that the advisory system can perform as
intended in the actual environment. This could perhaps be performed initially using
specialized testing devices such as a plant simulator.
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Appendix A. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in
Figure 9.4 (for Turbine Generator Lubrication Oil System)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.2.)
(1) Table A-i Conditional probability values for P(S_SW_Temp/F7_SWHigh Temp)
State of a node, "F7_SW_High Temp"
State of a node,
"SSW Temp"
(2) Table A-2 Conditional probability values for P(S_SW_Flow/F7_SW_Low Flow)
State of a node, "F7_SW_Low Flow"
State of a node,
"S_SW_Flow"
(3) Table A-3 Conditional probability values for P(S_HX_D Pressure/F6_HX_Fouling)
State of a node, "F6_HX_Fouling"
State of a node,
"S HX_D Pressure"
(4) Table A-4 Conditional probability values for P(S_HX_D Temp/F6 HX_Fouling)
State of a node, "F6_HX_Fouling"
State of a node,
"HXD Temp"
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Appendix A. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network
Shown in Figure 9.4 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.2)
(5) Table A-5 Conditional probability values for P(S_OL_Flow/F4_OIL_Low Flow)
State of a node, "F4_OIL_Low Flow" I
State of a node,
"S_OIL_Flow"
(6) Table A-6 Conditional probability values for P(S_OL_Temp/F4_OLHigh Temp)
State of a node, "F4_OIL_High Temp"
State of a node,
"S_OIL_Temp "
(7) Table A-7 Conditional probability values for P(S_OILPurity/F6_FLT_Clogging)
State of a node,
"S_OIL_Purity"
State of a node, "F6FLTClogging"
0.968 0.02 0
0.032 0.96 0.032
0 0.02 0.968
(8) Table A-8 Conditional probability values for P(F4_OIL_Low Flow/F5_Pump_Fault)
State of a node, "F5_Pump_Fault" I
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State of a node,
"F4 OIL_Low Flow"
Appendix A. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.4 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.2)
(9) Table A-9 Conditional probability values for P(F4_OIL_Contamination/F5_FLT_Clogging) (10) Table A-10 Library of alternative actions
of a node, "Action"
State of a node, "F5_FLTClogging"
I I No Action
: Remedial Action
: Trip Action
State of a node,
"F4_OIL_Contamination"
(11) Table A-11 Conditional probability values for P(F6_SW_Cool Loss/F7_SW_High Temp, F7_SW_Low Flow)
State of a node, "F7_SW_Low Flow" State of a node, "F7_SWHigh Temp"
0.99 0.25 0 0.25 0.05 0
State of a node,
"F6SWCool Loss" 0.01 0.7 0.05 0.7 0.85 0.03
In 0 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.1 0.97
(12) Table A-12 Conditional probability values for P(F5_HX_Failure/F6_HX_Fouling, F6_SW_Cool Loss)
State of a node, "F6_HX_Fouling"
I
State of a node, "F6_SW_Cool Loss"
0.99 0.25 0 0.251 0.05 0 0 0 0
0.01 0.7 0.05 0.7 0.85 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02
0 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.1 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.98
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State of a node,
"F5 HXFailure"
Appendix A. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.4 (Cont'd)
(13) Table A-13 Conditional probability values for P(F4_OIL_High Temp/F5_HX_Failure)
State of a node, "F5_HX_Failure"
State of a node,
"F4_OIL_High Temp"
(14) Table A-14 Conditional probability values for P(F3_LBOS_Failure/F4_OILHigh Temp, F4_OIL_Low Flow, F4_OilContamination)
State of a node, "F4_OILHigh Temp" State of a node, "F4_OIL_Low Flow" State of a node, "F4_Oil_Contamination"
State of a node,
"F3_LBOS_Failure"
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Appendix A. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.4 (Cont'd)
(15) Table A-15 Conditional probability values for P(F3'_LBOS_Failure/ F3'_LBOS_Failure, Actions)
State of "F3_LBOS_Failure" Alternative action
State of
"F3'_LBOS_Failure
0.99 0 0 0.98 0.9 0 1 0.96 0.94
0.01 0.25 0 0.02 0.1 0.2 0 0.04 0.06
0 0.75 1 0 0 0.8 0 0 0
(16) Table A-16 for Utility values of a node, "Utility"
State of "F3_LBOS_Failure"
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Alternative action
I
Appendix B. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network
Shown in Figure 9.14 (for the Generator Stator Winding System)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.7)
(1) Table B-1 Conditional probability values for P(SSTW_PDA/F2_INS_Degradation)
State of a node, "F2_INSDegradation"
0.98 0.037 0
State of a node,
"S STW PDA " 0.02 0.926 0.02
0 0.037 0.98
(2) Table B-2 Conditional probability values for P(S_STW_Vib/F2_STW_High Vib)
State of a node, "F2_STW_ High Vib"
0.985 0.032 0State of a node,
"S STW Vib" 0.015 0.936 0.015
(3) Table B-3 Conditional probability values for P(SSTW_Temp/F2_STW_High Temp)
State of a node, "F2_STW _High Temp"
State of a node,0.975 0.018 0
"SSTW Temp" 0.025 0.964 0.025
0 0.018 0.975
(4) Table B-4 for Library of alternative actions of a node, "Action"
: No Action
: Remedial Action
: Trip Action
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Appendix B. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.14 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.7)
(5) Table B-5 Conditional probability table for P(F2_STW_High Temp)/F3_SCCW_Failure, F3_HAS_Failure)
State of a node, "F3SCCWFailure " State of a node, "F3_HAS_Failure "
State of a node,
"F2_STW_High Temp"
(6) Table B-6 Conditional probability table for P(F1_STW_Damage/F2_STW_High Temp, F2_STW_High Vib, F2_INS_Degradation)
l State of a node, "F2_STWHigh Vib" I State of a node, "F2JNSDegradation" I
State of a node,
"Fl_STW_Damage"
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I State of a node, "F2_STW High Temp"
I • I I | J
Appendix B. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.14 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.7)
State of a node, "F2_STWHigh Temp" I I State of a node, "F2_STW High Vib" State of a node, "F2INSDegradation"
State of a node,
"Fl_STW Damage"
(7) Table B-7 Conditional probability table for P(F '_STW_Damage/Fl_STW_Damage, ACTION)
State of a node, "FlSTW_Damage" Alternative action
I
1 0 0 0.95 0.85 0 1 0.92 0.95
0 0.35 0 0.05 0.15 0.2 0 0.08 0.05
0 0.65 1 0 0 0.8 0 0 0
(8) Table B-8 for utility values of a node, "Utility"
State of a node, "F1'_STW_Damage" Alternative action
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State of a node,
"F ' STW_Damage"
Appendix C. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network
Shown in Figure 9.17 (for the Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.10)
(1) Table C-1 Conditional probability values for P(SSHT_Vib/F3_SHT_High Vib)
State of a node "F3_SHTHigh Vib"
State of a node
"S SHT Vib"
0.96 0.015 0
0.04 0.97 0.04
0 0.015 0.96
(2) Table C-2 Conditional probability values for P(S_BRG_Vib/F2_BRG_High Vib)
State of a node "F2_BRG_High Vib"
State of a node
"S BRG Vib "
(3) Table C-3 Conditional probability values for P(SBRG_Temp/F2_BRG_High Temp)
State of a node "F2_BRG_High Temp"
State of a node
"S_BRGTemp"
(4) Table C-4 Library of alternative actions of a node "ACTION"
: No Action
: Remedial Action
: Trip Action
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Appendix C. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.17 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.10)
(5) Table C-5 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRG_High Tempi F3_LBOS_Failure)
State of a node
"F3_LBOS_Failure"
__ _ 0.08
~--- ...,. --_.__.•._---
0.88
0.04
(6) Table C-6 Conditional probability values for P(F2_BRG_High Vibl F3_SHT_High Vib, F3_LBOS_Failure)
State of a node
"F2_BRG_High Vib"
(7) Table C-7 Conditional probability values for P(Fl_BRG_Damagel F2_BRG_High Vib, F2_BRG_High Temp)
State of a node
"Fi_BRG_Damage"
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Appendix C. Conditional Probability and Utility Values for the Network Shown in Figure 9.17 (Cont'd)
(Note: The node nomenclature is given in Table 9.10)
(8) Table C-8 Conditional probability values for P(F1'_BRG_Damage/ Fl_BRG_Damage, Action)
Alternative actionA state of a node,"FlBRGDamage"
A state of a node,
"F '_BRGDamage"
(9) Table C-9 Table for utility values of a node, "Utility"
IA state of a node,"Fl'_BRGDamage" I Alternative action
I
I Utility value (unit:$1,000) I
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